

FRAGILE STATES INDEX ANNUAL REPORT 2024



**FRAGILE
STATES
INDEX**

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
FRAGILE STATES INDEX

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THE WORLD IN 2024





FRAGILE STATES INDEX

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Very Sustainable

12.7 - Norway (179th)
14.3 - Finland (178th)
15.2 - Iceland (177th)
15.9 - Denmark (175th)
15.9 - New Zealand (175th)
16.2 - Switzerland (174th)
18.6 - Canada (172nd)
18.6 - Ireland (172nd)
18.7 - Luxembourg (171st)
19.5 - Netherlands (170th)
19.6 - Australia (169th)

Sustainable

20.6 - Sweden (168th)
23.1 - Austria (167th)
24.0 - Germany (166th)
25.4 - Singapore (165th)
25.9 - Portugal (164th)
26.1 - Slovenia (163rd)
28.3 - France (162nd)
29.8 - South Korea (161st)

Very Stable

30.2 - Japan (160th)
30.3 - Belgium (159th)
31.1 - Malta (158th)
33.7 - Uruguay (157th)
34.7 - United Arab Emirates (156th)
35.3 - Slovak Republic (155th)
36.5 - Estonia (154th)
37.4 - Lithuania (153rd)
37.7 - Czech Republic (152nd)
37.8 - Mauritius (151st)
39.4 - Costa Rica (150th)
39.8 - Qatar (149th)

More Stable

40.8 - United Kingdom (148th)
41.1 - Chile (146th)
41.1 - Italy (146th)
41.4 - Latvia (145th)
41.7 - Poland (144th)
44.0 - Spain (143rd)
44.2 - Argentina (142nd)
44.5 - United States (141st)
44.7 - Barbados (140th)
45.9 - Croatia (139th)
46.2 - Hungary (138th)
47.4 - Oman (137th)
47.7 - Panama (136th)
48.0 - Bahamas (135th)
49.3 - Kuwait (134th)
49.4 - Bulgaria (133rd)

Stable

50.7 - Mongolia (132nd)
51.0 - Romania (130th)
51.0 - Seychelles (130th)
51.5 - Israel (129th)
51.9 - Antigua and Barbuda (127th)
51.9 - Grenada (127th)
53.1 - Malaysia (126th)
53.5 - Trinidad and Tobago (125th)
53.6 - Botswana (124th)
53.9 - Brunei Darussalam (123rd)
54.1 - Cyprus (122nd)
54.7 - Greece (121st)
55.9 - Albania (120th)
56.2 - Vietnam (119th)
56.9 - Montenegro (118th)
57.0 - Belize (117th)
57.2 - Cape Verde (116th)
57.8 - Kazakhstan (115th)
58.1 - Macedonia (114th)
58.8 - Suriname (113th)
59.1 - Cuba (112th)
59.2 - Guyana (111th)
59.3 - Jamaica (109th)
59.3 - Namibia (109th)

Warning

60.2 - Dominican Republic (108th)
60.3 - Maldives (107th)
60.8 - Ghana (106th)
61.5 - Paraguay (105th)
62.2 - Turkmenistan (104th)
63.2 - Saudi Arabia (103rd)
63.7 - Indonesia (102nd)
63.9 - Samoa (101st)
64.2 - Bahrain (100th)
64.4 - China (99th)
64.5 - Bhutan (98th)
64.7 - Moldova (97th)
64.8 - Uzbekistan (96th)
66.2 - Thailand (95th)
66.4 - Fiji (94th)
66.9 - Micronesia (93rd)
67.2 - Tunisia (92nd)
67.8 - Serbia (91st)
68.0 - Ecuador (90th)
68.1 - Armenia (89th)
68.5 - Sao Tome and Principe (88th)
68.6 - Algeria (87th)
68.7 - Belarus (85th)
68.7 - El Salvador (85th)
68.8 - Morocco (84th)
69.0 - Mexico (83rd)
69.3 - Georgia (82nd)
69.4 - Bolivia (81st)
69.6 - South Africa (80th)

2024 SCORES

Elevated Warning

70.2 - Gabon (79th)
70.3 - Brazil (78th)
71.0 - Bosnia and Herzegovina (77th)
72.0 - Peru (76th)
72.3 - India (75th)
72.5 - Benin (74th)
72.8 - Azerbaijan (72nd)
72.8 - Tajikistan (72nd)
73.8 - Laos (71st)
74.2 - Senegal (70th)
74.3 - Jordan (69th)
74.6 - Lesotho (68th)
74.8 - Timor-Leste (67th)
74.9 - Guatemala (65th)
74.9 - Kyrgyz Republic (65th)
75.1 - Philippines (64th)
75.6 - Colombia (63rd)
75.7 - Tanzania (62nd)
76.1 - Gambia (61st)
76.7 - Nicaragua (60th)
77.6 - Eswatini (58th)
77.6 - Solomon Islands (58th)
78.0 - Nepal (57th)
78.1 - Honduras (56th)
78.6 - Cambodia (55th)
78.8 - Papua New Guinea (54th)
79.8 - Madagascar (53rd)

High Warning

80.5 - Malawi (52nd)
81.1 - Togo (51st)
81.2 - Zambia (50th)
81.6 - Djibouti (48th)
81.6 - Russia (48th)
81.7 - Comoros (47th)
81.8 - Rwanda (46th)
82.6 - Sierra Leone (45th)
82.8 - Egypt (44th)
82.9 - Iran (43rd)
83.7 - Equatorial Guinea (42nd)
84.0 - Türkiye (41st)
84.9 - North Korea (40th)
85.3 - Cote d'Ivoire (39th)
85.6 - Angola (38th)
85.9 - Bangladesh (37th)
86.5 - Kenya (36th)
86.9 - Liberia (35th)
87.0 - Mauritania (34th)
88.2 - Sri Lanka (33rd)
88.4 - Guinea Bissau (32nd)
88.6 - Iraq (31st)
89.0 - Venezuela (30th)

Alert

90.2 - Congo Republic (29th)
91.1 - Uganda (28th)
91.7 - Pakistan (27th)
92.1 - Eritrea (26th)
92.5 - Mozambique (25th)
92.6 - Burundi (24th)
92.7 - Lebanon (23rd)
93.1 - Ukraine (22nd)
94.2 - Burkina Faso (21st)
94.3 - Cameroon (20th)
95.2 - Niger (19th)
95.7 - Zimbabwe (18th)
96.4 - Guinea (17th)
96.5 - Libya (16th)
96.6 - Nigeria (15th)
97.3 - Mali (14th)
97.8 - Palestine (13th)
98.1 - Ethiopia (12th)
100.0 - Myanmar (11th)

High Alert

102.7 - Chad (10th)
103.5 - Haiti (9th)
103.9 - Afghanistan (7th)
103.9 - Central African Republic (7th)
106.6 - Yemen (6th)
106.7 - Congo Democratic Republic (5th)
108.1 - Syria (4th)
109.0 - South Sudan (3rd)
109.3 - Sudan (2nd)

Very High Alert

111.3 - Somalia (1st)

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Affected States



Contextual Risk Tools



Data for Peace



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Response



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Violence

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Practices



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Stakeholder Initiatives



Preventing Gender-Based
Violence



Combatting Violent
Extremism

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Contextual Risk
Assessments



Security Standard
Compliance



Security Risk Assessments



Training and
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A World Adrift: The Failures of the Global Order and What Comes Next

Nate Haken

For nearly two decades, the Fragile States Index has tracked the shifting trends in global stability, offering insight into the underlying drivers of current challenges and risks. Over this period, the world has seen mounting pressures on states and the international system generally. These include the 2007-2008 food riots that swept through dozens of countries, signaling the vulnerabilities of global supply chains, the 2009 financial crisis that shook economies and deepened inequalities, and a doubling of global refugees in the last ten years. Climate change has amplified fragility by fueling migration and resource conflicts, while the COVID-19 pandemic exposed and widened cracks in governance and health systems worldwide. Political upheavals like the January 6 insurrection in the United States revealed the fragility of even long-established democracies, while conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine underscore a weakening of the post-World War II rules-based order. This year's Fragile States Index captures these cascading stresses, and explores how the cumulative impact of economic shocks, climate crises, pandemics, and conflict are reshaping societal values, ideas of national security, and even the international system itself.

Following World War II, the United States led the design and evolution of the international order with the aim of managing global fragility and international conflict. This effort was typically characterized by multilateralism, the intentional reinforcing of international norms, and a focus on collective security. It also facilitated global trade under the theory that economic interdependence creates enough shared prosperity and win-win incentives to encourage widespread buy-in.

Foreign development assistance, although de minimis as a percentage of the US federal budget was a vital tool of soft power to reinforce stability and American influence around the world. Certainly, there were exceptions in the application of these principles; powerful countries benefited disproportionately. Political dynamics shaped their implementation. And internal strife in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Myanmar raised questions as to how well-suited the rules-based order was to effectively address such challenges. But the bipartisan and broad-based consensus was enthusiastic about supporting this international order, despite the resources and commitment required to sustain it.

Eventually, the internal contradictions came to a head, with growing inequality, environmental degradation, and technology-driven consolidation of wealth and power, leading to a rise in populist nationalism, protectionism, and xenophobia worldwide. While on one level this may appear to be a natural counter-reaction to the failures of globalism, this backlash is no remedy but rather fuels a self-reinforcing cycle of instability and division both at home and abroad.

Beneath this backlash lies a deeper, more pervasive force: uncertainty. Advances in artificial intelligence, automation, and biotechnology have upended traditional labor markets and redefined industries, leaving many workers feeling unmoored in a rapidly shifting economy. The conduct of war has also evolved in ways that traditional defense structures struggle to address, with asymmetric attacks,

cyber warfare, and autonomous drone swarms scrambling the balance of power and making conflicts more unpredictable. Meanwhile, the sheer velocity of information—both real and fabricated—has made it increasingly difficult to discern truth from manipulation, further eroding trust in institutions, whether they be in Indonesia, Brazil, or Mexico. In this volatile landscape, many have sought refuge in nationalism, protectionism, and authoritarianism, believing that a retreat from globalism offers stability in an unpredictable world. Yet rather than resolving the uncertainty, these responses have often deepened it, exacerbating economic fragmentation, diplomatic rifts, and new forms of conflict.

This shift, marked by weakened alliances, diminished global restraint, and new power alignments—has created a geopolitical landscape fraught with instability, amplifying fragility in regions like West Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East, and even in powerful countries previously considered stable. This year's Fragile States Index provides a compelling lens to examine these dynamics. In this broader context, the following report looks at climate pressures in Somalia, populism in Niger and India, migration in Tunisia, fragmentation in Burkina Faso, as well as conflict in Sudan, South Sudan, Mozambique, and elsewhere.

Stresses on alliances and regional fragmentation have significantly strained traditional unions, such as ECOWAS and NATO, leaving power vacuums that are often filled by alternative actors. In the Sahel, ECOWAS has struggled to respond to a wave of coups and growing authoritarianism, with countries like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger withdrawing from regional frameworks and aligning with non-traditional partners, including private military contractors such as the Wagner Group. Similarly, NATO's cohesion has been tested by internal divisions, shifting priorities, and challenges in addressing security threats

emanating from Russia. In this context, non-state actors, extremist groups, and opportunistic foreign powers have been emboldened, exacerbating instability.

The global rise of populism and authoritarianism poses a direct challenge to the values underpinning the post-World War II rules-based order, fostering instability and fragmentation. Populist leaders often exploit societal divisions and grievances to consolidate power, such as the scapegoating of migrants and other minority groups. Authoritarian regimes that prioritize control and power consolidation over collective security and human rights not only weaken multilateral frameworks but also embolden illiberal actors worldwide, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of diminished trust in institutions and escalating instability.

While the world has never been devoid of conflict, the erosion of norms, ideals, and principles of proportionality and restraint has marked a dangerous shift, even among those countries who previously purported to uphold them. Tactically, the use of indiscriminate violence or the targeting of civilian infrastructure may offer short-term advantages, such as shifting the balance of power or deterring further aggression by projecting dominance. However, the second-order effects of these strategies are profoundly destabilizing. They not only intensify the collective and individual suffering and trauma, but also undermine international norms, embolden other actors to adopt similar tactics, and fuel cycles of retaliation, displacement, and deepening fragility. This normalization of unrestrained violence risks creating a world where the long-term costs of conflict spiral, leaving even the most powerful states vulnerable to the consequences of a fractured global order.

This dynamic of eroding norms and emboldened illiberal actors does not exist in isolation; its ripple

effects are deeply interconnected with global systems, exacerbating fragility in the world's most vulnerable regions, even far beyond the immediate zones of violence. The cascading effects of displacement, food insecurity, and resource competition often leaves peripheral regions to shoulder the heaviest burdens of global instability.

The war in Ukraine, for example, has disrupted global grain and fertilizer supplies, driving up food prices and worsening food insecurity in already vulnerable regions like the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Similarly, conflicts in Sudan and the broader Sahel, authoritarianism in Venezuela, and natural disasters amplified by climate change in the Caribbean have triggered mass displacement, forcing millions to migrate across borders or become internally displaced, placing immense strain on neighboring states and host communities with limited capacity to absorb these populations. These migration patterns often intensify social tensions, exacerbate resource competition, and overwhelm public services, creating fertile ground for extremism and intercommunal violence. Meanwhile, the destabilizing effects hamper economic recovery efforts in both affected regions and beyond, compounding the challenges faced by peripheral states already struggling to maintain stability and governance.

The 2024 Fragile States Index underscores the complex and interconnected nature of global fragility, illustrating how shocks and systemic vulnerabilities are reshaping the contours of governance, security, and resilience worldwide. From the erosion of international norms to the rise of populism, authoritarianism, and regional fragmentation, the challenges of our time demand a reimagining of how the international community addresses instability. While the traditional rules-based order provided a framework for collective security and economic cooperation, its fractures

have exposed its limitations in addressing the deeper, systemic drivers of fragility.

To move forward, a new paradigm must emerge—one that fosters resilience at both the local and international levels. This means prioritizing community-led governance, ensuring equitable access to resources, and empowering local actors to mitigate and respond to crises. Simultaneously, international frameworks must evolve to complement these local efforts by promoting decentralized, adaptive solutions to shared global challenges like climate change, displacement, and resource scarcity. A resilient world is not one that relies solely on top-down norms and multilateral agreements, but one that invests in the capacity of communities to withstand shocks, builds representative institutions that bridge divides, and enables cooperation across regions and sectors. By integrating local agency with global coordination, the international community can chart a path that addresses the root causes of fragility while creating sustainable systems of governance and security. Without this shift, the ripple effects of today's crises will only deepen the fractures of tomorrow's world.



Facing the Climate Crisis: Somalia's Urgent Need for Adaptation to Combat Fragility



Somalia

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

113.3

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

1st

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

-0.6

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

-1.0

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

-1.3

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Ahmed Mohamed

Since 2008, Somalia has held the inauspicious record of consistently being either the first or second most fragile country on the index. Somalia's scores peaked in 2011 and 2012 after what is considered to have been the worst drought in the country's history, which claimed the lives of 260,000 people. In 2017, another severe drought pushed millions to the brink of starvation, requiring a massive international humanitarian response to avert a repeat of the 2011 famine. Then in the last two years (2023 and 2024), Somalia has once again been the most fragile, due in part to yet another drought caused by the failure of consecutive rainy seasons compounded by La Niña weather patterns and environmental degradation.² Insecurity also hinders water management interventions—such as the dredging of rivers, borehole drilling, and the construction of water infrastructure that could mitigate the effects of drought on the most vulnerable populations. Somalia is a nation grappling with decades of conflict and is increasingly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. The interplay between climate change and fragility in Somalia poses significant threats to the country's security and development.³

Somalia's climate is characterized by extreme variability, with frequent droughts and sporadic floods, leading to food and water shortages, displacement, and heightened competition for

scarce resources. These climatic shocks have dire consequences for the largely agrarian and pastoralist communities, whose livelihoods are directly dependent on rain-fed resources.⁴

Somalia's fragility is rooted in a complex interplay of historical, political, and socio-economic factors. Decades of civil war and political instability have left the country with weak governance structures, pervasive insecurity, and limited capacity to respond to crises. The presence of militant groups, such as Al-Shabaab, further exacerbates the security situation, hindering humanitarian efforts and development initiatives.⁵

Climate change acts as a threat multiplier in this fragile context. The scarcity of water and arable land due to prolonged droughts intensifies competition among communities, often leading to violent conflicts. Pastoralist communities, in particular, face challenges in accessing grazing lands and water sources, resulting in inter-clan clashes and displacement. The displacement of populations due to climate-induced factors also strains urban centers and exacerbates social tensions.

Moreover, the impacts of climate change can indirectly fuel radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups. Al-Shabaab has exploited

environmental stresses to gain support by providing resources and services in areas where the government and humanitarian agencies have struggled to operate. This dynamic illustrates how climate change can deepen existing grievances and contribute to the perpetuation of conflict.⁷

The humanitarian implications of climate change in Somalia are profound. The country hosts a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), many of whom have been displaced multiple times due to conflict and climatic shocks. These displaced populations are highly vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition, and disease outbreaks. Humanitarian agencies face significant challenges in reaching these populations due to insecurity and logistical constraints.⁸

In addition to the imperatives and challenge of humanitarian response, longer-term development efforts in Somalia are also hampered by the impacts of climate change and insecurity. Agriculture, which is the backbone of the Somali economy, is severely affected by increasingly erratic weather patterns. Crop failures and livestock losses undermine food security and economic stability, perpetuating cycles of poverty and dependence on humanitarian aid. Additionally, the destruction of infrastructure, such as roads and water supply systems, by floods further impedes development progress, keeping Somalia locked in a fragility trap, unable to move beyond a vicious cycle of recurrent or protracted crisis.⁹

The 2011 drought in Somalia remains a devastating chapter in the region's history, leading to a famine that claimed the lives of approximately 260,000 people, half of them children. Several factors converged to create this crisis: failed rains, high food prices, ongoing conflict, and weak governance under the Transitional Federal Government. This lack of political stability not only limited the ability of the Somali government to

to coordinate relief efforts but also hindered international agencies, with Al-Shabaab's control over certain areas blocking aid deliveries.¹⁰

By contrast, the 2022-2023 drought, though more severe in terms of lack of precipitation, did not have the same catastrophic humanitarian toll. Improved governance under the Somali Federal Government, which was established in 2012, allowed for better coordination with international partners and more efficient use of early warning systems. These factors played a significant role in preventing a famine of the same scale, even in the face of harsh climatic conditions. This comparison highlights the importance of governance and international collaboration in addressing climate-related disasters.¹¹

Towards a More Sustainable Future

Addressing the nexus of climate change and fragility in Somalia requires a multifaceted approach that integrates climate adaptation, conflict resolution, and sustainable development. Building the capacity of local and national institutions to effectively manage natural resources and respond to climatic shocks is crucial. This involves improving water management, land use planning, and disaster preparedness. Enhanced governance can ensure better coordination and implementation of climate adaptation policies, thereby reducing the risk of resource-based conflicts.¹²

Efforts to mitigate resource-based conflicts through dialogue and mediation are essential. Supporting community-based conflict resolution mechanisms can help prevent violence and promote social cohesion. Traditional dispute resolution practices, combined with modern conflict management approaches, can play a significant role in addressing tensions over resources.¹³

Enhancing the resilience of livelihoods through diversification and sustainable practices can reduce vulnerability to climate change. This includes promoting climate-smart agriculture, providing access to climate information, and supporting alternative income-generating activities. For instance, introducing drought-resistant crops and improving livestock management can help communities adapt to changing climatic conditions.¹⁴

Strengthening the capacity of humanitarian agencies to respond to climate-induced displacement and emergencies is critical. This involves ensuring timely and effective delivery of aid, as well as addressing the long-term needs of displaced populations. Integrated approaches that link emergency response with development programs can enhance the resilience of affected communities.¹⁵

Climate change is a transboundary issue that requires regional cooperation. Collaborating with neighboring countries on water management, early warning systems, and climate adaptation initiatives can enhance resilience across the region. Regional frameworks and agreements can facilitate joint actions and resource sharing, thereby mitigating the impacts of climate change on a larger scale.¹⁶

Several initiatives in Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa region offer valuable lessons on building climate resilience and promoting peace. For example, the Somalia National Water Strategy (2021-2025) addresses climate fragility by focusing on sustainable water management to counter the increasing impacts of climate change. It highlights Somalia's vulnerability to extreme droughts, floods, and water scarcity, which intensify fragility, conflict, and displacement. The strategy emphasizes integrated water resource management and infrastructure improvements to enhance resilience, ensuring water security in

vulnerable regions. By building adaptive capacity, the strategy seeks to mitigate the socio-political tensions exacerbated by climate-induced water stress. The Somali government also developed its National Adaptation Plan (NAP) to prioritize climate adaptation strategies. It outlines immediate actions required to enhance the resilience of vulnerable communities, with a focus on water management, agriculture, and disaster risk reduction.¹⁸

Somalia's National Climate Change Policy highlights the deepening of fragility due to the country's vulnerability to climate change, particularly through droughts, floods, and desertification, which exacerbate resource scarcity and fuel conflicts over land and water. The policy underscores the need for stronger governance and institutional frameworks to manage resources effectively and mitigate the impact of climate stressors. It calls for resilience-building and adaptation strategies to reduce fragility by enhancing communities' capacity to withstand climate shocks.¹⁹

Additionally, the Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS) consortium has implemented community-driven projects aimed at enhancing food security and livelihoods. These projects include constructing water harvesting systems, establishing community gardens, and training locals in sustainable agricultural practices.²⁰

Another notable initiative is the Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme (DRSLP), which focuses on improving water infrastructure, pasture management, and market access for pastoralist communities. By addressing both the environmental and economic dimensions of vulnerability, the DRSLP has contributed to reducing the risk of conflict over resources.²¹

Regional cooperation efforts, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), provide critical climate information and early warning services. ICPAC's work helps countries in the region anticipate and respond to climatic shocks, thereby enhancing preparedness and reducing the humanitarian impact.²²

The international community has a vital role to play in supporting Somalia's efforts to address the nexus of climate change and fragility. Increased funding for climate adaptation and resilience-building programs is essential. Development partners can also provide technical assistance and capacity-building support to strengthen local institutions and improve governance.²³

Additionally, integrating climate considerations into peacebuilding and development strategies can enhance the effectiveness of international assistance. Multi-stakeholder platforms that bring together government, civil society, and international actors can facilitate coordinated and comprehensive responses to the intertwined challenges of climate change and fragility.²⁴

The nexus of climate change and fragility in Somalia presents a complex and urgent challenge, particularly as climate predictions forecast even more severe floods and droughts in the future due to rising temperatures. This increasingly volatile climate scenario exacerbates existing vulnerabilities and intensifies the risk of humanitarian crises.²⁵

Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive approach that integrates climate adaptation, conflict resolution, and sustainable development. The projected climate extremes demand urgent adaptation strategies, as the current improvements in humanitarian responses to droughts since 2011 will not suffice on their own.

Although the humanitarian situation has seen some progress, the escalating climate threats make it clear that adaptation is crucial for Somalia to break free from the fragility trap.²⁶

Strengthening governance, promoting peacebuilding, investing in resilient livelihoods, improving humanitarian response, and enhancing regional cooperation are essential steps. These measures will help Somalia navigate the impacts of climate change and build a more secure and resilient future. While the journey towards climate resilience and security in Somalia is fraught with challenges, the concerted efforts of local communities, national authorities, and the international community can transform climate-related threats into opportunities for peace and sustainable development. As Somalia continues to address this nexus, the lessons learned and successes achieved will provide valuable insights for other fragile states facing similar climate-induced challenges.²⁷



Niger's Fragile Democracy: The Vicious Cycle of Instability, Populist Discontent and Authoritarianism in the Sahel



Niger

TOTAL SCORE

FSI Score 2024

95.2

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK

OVERALL 2024

19th

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE

YEAR-ON-YEAR

+1.8

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM

TREND

-1.0

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM

TREND

-2.7

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Wisdom Tokame

In March 2023, United States' Secretary of State, Antony Blinken hailed Niger as "a model of democracy and resilience" when he visited the country.¹ This was not a mere diplomatic accolade, but a testament to the country's significant strides considering its location in the deeply fragile Sahel region which has been labelled as the "coup belt" of Africa.² The Fragile States Index (FSI) captured the country's positive trajectory, showing a decade of slow but sustained improvement since the 2010 coup and the fallout of war in Libya to the north. However, these gains have been eroded by the lurking strains on Niger's fragile democracy, compounded by persistent socioeconomic and climatic challenges. These issues are further intensified by Niger's role as "a geographic buffer" between violent extremist groups and many countries in Africa.⁴

In this context, a vicious cycle has emerged where the population's loss of confidence in democratic institutions to meet their basic needs has fueled widespread resentment. This dissatisfaction extends not only toward the government but also toward the lingering colonial entanglements with France and the West more broadly, as many believe foreign military and economic interventions have failed to address insecurity and poverty. As a result, anti-Western sentiment has intensified, and this disillusionment has been transferred to regional bodies like the Economic

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), seen as complicit in these external influences. The lack of tangible improvements in security and development has deepened the sense of frustration, pushing people to embrace authoritarian alternatives and reject external actors, further entrenching instability in Niger and the broader Sahel region, culminating in another coup on July 26, 2023, that ousted President Mohamed Bazoum.

Ranking 19th most fragile with a score of 95.2 on the FSI in 2024, Niger recorded its highest worsening year-on-year points change in the last 10 years. Out of the 12 FSI indicators, the country deteriorated in 8 of them. This underscores the centrality of democratic governance and the wide-ranging impact of its breakdown on internal cohesion and security as well as on political and socioeconomic conditions and outcomes.⁵ It also further accentuates the trend of coup d'états sweeping across Africa, particularly in the Sahel region where the consequences of weak democratic resilience have been spilling over from country to country amid a growing incidence of attacks on fragile democratic systems globally.⁶

One of the reasons for the success of the coup d'état in Niger is the declining support of citizens for democracy. This can be gleaned from Afrobarometer data spanning 2013 to 2022 which

reveals: 1) a decrease in citizens' preference for democracy from 66% to 61%; 2) a fall in citizens' satisfaction with democracy from 65% to 51%; 3) a reduction in citizens' rejection of military rule from 54% to 44%; and 4) only 30% of Nigeriens support the idea⁷ that the army should not intervene in politics. It was therefore not surprising that there were street celebrations in support of the coup leaders who have subsequently formed a military junta, named the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland under the leadership of General Abdourahmane Tchiani, who was the head of Niger's presidential guard.⁹ In neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, even worse trends of democratic fragility exist.¹⁰ The strong influence and support of these junta-led states therefore served as both a magnet and a compass in propelling the shift to authoritarianism in Niger which has now been under military rule for more than a year.

With democratic governance toppled, and the withdrawal of Western military forces from the country on the orders of the military junta, there has been a reported surge in insecurity linked to violent extremism around Niger and in the Sahel by the operations of IS Sahel, al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, Boko Haram, and other militant, bandit and armed groups. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, fatalities linked to violent extremist groups are projected to increase by 60% from last year by the end of 2024.¹¹ The deterioration of the country's Security Apparatus indicator, which recorded its highest score in the history of the Index and ranks among the country's top 4 worsened indicators this year, shows the precarity of the situation. This reflects the lingering strains of the coup – unrest, violence and vandalism – which threaten to reinforce the cycle of insecurity and political instability. This can trap the country in deeper fragility and further destabilize the broader region of Africa via spillover effects from the Sahel.

Despite the apparent popular support of the military regime, the Nigerien population is highly fractured. To explain this, some sources point to ethnic polarization in the wider society where the minority Arab group (to which Bazoum belongs) has been labelled as foreigners, as well as to the country's military where recruitment and promotion are reported to be based on ethnic lines.¹² This has manifested in the “pro-junta” and “pro-Bazoum” factions in the country. Some analysts suggest that there are tensions even among Niger's security and defense forces, as some senior officers reluctantly supported the coup d'état and may seize any window of opportunity to overthrow the junta.¹³ These are all reflected in the State Legitimacy and Factionalized Elites indicators which have both retrogressed. While the latter scored 9.9 out of 10, the former's decline highlights the suspension of constitutional order and the low confidence of some segments of the Nigerien population in the junta to deliver any substantial socioeconomic development.

¹⁴

While the junta's core justification of the coup d'état was the continuous deterioration of Niger's security situation and bad economic management, some analysts challenge this claim, pointing to a decade of slow but steady improvements on a number of fronts. Indeed, GDP per capita has increased marginally, with the growth rate in 2022 reaching 7.8% which¹⁶ is the highest since 1978. Also, as Bazoum said in a recent op-ed, violent¹⁷ extremism has been more effectively countered in Niger than in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso and Mali.

¹⁸

Although poverty and insecurity in Niger have inarguably contributed to Niger's fragility for decades, a recent spike in anti-French sentiment and anti-neocolonial rhetoric against Western powers have fundamentally underpinned and fueled the recent wave of coup d'états in the Sahel that have plunged the countries in that

belt into greater political fragility.¹⁹ In Niger, just like Burkina Faso and Mali there has been widespread discontent for the large number of foreign military troops in their territory from countries such as France, other European states and the United States.²⁰ The Nigerien army, for instance, sees such external intervention as undermining their authority.²¹ A majority of the population also believes that not only have such military cooperation failed to effectively deal with the insecurity situation in Niger and the broader Sahel region, but that it has also been leveraged by Western countries such as France to plunder Niger's mineral resources, particularly uranium.²²

This underscores the declining influence of Western powers, who were driven by their narrow focus on security concerns but failed to prioritize the consolidation of good governance and investment in economic and democratic resilience in the wider Sahel region.²³ Further, Western attention to Niger has shifted due to emerging priorities in Europe and the Middle East, diverting focus from the Sahel. To the extent that the United States does seek to revitalize good governance to promote stability through the Global Fragility Act and Strategy, only Coastal West African countries are prioritized, not the Sahel. Meanwhile, Africa's regional bodies such as the African Union and ECOWAS have also been unfocused in addressing persistent political instability in the region. This was evident²⁵ in Niger's case that the condemnations, suspension, economic and financial sanctions, and threats of military intervention employed by Africa's regional blocs, Nigeria, and other Western international actors only strained relations further.²⁶

The result is the weakened credibility of both Western powers and Africa's regional blocs which leaves the entire region more vulnerable to authoritarian governance and malign foreign influence. Credence is lent to this by the announced exit of Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali

from the ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States, coupled with the pivoting of all these three junta-led states toward Russia and others accused of anti-democratic inclinations.²⁷

These are worrying signs that risk entrenching instability in the Sahel, with concomitant implications for the entire continent. In addition, human rights are at serious risk under the military rule, as reflected by the decline in Niger's Human Rights indicator. The State Court created by the junta has recently been used to scrap Bazoum's immunity, which could see him being prosecuted for the alleged crime of high treason.²⁸ The arbitrary arrests of dozens of officials of the ousted government, among other power abuses being perpetrated, can erode public trust in the rule of law and further undermine state legitimacy.²⁹ Furthermore, with the postponement of elections being a common issue under military regimes in the Sahel, Niger's transition to democracy through free and fair elections remains in limbo;³⁰ no concrete roadmap has been adopted despite the three-year timeframe given earlier by the junta.³¹ Apart from jeopardizing the country's democratization, this uncertainty in the face of continuous suppression of political activities, as well as the restriction of civil liberties, threaten to spark political tensions and uprisings that could further destabilize Niger.³²

As important as external intervention in the form of diplomatic measures may be in dealing with a coup d'état, such measures are not only less potent at addressing the underlying issues that cause citizens' faith in democratic governance to wane, but they can become pressures that exacerbate socioeconomic vulnerability. This is reflected in this year's Index where both the External Intervention and Economic Decline indicators of Niger deteriorated. According to the African Development Bank, as a consequence of the economic and financial sanctions imposed on the country, economic activity plummeted to

2.5%, food insecurity and health conditions worsened, and the incidence of poverty increased to 43.9% in 2023.³³ This has in turn increased the number of the Nigerien population in need for humanitarian assistance to 4.3 million people in 2024.³⁴ This has the risk of worsening the precarious situation of low access to basic social services, especially for refugees and internally displaced persons whose population has increased from 280,000 in 2018 to more than 705,000 in 2023.³⁵

There is no gainsaying that Niger is one of the poorest countries in the world, currently ranking 189th out of 193 on the Human Development Index.³⁶ In spite of the favorable economic outlook being projected following the lifting of the sanctions on critical humanitarian grounds, political risks linked to tensions around the military regime can undermine these prospects and deepen the already high levels of extreme socioeconomic vulnerability in the country. Addressing³⁷ fragility in Niger today would therefore significantly revolve around restoring political order within the shortest possible time and reversing the trend of authoritarianism fueling instability in the wider Sahel region. Regional and international actors should pursue sustained diplomatic engagement with the military juntas in the Sahel, build trust, and offer incentives for good democratic governance. This should form the basis for dealing with the Sahel Crisis holistically, where prioritizing democratic resilience involves balancing investments in better governance with security concerns and opportunities for economic development to deliver long-term stability and sustainable development in Niger and other countries in the region.



Fragility and Migration in Tunisia



Tunisia

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

67.2

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

92nd

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+0.8

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

-2.9

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

-10.3

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Armance Ollivier Gouagna

In the past year, Tunisia under President Saïed has faced significant turmoil, marked by economic difficulties, increased migration flows, and a populist response to socio-economic challenges. While the country has transitioned into a major transit hub for sub-Saharan migrants in the past years, recent events in 2023 highlight a worsening human rights record for non-Tunisians, rising anti-migrant sentiment, and civil unrest due to sub-Saharan people being scapegoated for Tunisia's poor economic and social situation. Tunisia's Fragile States Index score rose to 67.2 in 2024, an increase of 0.8 points from last year, moving the country from 96th to 92nd place, indicating a deteriorating situation.

Tunisia has become a crucial origin, destination, and transit point for migrants, surpassing Libya in the number of people departing for Europe.¹ The 2017 migration agreement between Libya and Italy redirected sub-Saharan migrants towards Tunisia. While Libya received funds to establish detention centers and transform its coast guards, migrants continued to enter Tunisia via air travel, solidifying Tunisia's status as a migration hub.² Between January and July 9, 2023, of the 69,599 people who arrived in Italy via Mediterranean Sea routes, 37,720 had departed from Tunisia, 28,558 from Libya, with others from Turkey and Algeria.³ Moreover, the succession of coup d'états, poor living conditions, and the climate crisis in the Sahel

region have prompted thousands to leave their homes in hopes for a better future further north. Tunisian migration groups estimate that there were between 20,000 to 50,000 sub-Saharan migrants in the country in 2023.⁴

The profile of people leaving Tunisia for Europe has also shifted in 2023. While Tunisian nationals accounted for 71% of intercepted migrants in 2020-2021,⁵ sub-Saharan migrants comprised the majority of migrants trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2023. Foreigners made up 78% of the 69,963 migrants intercepted by Tunisian authorities this year, compared to 59% of the 31,297 last year.⁶

This surge in migration has coincided with deteriorating economic conditions, exacerbating anti-migrant sentiment and pessimism among the Tunisian population. Tunisia's modest economic recovery slowed in 2023, with real GDP growth for 2023 at 0.4% percent down from 2.6 percent in 2022, a very low level in comparison with other countries from the Middle East and North African (MENA) region.⁷ Tunisia faces an exceptionally high unemployment rate among higher-educated individuals, ranking within the top 10 globally.⁸ This reality drives significant brain drain and contributes to youth restiveness, intensifying social dissatisfaction and exacerbating migration pressures both

within and out of the country. As economic recovery falters and job opportunities for educated youth remain limited, many are left with few options but to seek opportunities abroad, which further diminishes Tunisia's potential for economic revitalization and social stability. In addition, severe drought and uncertain financing have hindered economic growth, with the unemployment rate rising to 15.6 percent in Q2 2023 from 15.3 percent the previous year.⁹ The inflation rate also went up to 9.5 compared to 8.4 in 2022.

President Saied's populism has been characterized by targeting old elites and opponents while absolving himself of responsibility for the economic state of the country, often blaming "the mafias of the shadow". In 2023,¹⁰ numerous opposition members, activists, and lawyers were targeted by a wave of arrests.¹¹ Saied's repression has also targeted freedom of expression and the press, with journalists, activists and political opponents criminally investigated under Decree 54 on cybercrime issued at the end of 2022, which imposes prison sentences for spreading "fake news" in the media.¹²

In late February, during a National Security Council meeting, Tunisia's head of state alleged that "hordes of illegal migrants" arriving from sub-Saharan Africa were part of "a criminal plan to change the composition of the demographic landscape of Tunisia" blamed them for "violence, unacceptable crimes, and practices."¹³ Saied's claims have been swiftly condemned by international bodies, NGOs, and activists both within the country and abroad, with critics highlighting Saied's scapegoating of migrants for the country's fragile situation and his attempt to temper national pessimism.¹⁴

Following Saied's declaration, the country witnessed a crackdown on sub-Saharan migrants throughout the country. Undocumented migrants

s faced waves of arrests, while verbal and physical violence against them, foreign students and refugees spiked.¹⁵ Many were forcibly evicted from their homes or lost their jobs, prompting them to organize protests in front of the UNHCR and IOM offices in Tunis in March, which police dispersed by force.¹⁶ The situation quickly escalated, particularly in Sfax, where migrants make up a significant portion of the population. On July 3, a Tunisian man was killed in a clash with sub-Saharan migrants.¹⁷ Sub-Saharan migrants were taken by Tunisian authorities to the desert near the Algerian Libyan border, leaving them stranded with little to no access to food or water. At least 5,500 migrants were expelled to the Libyan border and 3,000 to the Algerian border in the latter half of the year, with more than 100 dying due to the harsh desert conditions.¹⁸

The mistreatment of migrants, along with the continued restriction of freedom of speech and the press contributed to a worsening of Tunisia's human rights score from 5.5 to 7.0 in the FSI 2024. Despite being party to multiple human rights conventions, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the UN and African Refugee Conventions, and the Convention Against Torture, the crackdown on sub-Saharan migrants in 2023 has raised significant concerns about the country's ability to become a safe third country and migration hub with respect for asylum and human rights.¹⁹

While Tunisia's migration challenges have been exacerbated by deteriorating economic conditions, increased violence, and rising xenophobia, the government's failure to develop a comprehensive strategy to manage the presence and movement of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa risks worsening the crisis further. Non-enforcement of the existing anti-racial

discrimination law, along with the absence of legal frameworks to protect and respect asylum rights, as Tunisia refuses to pass an asylum law, complicates international organizations' efforts to mitigate the human rights impact on migrant populations.²⁰ Lack of funding is another significant issue, as only half of the UNHCR's required funding for its Tunisia office in 2023 was met. Since 2020, funding has been on the decline, while the number of refugees in the country has more than doubled.²¹ From January to June 2023, only 734 persons received cash assistance by UNHCR, hampering efforts to support the growing refugee population effectively.²²

struggles, fragility in Tunisia is likely to deepen in the coming months. Without the government recognizing people's right to mobility or European countries shifting from an externalization approach to a comprehensive strategy on human rights safeguards, Tunisia's migration problem is likely to persist.²⁸

Additionally, the scale of the current migration flows is too large for border forces to effectively contain. In July, the spokesperson for the Tunisian National Guard, Ben Amor, told *Le Monde*, "The security apparatus is exhausted, lacks resources and has been working continuously for several months."²³ This security-oriented approach to migration challenges is echoed by a growing number of European countries, which use southern Mediterranean states as a buffer zone.²⁴ The externalization of migration control has not reduced the number of migrants arriving in Italy. By contrast, the numbers have only increased and crossing conditions for migrants have worsened.²⁵ Far-right European governments such as Meloni's in Italy, have softened their criticism of Tunisia's poor protection of migrants' rights and increased funding for the country without any safeguards to ensure respect for human rights. In July 2023, the EU signed a new agreement with Tunisia, offering €105 million in aid aimed at combating illegal immigration. Furthermore, on June 19, French Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin pledged approximately €25 million to enhance migration control measures.²⁶

As the influence of the far right on migration policy increases at EU level,²⁷ and given the insufficient efforts at the national level coupled with economic



India at a Crossroads: Populism or Inclusive Governance?



India

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

72.3

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

75th

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

-1.8

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

-2.1

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

-4.6

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Hunter Pease

Group grievance ticked up again this year in India, continuing a long-term trend in the Fragile States Index (FSI).¹ These findings are corroborated by the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide and Dartmouth's Early Warning Project, which has placed India among their top-15 highest-risk countries for multiple years, and at number 5 in their 2023/2024 report.² The report mentions the continuation of "violence against ethnic and religious minorities" in 2023 and the nationalistic government's hate speech against Muslims, along with the lack of government response to Hindu attacks on Muslims and other minorities.

Hindu nationalism and political and sectarian polarization have been a long-term concern in India.³ In 1992, Hindu nationalists destroyed a 16th century mosque, triggering a spate of deadly riots between Muslims and Hindus, and highlighting tensions between the two religious groups.⁴ Since the destruction of the mosque, BJP, Prime Minister Modi's party, and other right-wing nationalistic hardliner groups have pushed for the creation of the Ram Temple atop the same site.⁵ Further exemplifying such polarization prior to Modi's rise, the 2002 Gujarat riots resulted in the reported deaths of hundreds of Muslims by Hindu mobs. During his tenure, Modi and the BJP have intensified anti-minority attitudes by introducing multiple laws restricting minority rights,

utilizing hate speech, and ignoring violent outbreaks between Hindus and minority groups. These actions have led to accusations that under Modi, India's Hindu-led nationalistic government "has mainstreamed sectarian violence." *The Independent* aligns with this viewpoint, noting that, "Modi's decade in power has seen a surge in hate speech against religious minorities, attacks on their places of learning and worship, and mob lynchings." This claim is further supported by Modi's and the BJP's association with the RSS, a Hindu nationalist paramilitary organization. BJP was created as the political affiliate of the RSS in 1980, and Modi was a part of the RSS during the start of his political work.

Additionally, from 2004 to 2022 and into Modi's reign, violence against civilians committed by Naxalite-Maoist rebels was recorded.¹¹ According to ACLED, there were more than 210 clashes between Hindus and Muslims reported during Modi's second term, with one instance recording 50 deaths and leading to accusations that Delhi police enabled Hindu mobs.¹² Following instances of Hindu violence against Muslims, including an attack on a mosque in India's Naga region in 2023, Indian authorities have commonly accused Muslims of starting the violence and responded with "bulldozer justice" to destroy Muslim homes and businesses

s around the physical location of the violent altercations. ACLED has recorded around 100 such instances since 2019, with Hindu properties conspicuously spared in multiple occurrences.¹³

India's government has also introduced various restrictive laws, including a regional uniform civil code accused of replacing minority religious laws with Hindu¹⁴ laws, which the BJP hopes to adopt nationally. In addition, the Indian government, under Modi, retracted Muslim-majority Jammu's¹⁵ and Kashmir's special autonomous status in 2019. A 2019 citizen law amendment enables those in nearby Muslim-majority countries with minority religious affiliation, excluding Islam, to more easily gain Indian citizenship; this policy was eventually implemented in 2024.¹⁶

Further increasing discrimination in the country, state governments and leaders have continuously used hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric towards minorities, particularly Muslims, within India. Hindu nationalists and politicians commonly use the loaded term "jihad" to insinuate bad faith on the part of Muslim citizens.¹⁷ Ministers and other senior BJP officials have also called for violence against minorities, stating that those opposed to a restrictive minority law should be "shot," and the India Hate Lab has noted that hate speech against Muslims reached elevated heights during 2023 Indian state election campaigning.¹⁸ The Lab recorded 668 instances of hate speech against Muslims last year.¹⁹ The Lab also documented a rise in hate speech against Muslims leading up to the 2024 elections, particularly by Modi and in BJP-ruled states.²⁰ During multiple campaign speeches, Modi and other BJP politicians have encouraged polarization between the Muslim and Hindu communities, describing Muslims as "infiltrators," along with other discriminatory phrases, and claiming that if the opposition party won the parliamentary election, they would give money reserved for Hindus to Muslims.

The 2024 election marks Modi's third victory as the country's prime minister, but it was much closer than expected. The BJP was expected to win as many as 400 seats, but only won 240 seats, losing 63 of their former seats.²² While remaining the most popular party in India,²³ following the election the BJP was forced to create a governing coalition with fourteen of its allies, expanding its social and political power outside of its northern stronghold while ending BJP's absolute control of India's parliament.²⁴ According to election analysis, lower-caste and religious minority communities shifted their vote to the INDIA opposition coalition, due to fear of more restrictive policies from another overpowering BJP victory, while high castes in India continued to support the BJP.²⁵ This issue further highlights India's continually high scores in both group grievance and factionalized elites. The unexpected seat losses could also indicate a lessening in BJP's, Modi's, and Hindutva's (Hindu nationalism) popularity, especially among "those with a more cosmopolitan and secular outlook."²⁶

India is now at a crossroads. On the one hand, BJP has had to expand its coalition beyond its core nationalist base which may presage a reduction in polarization. On the other hand, however, opposition parties are now drifting towards a 'Soft Hindutva,' "endorsing some of the more moderate demands of Hindu nationalism and practicing more performative Hinduism, in the hopes of clawing back some Hindu voters from the BJP."²⁷ Depending on which approach is ultimately the most politically effective, power brokers may either double down on Hindu nationalism over the next cycle,²⁸ or take a more inclusive approach to politics and coalition building. As a possible signal of the latter path, the two largest parties in Modi's coalition rely on Muslim constituencies in their states and do not adhere to Hindu nationalism. This could have the positive effect of mitigating

some of the more radical anti-Muslim rhetoric and laws which would otherwise be advanced.²⁹

Given the newness of India's 2024 parliament, the impact of the election outcomes on nationalistic and anti-minority policies and speech in India remains uncertain. BJP must now consult with its partners, contend with coalition members' efforts to appeal to Muslim communities among their voting bases, and compete with an increasingly nationalist opposition in a wider region outside of BJP's historical strongholds. Whether this leads to a net reduction of polarization or an increase in deadly clashes, bulldozer justice, and extremist rhetoric is yet to be seen.

India is at a turning point, with potential paths either towards greater inclusion or a doubling down on Hindu nationalism, atrocities, and restrictions on minority rights. Indices and reports, such as the FSI and the Early Warning Project, underscore these concerns. Lawmakers, influencers, and stakeholders must work together to encourage India to choose the path of inclusion and unity if India is to have a more resilient and prosperous future.



Brazil: A Remarkable Display of Institutional and Democratic Resilience, or Only a Brief Respite from Worsening Fragility?



Brazil

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

70.3

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

78th

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

-4.2

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

-1.5

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

+8.9

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Max Piner

Since 2014, Brazil has struggled with economic and political crises, which have resulted in its fragility score significantly worsening from 61.4 to a peak of 75.8 in 2021.¹ Its institutions and state legitimacy have had to withstand increasing pressures that came to a head in the election year of 2022. President Jair Bolsonaro spent months casting doubt on the veracity of the electoral system and results when he lost against Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva. This culminated in an attack by Bolsonaro’s supporters on the institutions of government in Brasilia on January 8, 2023, a week after Lula took office in scenes reminiscent of the January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol building. Yet, Brazil’s score on the Fragile States Index in 2024 represents a remarkable success story: it withstood the attack and appears to have come out stronger than before, with Brazil the most improved country on this year’s Fragile States Index (FSI).

Former President Bolsonaro, a former army captain commonly described as a right-wing populist, had spent much of 2022 spreading misinformation about the election, particularly casting doubt on Brazil’s highly regarded electronic voting system.² His rise to power had fostered increasingly toxic polarization and extremism that was exacerbated significantly by his election denialism.³ The FSI recorded this, with Brazil’s group grievance score rising from a low of 5.6 in

2014 to 7.5 in 2023.⁴ Factionalized elites also significantly rose from 5.2 the year before his presidency to 6.5 in 2023.⁵

Additionally, throughout his presidency, Bolsonaro consistently attacked Brazil’s institutions, particularly its Supreme Court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF), and the Electoral Court, weakening trust and contributing to the resulting attack in Brasilia. Said attack, in which Bolsonaro’s supporters openly called for a military coup to remove Lula from office, has been described as the most significant attack on state institutions since Brazilian democracy was restored in 1985.⁶

Brazil’s improvement in 2023 is, therefore, a remarkable testament to the country’s institutional and democratic resilience. Following the attacks, 1500 people were arrested, Lula’s position was unchallenged, and no major protests have occurred since.⁷

One reason for this is the effective division of power and strong checks and balances on the Presidency in Brazil. The STF, Electoral Court, and Congress were able to be resilient to Bolsonaro’s undermining and check his abuses of power.⁸ Indeed, the Brazilian court system is notable for its independence, dynamism, and speed of operation following years of pressures

and scandals (including Lula's own imprisonment on since-annulled corruption charges), which has enabled it to build up strong resilience against the machinations of the executive, when necessary.⁹ The Electoral Court, perhaps the most powerful in the democratic world, withstood pressure from Bolsonaro to change the voting system and was able to quickly act and bar Bolsonaro from office for eight years.¹⁰ Other ongoing criminal investigations could lead to Bolsonaro being permanently barred from office.¹¹ This institutional resilience should maybe not be a surprise: The Fund for Peace's State Resilience Index records its democratic institutions as having a relatively high resilience score of 6.8.¹² The years of political crisis since 2014 enabled the courts to adapt and build resilience,¹³ and Brazil's past experience of military coups additionally may have enabled the country's political culture to be more receptive to pro-democracy arguments.¹⁴ The nimbleness and independence of the court system are key differences from those in the US, where court action since the January 6 attack has been much slower.¹⁵

Another factor behind Brazil's resilience is the country's factionalized elites score on the FSI. While it has risen, it is notably lower than that of the US and fell another 0.4 points in 2023.¹⁶ Political elites across the spectrum, including Bolsonaro's allies, quickly recognized Lula's victory, which deflated Bolsonaro's ability to resist the result.¹⁷ Indeed, one of the ongoing criminal investigations alleges Bolsonaro had plotted a military coup to stay in power that fizzled out once it became clear he lacked the military and political support to carry it out.¹⁸ This cross-party support for the democratic result continued into 2023 and following the Brasilia attack with politicians, including the Bolsonaro ally and Acting Speaker of the Lower House, Arthur Lira, joining with Lula, the President of the Senate, and Supreme Court Justice Alexandre de Moraes in a show of pro-democratic unity, condemning the assault.¹⁹ This pro-democratic unity accounts for the

fall in the factionalized elites score in 2023 and is another contrast to the US. This may be because Brazil's party diversity means there was not one party strong enough to support Bolsonaro.²⁰

Bolsonaro's allies in 2023 appeared to turn away from 'Bolsonarismo' and have tacked towards the center and away from right-wing populism in search of moderate support.²¹ Among those advocating for this shift is Bolsonaro's son, Senator Flavio Bolsonaro, who in early 2024 said that the "right has to be more center-right."²² In the fall of 2024, Brazil will hold municipal elections, and whether this moderation holds will be a key story in those elections.²³

Brazil's improvement in the FSI scores included factors other than politics and democracy. There was a significant improvement in the human rights and rule of law score (0.5 points) due to the reversal of harmful acts implemented under Bolsonaro and the end to Bolsonaro's undermining of the court system.²⁴ One example of improvement is in the treatment of Indigenous people, with Lula ushering in a sharp fall in deforestation of Indigenous lands in the Amazon and the STF upholding Indigenous land rights (though Congress has sought to contravene this against Lula's veto).²⁵ Another significant improvement was in the economy, another area that has been in crisis since 2014. Brazil's economic scores improved by 0.5 points in 2023 due to growth surpassing expectations,²⁶ alongside falling inflation and tax reforms praised by the IMF.²⁷ Additionally, despite initial hesitancy over Lula's presidency, investor confidence grew in 2023.²⁸

Yet despite this significant improvement in 2023, whether Brazil has escaped the fragility trap remains uncertain. It remains very possible that 2023 will prove only a brief respite from previous trends. Bolsonaro may be barred from running in

the 2026 Presidential Election, but despite calls for the right to moderate, Bolsonaro personally retains significant support. Polarization remained high in 2023 and has only become more entrenched. In one December 2023 poll, over 90% of voters for both Lula and Bolsonaro did not regret their votes in 2022.²⁹ Indeed, despite Brazil's overall improvement, it is highly significant that one score that did not improve was Group Grievance. This remains static in 2024 at its highest-ever level. The divisions in Brazilian society run very deep.

In this context, Bolsonaro's former political allies are playing a delicate balancing act. They are simultaneously speaking of moderating but still seeking the support of Bolsonaro and his supporters.³⁰ One of Bolsonaro's potential successors as leader of the right, Tarcísio de Freitas, continues to call Bolsonaro the "undisputed" leader of the right.³¹ Like many of Bolsonaro's political allies, Freitas simultaneously is seeking to portray himself as moderate and has put on shows of unity with Lula including a famous handshake.³² Yet while he has condemned the January 8 attack, he and many on the Brazilian right obfuscate Bolsonaro's involvement, claiming it was a leaderless event and not a coup attempt.³³ Alternatively to Freitas, there is a threat of a Bolsonaroist dynastic element forming regarding other potential leaders of the right, including Bolsonaro's wife Michelle and sons Flavio and Eduardo.³⁴ Eduardo has particularly been noted for his extreme views, including calling for a "new AI-5," an act during Brazil's military dictatorship that violently cracked down on human rights and dissent.³⁵

International factors will also be key in Brazil. The global rise of right-wing populism means that Brazil has been an aberration against the trend. The results of elections in the Americas are particularly relevant due to the importance of neighborhood effects on democratic resilience.³⁶ Javier Milei's highly distinct form of right-wing populism in

Argentina is one to watch regarding its influence on the Brazilian right.³⁷ The results of the US election may be even more relevant. While not necessarily the critical factor to Brazil's remarkable resilience in 2023, the Biden administration's backdoor diplomacy was reportedly important to ensure military figures did not support Bolsonaro's planning for a coup attempt or oppose the election results.³⁸

There are already some worrying signs going into 2024. Figures on the right, like Freitas and Lira, did not attend the ceremony marking the one-year anniversary of the January 8 attack, which had been intended as a display of pro-democratic unity.³⁹ Furthermore, Bolsonaro's biggest supporters in Congress have introduced a bill to grant amnesty to the attackers⁴⁰ and have called the investigations into Bolsonaro's actions "political persecution."⁴¹ The influence of social media is also likely to play a critical factor in the future. After Elon Musk criticized Justice de Moraes, Bolsonaroists have adopted Musk as a new hero in 2024.⁴²

Following Brazil's improvement and resilience in 2023, the country now stands at a crossroads. Brazil has the opportunity to reverse years of worsening fragility and build on its remarkable institutional and democratic resilience. Yet there is a great danger that Brazil could return to its previous trend. Only time will tell which path Brazil takes.



Guardians or Threats? The Dual Role of Community-Based Self-Defence Forces in Burkina Faso's Security Landscape



Burkina Faso

TOTAL SCORE

FSI Score 2024

94.2

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK

OVERALL 2024

21st

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE

YEAR-ON-YEAR

+0.2

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM

TREND

+10.3

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM

TREND

+5.2

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Mbuwul Godwill Ankiambom

In 2023, the security apparatus in Burkina Faso was fraught with conflicting and competing forces, including state security forces, extremist groups, and community-based self-defense militias. Further complicating matters, in 2023, Burkina Faso announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel and terminated their military accord with France. This reshuffling of alliances and security arrangements¹ has now opened the door for the involvement of private military contractors like the Africa Corps (formerly known as the Wagner Group)² who have been accused of fueling terrorism in the region.³ This dynamic has exacerbated the country's fragility, with insecurity spiking in 2023. Escalating violence, driven primarily by extremist groups like Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), led to a dramatic surge in attacks on both civilians and security forces. According to ACLED data, fatalities doubled from 4,225 to over 8,492 in 2023. Burkina Faso went from not being listed among the 20 most terror-affected countries in 2017 to being the most affected country in 2023. This marked the first time that a country other than Iraq or Afghanistan has occupied this position since the launch of the Global Terrorism Index in 2011. Since 2019, the country has experienced a steady decline on the Fragile State Index (FSI), with its score worsening from 83.9 in 2019 to 94.2 in 2024. This deterioration has led to its ranking

dropping from 47th to 21st place among the world's most fragile states, as per the 2024 FSI ranking.⁴

The crisis in Burkina Faso, compounded by increasing environmental pressures, has led to an unprecedented surge in internal displacement, with over 707,000 people forced to flee in 2023 alone, resulting in more than 2.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) by year-end, constituting approximately 10% of the population.⁵ This mass displacement underscores the severity of the humanitarian crisis, significantly impacting the lives and livelihoods of countless individuals and families nationwide. According to the 2024 FSI, refugees and IDPs pillar has deteriorated from 6.0 to 8.3 since 2019, reflecting the worsening scale and complexity of the displacement challenge and highlighting critical systemic issues in providing necessary support, security, and sustainable solutions for displaced populations.⁶

Conflict in Burkina Faso has also worsened intercommunal tensions, further hindering the country's short- and long-term development prospects. Due to the limited reach and capacity of state security forces in Burkina Faso, coupled with the pervasive violence and insecurity across the country that has stretched thin state security forces, the state is unable to secure all regions

effectively, therefore creating a vacuum of authority and protection.⁷ This complex dynamic has led to a situation where self-defense militias, while initially emerging as a grassroots response to insecurity, and largely legitimized by the government, have become increasingly intertwined with the broader conflict, simultaneously contributing to both stability and instability within Burkina Faso.⁸ For example, Tenkodogo and its surrounding regions often lack sufficient state security forces, making local groups like the Koglweogo, which intensified their activities in 2015, essential for maintaining order and safety.⁹

These self-defense militias have garnered substantial local support by providing much-needed protection and stability. In 2020, they evolved from informal groups to more organized entities coordinated as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) formed by then-President Roch Kaboré. The group's operations have expanded significantly under Traoré's leadership, with increased activities in the Sahel, East, Center-North, and North regions expanding to nearly 90,000 members under the leadership of Capt. Ibrahim Traoré, who emphasized the need for civilian involvement in national defense, far exceeding the initial target of 50,000.¹⁰ The VDP, in particular, has grown significantly in membership and operational scope, engaging in direct combat with extremist groups and helping to bolster national defense efforts.

The use of community militias has created a double-edged sword in Burkina Faso's counterinsurgency efforts. While these groups extend the reach of the Burkinabe armed forces and provide critical support in regions where state presence is minimal, they have also been implicated in serious human rights abuses and exacerbating ethnic tensions.¹² As captured in the 2024 FSI scores, this has in part exacerbated group grievance and a deterioration in social cohesion. The group grievance pillar, which assesses the extent to which group-based identity

differences contribute to tensions or violence within a society, worsened substantially from 3.9 in 2019 to 5.9 in 2024.¹³ Volunteer militia groups, including the VDP, have been reported to engage in extrajudicial killings, particularly targeting the Fulani ethnic group. The indiscriminate violence by community militias has instilled fear among Fulani members, who now find themselves threatened not only by extremist groups but also by the VDP fighters. The Burkinabe civil society organization, the Collective Against Impunity and Stigmatization of Communities, has reported a dramatic increase in extrajudicial killings of Fulani members, with 250 documented cases in the last three months of 2023 alone.¹⁴ While these groups have been crucial in filling security gaps, their actions have often contravened the state's monopoly on the use of force.

A significant issue exacerbating intercommunal tensions is the poor oversight of the VDP and the lack of inclusivity in their recruitment processes. The VDP law mandates that recruitment should occur at the village level or in the residence area on a voluntary basis, with the approval of local authorities.¹⁵ However, this process has led to the under-representation of pastoralists, nomads, and individuals less connected to village or regional authorities. Reports indicate that VDP attacks against civilians in 2020 were disproportionately directed at Fulani individuals.¹⁶ This targeting has heightened fears that the arming of civilians would exacerbate conflicts and deepen ethnic divisions, particularly between Fulani pastoralists and farming communities like the Mossi, Foulse, and Gourmantche.

The localized recruitment of militia members has had the unintended consequence of reinforcing ethnic, political, and sectarian divisions in society. Initially formed to provide local security, these militias often gain social and political

power, as the government grants them a degree of free rein especially with the passing of a new law in 2020 giving the initiatives a more militarized role. According to article 13 of this law, “VDPs shall enjoy the protection of the state while carrying out their duties,” with the sole objective to “contribute, if necessary, by force of arms, to the defense and protection of persons and property in the VDP’s village or residential area” as captured in article 3.

The implications of citizens taking the law into their own hands are manifold and complex. While militias may provide a temporary sense of security and protection against immediate threats, their actions often blur the lines between lawful self-defense and unlawful vigilantism. This can lead to a cycle of violence, where the very communities these groups aim to protect become embroiled in conflict and retribution. Additionally, any atrocities committed by these militias fuel tensions and polarize society. The state’s monopoly on violence is challenged, leading to a fragmented and unstable security environment. As militias gain power, their actions can lead to widespread human rights abuses, perpetuating a cycle of violence and instability that is difficult to break.

The demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of former VDPs present a long-term challenge. The Burkinabe government now faces the task of disarming and demobilizing another armed group, which, despite being formally contracted for up to five years, remains largely unregulated and outside effective state control. The central authorities’ limited ability to monitor VDP recruitment, member registration, and weapon accounting complicates future DDR efforts, reintegration, and stabilization processes.

Ultimately, the challenge lies in balancing the need for immediate security with the long-term goal of upholding democratic principles and human rights. While militias may provide short-term solutions to security gaps, their existence and actions often

pose significant threats to the rule of law, social harmony, and state legitimacy in the long run. Addressing these issues requires a comprehensive approach that strengthens state institutions, ensures inclusive governance, and promotes community trust in official security mechanisms. Only through such measures can the delicate balance between security, democracy, and human rights be maintained and sustained. When security is compromised, democratic institutions are inherently weakened, as the fundamental stability required for democratic processes is eroded. In such environments, human rights become exceedingly fragile.



Shifting the Paradigm: From Elite Bargains to Inclusive and Civilian Empowerment in Sudan



Sudan

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

109.3

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

2nd

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+3.1

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

+1.3

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

-0.8

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Micaiah Palmer

In 2019, the global community celebrated the civil-society led protests that ousted President Omar al-Bashir from power, viewing it as a turning point for democracy.¹ In fact, Sudan was the fourth most improved country on the Fragile States Index (FSI) that year. However, the celebration masked deeper, unresolved issues that would soon resurface. The underlying structures of elite power, factionalism, and ethnic grievances remained intact, while marginalized groups were quickly sidelined in the formal political process. The military and political elites who had long dominated Sudan's governance used the transition period to consolidate their power, ultimately undermining the civilian-led movement. Meanwhile, international attention quickly waned, with a focus on other foreign policy priorities such as Ukraine, Gaza, and Great Power Competition between East and West, to the point that Sudan's crisis was relegated to a "forgotten war" ² even as violence escalated. ³

The conflict in Sudan has deepened human suffering in the country by expanding the critical humanitarian crisis and toppling Sudan's economy. Since the conflict, over 25 million Sudanese people are in desperate need of humanitarian assistance, and 8.2 million people remain displaced across the country. ⁴ Over 150,000 Sudanese have died in the violence,⁵ and 30,000 injured.⁶ Current levels of violence taking place are comparable to that of the 2003 genocide in Darfur.⁷

In 2023, inflation spiked by 300 percent. ⁸ Critical goods such as sorghum,⁹ wheat flour,¹⁰ goats,¹¹ and water saw substantial price hikes.¹² The Sudanese pound decreased in value by 50 percent,¹³ and Sudan's economy is projected to reach an 18.3 percent contraction in its gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024.¹⁴ More than one-third of the country's population requires immediate food assistance.¹⁵ Estimates of half of the Sudanese population is unemployed and dependent on critical humanitarian aid.¹⁶ Addressing this troubling humanitarian and economic reality in the country requires counteracting key longstanding drivers of fragility in Sudan.

Conflict, mass atrocities, and humanitarian crises are not new to Sudan. However, previous conflicts were largely concentrated in peripheral regions like Darfur, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile, largely involving marginalized ethnic and regional groups, leaving Khartoum as the political and economic center of the country relatively insulated. However, in 2023, for the first time since the 1980s, violent conflict struck at the very heart of Sudan's political power in Khartoum.¹⁷

The violent struggle for political and military power erupted in April 2023 between the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Abdel

Fattah al-Burhan and the head of the Raid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, over tensions in the integration of the RSF into the army as part of the country’s political transition.¹⁸ A year later, the war has sparked the greatest humanitarian and internal displacement crisis in recent history, upended Sudan’s economy, reignited peripheral grievances,¹⁹ and delayed hopes for achieving democratic civilian rule.²⁰

Resolving this unprecedented crisis will require an unprecedented focus on inclusive mediation, civilian resilience, and long-term social cohesion rather than the conventional elite bargaining and top-down negotiations that are typically employed to deescalate such crises. Although women, youth, and civil society were pivotal in driving the 2019 protests that ousted al-Bashir, they were largely excluded from formal negotiations and leadership roles in the transitional government, leaving elite military and political actors in control. By focusing only on the surface-level political victory, the world underestimated the entrenchment of Sudan’s fractionalization and ignored the need for sustained support for marginalized groups and the perpetuation of the cycle of elite domination and group grievances. Failing to include broader sections of society risks future unrest and opposition to any settlement. By ensuring that marginalized groups are fully engaged in the peace process and by supporting local grassroots efforts, a more legitimate and resilient foundation for peace can overcome the elite-driven power struggles that doomed previous transitions.

Although Sudan has remained among the top 10 countries with the greatest levels of state fragility for almost two decades,²¹ in 2023 Sudan rose to become the second most fragile country on the FSI.²² The conflict contributed to a worsening across almost all 12 FSI indicators.²³ While addressing all indicators of fragilities in Sudan is critical, specifically combatting the issues of Factionalized Elites and Group Grievance is vital

for a long-term resolution to the crisis.

Factionalized Elites and Political Transition.

The issue of factionalized elites has remained a driving impediment to Sudan’s political transition and was a key trigger for the current conflict. Competition among elites has undermined the civilian initiatives that began the 2019 revolution. For example, the 2021 military coup and numerous assassination attempts against Sudan’s former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok worked to undermine civilian efforts and interests.²⁴ Sudan’s factionalized elites score has remained the highest point of fragility for the country with a score of 9.6 out of 10 since 2022.²⁵ Internal spoilers to the country’s political transition set the foundation for the severity of the ongoing war. Reports indicate that supporters of the former al-Bashir regime sought to incite competition between the SAF and RSF and spoiled the political process through social media campaigns.²⁶ Creating a more efficient mediation process is crucial to prevent warring parties and key Sudanese organizations from seeking out multiple mediators to advance their own agendas and to manage competing interests among these groups.²⁷

Factionalized Elites and the Security Apparatus.

Elite competition has also exacerbated fragilities in Sudan’s security apparatus. Sudan’s FSI security apparatus score rose between 2023 and 2024 from 8.3 to a 9.3 respectively.²⁸ Growing militarization throughout Sudan’s peripheries is a notable driver of this increase. Approximately 6,000 former al-Bashir regime intelligence operatives connected with the Islamist movement joined the Sudanese Army ahead of the 2023 conflict.²⁹ Localized communal and ethnic militias have also joined the army following calls from the SAF and RSF for civilians to take up arms.³⁰ Early reports cited RSF recruitment initiatives and mobilization of Arab tribal militias and foreign mercenaries in the

Darfur region.³¹ This reflects a splintering of fronts as the conflict has expanded to Sudan's east and west,³² its Blue Nile State,³³ and South Kordofan.³⁴

Factionalized Elites and Group Grievance. The combination of factionalized elites and a worsening security apparatus has also contributed to an increase in group grievances throughout the country. As the war continued, conflicting parties once again adopted long used tactics of stoking group grievances throughout the country's periphery to garner power.³⁵ Recruitment tactics have also included reigniting xenophobic ethnic narratives to mobilize non-Darfuris to fight against who the army describes as "occupiers" and "invaders".³⁶ An uptick in attacks, killings and targeting against Sudan's Black Masalit ethnic group by the RSF and other Arab militias was also reported.³⁷ Targeting has further escalated into expulsion of non-Arabs from small towns like Geneina.³⁸

Factionalized Elites and IDPs. Social cohesion in local communities is also weakening. Prior to the current conflict, local stakeholders interviewed by the Fund for Peace described strong social cohesion as communities actively supported displaced populations.³⁹ However, the same interviewee highlighted diminishing social cohesion⁴⁰ and a rise in hate speech due to increased pressures on scarce resources.⁴¹ Hate speech has manifested both directly against internally displaced persons and has also taken on an ethnic dimension.⁴² An interviewee emphasized:

If this [governance] crisis gets longer, there will be more issues, there will be more IDPs, there will be more hate speech and all these things are things that could be sorted out much earlier. So the cost of intervention in the future will be more higher than [if these problems were addressed] now.⁴³

Factionalized Elites and External Intervention. Finally, the conflict is also influenced by external interests. External competition has contributed to a

worsening of factionalized elites in the country as both the RSF and SAF feel emboldened due to support from a range of international actors.⁴⁴ The SAF is supported with arms from Egypt, Iran, and more recently Russia while the RSF has received weapons from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as Russia.⁴⁵ Reports allege that Russia continues to supply the RSF with weapons in exchange for gold to fund its war in Ukraine, further illustrating the extent to which international interests influence the Sudanese conflict.⁴⁶

Sudan has become the arena for geopolitical competition as some Middle Eastern and African powers vie for land and influence.⁴⁷ As a migration gateway into Northern Africa, the Middle East and Europe, Sudan is a critical linchpin for China's Belt and Road Initiative and a vital location for great powers and Middle Eastern countries to garner regional influence.⁴⁸ While many great and regional powers already had varied degrees of engagement in Sudan, the expanding war in the Middle East has made Red Sea access and the region more critical and the region more competitive.⁴⁹ Conflicting interests among external actors have made it challenging to create a unified international approach to mediating the Sudanese conflict.⁵⁰

The promotion of political inclusion and social cohesion is vital to put Sudan back on the path to peace. Overall, the complexity of the crisis in Sudan can only be resolved through concerted international pressure and local civilian leadership.⁵¹ Since the conflict in 2023, civilian resilience has manifested through international peace advocacy,⁵² coordination of humanitarian assistance,⁵³ and persistence of development projects. Providing civilians with greater international support is crucial to strengthening existing capabilities and resiliencies in Sudan. Amplifying civilian voices and addressing both immediate and long-term needs helps to offset

the legitimacy afforded to armed groups in the country. This work must be done in tandem with increasing humanitarian assistance and aligning mediation efforts to reduce the long-standing fragility in Sudan.



Improvement in Mozambique: A Window of Opportunity or Calm Before the Storm



Mozambique

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

92.5

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

25th

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

-1.5

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

+3.8

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

+6.6

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Noah Branigan

According to the Fragile States Index (FSI), over the last two decades, Mozambique has been growing increasingly fragile due to environmental pressures and conflict. However, in the 2024 edition of the FSI, Mozambique sharply improved from 94.0 in 2023 to 92.5, a larger year-on-year improvement than the country has ever experienced. Whether this proves to have been a window of opportunity or just a blip in Mozambique's continued deterioration will be revealed in time. However, the improvement can be attributed to the effective operations of Mozambique's state security forces, bolstered by the support of the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) and Rwandan forces, in combatting Al Shabaab insurgents in Mozambique's marginalized Northern Cabo Delgado province.¹ Military victories in 2023 have resulted in the recapture of key territories and the stabilization of Cabo Delgado.² This improving stability is underscored by data from ACLED, which reported a decrease in conflict events (500) and fatalities (922) in 2022 to 237 and 300, respectively, in 2023.³ Consequently, Mozambique's security apparatus score on the FSI has continued a longer-term trend of improvement from 7.3 in 2021 to 6.5 in 2024.

Alongside these security gains, Mozambique's economy has also shown notable signs of improvement. The country's economy grew by 5

percent in 2023, driven by the development of the Coral South offshore liquefied natural gas facility and growth within the services and agricultural sectors.⁴ Inflation, which peaked at a five-year high of 9.8 percent in 2022, declined to 7.1 percent in 2023.⁵ These positive economic developments are reflected in Mozambique's 2024 FSI economy score, improving substantially from 7.7 in 2023 to 7.1 in 2024.

While these achievements underscore Mozambique's resilience since the onset of the insurgency in 2017, the root causes of the conflict remain unresolved. High FSI scores in group grievance, economic inequality, and public services highlight these ongoing challenges to stability. While the state's military-focused approach has reclaimed lost territory and significantly improved the state's control over the use of force, it has failed to deliver a decisive blow, evident from a resurgence in insurgent attacks in 2024. In January 2024, attacks were three times higher than in December 2023,⁶ suggesting that insurgent forces are regrouping.⁷ Mozambique now faces a critical juncture: addressing the underlying grievances fuelling the insurgency or risking future instability.

A Simmering Crisis

While the conflict is often framed through the lens of violent extremism, the underlying drivers

of the Cabo Delgado insurgency stem from the long-term socio-economic marginalization of the historically neglected Cabo Delgado province.⁸ Mozambique has recorded a steadily increasing FSI score for group grievance, rising from 5.8 in 2021 to 7.5 in 2024, underscoring an escalating threat to social cohesion. Grievances related to resource access have been compounded by the discovery of extensive natural resource deposits, further intensifying tensions.⁹ The role of group grievance in driving conflict is widely acknowledged. Horizontal inequalities, manifested as socio-economic and political alienation, create fertile ground for the emergence of non-state armed actors, exemplified in Cabo Delgado with the emergence of Al Shabaab in 2017.¹⁰

Access to Resources

Ensuring future stability and mitigating insecurity hinges on addressing grievances held in Mozambique's marginalized northern provinces. The country faces persistent challenges related to the unequal distribution of resources, with resources heavily concentrated in the capital city of Maputo, where the poverty rate was just 11.4% in 2023, while the northern regions remain significantly underdeveloped. Poverty rates in the northern provinces of Niassa (67%), Nampula (65%), Zambezia (62%) and Cabo Delgado (50%)⁴ underscore these pronounced regional disparities. This sense of marginalization has been exploited by Al Shabaab for recruitment and poses a risk of⁵ exacerbating future regional tensions. Mozambique's 2024 FSI economic inequality score of 9.1 underscores the ongoing challenge of addressing these regional disparities, an issue critical to the country's long-term stability and social cohesion.

The mismanagement of Cabo Delgado's natural resources presents another challenge to future stability. Following the discovery of substantial offshore natural gas deposits in 2010, promises⁶ of prosperity for the province have gone unfulfilled.

Instead of reducing inequality, the outcome has seen these issues worsen. While foreign corporations prosper, job creation has failed to benefit local communities, and politicization of resource allocation within the ruling FRELIMO party has kept profits away from the province, further fuelling anger and resentment towards the state.¹⁷ This mismanagement of resources has been identified as a primary driver of the insurgency, yet little has been done to address this significant grievance.¹⁸

Access to Services

Access to public services presents another key challenge Mozambique must overcome to build future stability within its marginalized Northern regions. The provision of public services has remained a long-standing issue for the government, with access to healthcare and education proving a significant challenge in Cabo Delgado and the wider Northern region. This issue is reflected in Mozambique's 2024 FSI public services score of 9.4, underscoring the severity of the issue. The situation has been exacerbated by both the ongoing conflict and natural disasters, with an estimated 1.3 million people in conflict-affected areas requiring humanitarian assistance.

The state's inability to equitably and inclusively deliver essential services including healthcare, education and security¹ in the region has eroded trust and confidence. Political marginalization and a weak state presence have further alienated the population, leaving² them excluded from decision-making processes. Despite recent efforts to re-establish limited services in recaptured areas, allegations of corruption in service delivery and reports of abuses by security forces threaten to undermine any positive benefits these developments may have generated.

Building Future Stability

Despite these challenges, Mozambique has shown a 1.5-point improvement on the 2024 FSI, indicating efforts towards building stability, particularly in Cabo Delgado. However, it is evident that military interventions alone have proven insufficient in resolving the underlying issues, as indicated by the resurgence of militant activity in 2024. Recognizing this, initiatives addressing both resource and service access have emerged. Notably, the Integrated Development Agency for the North (ADIN) was established in 2020 to undertake extensive reconstruction and resilience projects in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and Nampula provinces.

A look at the top of the FSI over the last 18 years suggests that fragility often perpetuates itself leading to a fragility trap, a vicious cycle of recurrent or protracted crisis that undermines governance and development efforts. However, this cycle is breakable. Mozambique has shown marked improvement in this year's FSI. To build on this stability, Mozambique must address deep-rooted horizontal inequalities, support affected local communities, and translate regional economic opportunities into sustainable livelihoods. These strategies offer the most viable solutions to ending the conflict and facilitating the disarmament and reintegration of both active and former combatants. Perhaps the developments of 2023 will be proven to be a brief pause in Mozambique's deterioration, but maybe they will have opened a critical window of opportunity to be grasped in order to reverse these trends and promote resilience before it is too late.



Senegal as a Model: Resisting the Global Slide Toward Autocracy



Senegal

TOTAL SCORE

FSI Score 2024

74.2

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK

OVERALL 2024

70th

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE

YEAR-ON-YEAR

+2.7

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM

TREND

-3.0

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM

TREND

-8.6

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Fatoumata Maïga
Perin Arkun

In 2023, Senegal – a nation often celebrated for its stability and democratic governance in West Africa – found itself facing an unprecedented political and constitutional crisis, exposing vulnerabilities in its political system. ¹ Tensions centered on President Macky Sall’s potential bid for a third term, the legal persecution of opposition leaders, notably Ousmane Sonko, and the postponement of the presidential elections initially scheduled for February 2024. ² These political challenges exacerbated existing economic grievances fuelled by high inflation, unemployment, and the government’s mishandling of critical reforms.³ The crisis triggered mass protests, government crackdowns, and a significant decline in public trust in Senegal’s democratic institutions.⁴ Yet, this crisis also highlighted the resilience of Senegalese society and government institutions through the proactive engagement of civil society. Civil society’s advocacy for justice, mediation efforts, and mass mobilization played a crucial role in promoting democratic norms, reducing tensions, and preventing further instability. Analyzing the political fragility exposed by these events and the erosion of state legitimacy in Senegal—as well as the critical role civil society plays in upholding democratic norms—offers valuable lessons for safeguarding democratic institutions and processes in established democracies that may face similar constitutional or governance challenges.

State Legitimacy and Fragility in Senegal’s Political System

Senegal’s 2023-2024 political crisis reflects a sharp decline in state legitimacy, as demonstrated by several key factors, including constitutional manipulation, the repression of dissent, political violence, and widespread socio-economic grievances. These issues are further highlighted by Senegal’s worsening Fragile State Index (FSI) score, dropping from 80 in 2023 to 70 in 2024, driven by increased fractionalized elites, a decline in state legitimacy, and human rights concerns.⁵

Constitutional Manipulation and Confidence in the Political Process:

One of the central issues undermining state legitimacy was the potential manipulation of the constitution to allow President Macky Sall a third term in office.⁶ A 2016 referendum reduced the presidential term from seven to five years, which, Sall’s supporters argued, reset his term limits, potentially enabling him to run in 2024.⁷ This controversy was a major driver of the protests, as many Senegalese viewed the move as an erosion of democratic principles.⁸ By postponing the elections from February to December 2024, Sall further fueled suspicions about his intentions. While he ultimately announced in July 2023 that he would not seek re-election, the damage to public trust

had already been done.⁹ According to Afrobarometer data, public confidence in the political process had declined for several years.¹⁰ While 84% of Senegalese supported democracy in principle, only 48% expressed satisfaction with its functioning in 2022 – a sharp decline from 64% in 2014.¹¹ This reflects growing disillusionment with the government's handling of key political issues, a sentiment exacerbated by the constitutional manipulation and election delays. Indeed, many citizens viewed Senegal as less democratic than it had been five years prior, and only 24% expected improvements in the next five years.¹² The FSI score for state legitimacy dramatically worsened, rising from 3.7 in 2023 to 7.2 in 2024, further indicating public dissatisfaction.¹³

Legal Persecution of Political Opposition and Public Dissent:

The legal challenges against opposition leader Ousmane Sonko further undermined the credibility of Senegal's political system. Sonko's conviction in 2023 for "corrupting the youth," following earlier rape charges that were ultimately dismissed for lack of evidence, effectively disqualified him from running in the 2024 election. His supporters and many independent observers viewed the charges as politically motivated, intending to sideline one of President Sall's most prominent challengers. This perception of legal persecution followed by the dissolution of Sonko's party, Patriotes Africains du Sénégal pour le Travail, l'Éthique et la Fraternité (PASTEF – Senegalese African Patriots for Work, Ethics and Fraternity), led to widespread protests and worsening tensions between the government and opposition forces in July 2023. This period marked one of the most violent political episodes in Senegal's recent history.¹⁶

Throughout 2023, the government intensified its crackdown on media and dissent, suspending independent outlets, such as Walf TV, for covering opposition protests and arresting journalists and political opponents.¹⁷ In May 2023, journalist Maty

Sarr Niang was arrested for Facebook posts critical of the government, while in July, journalist Pape Alé Niang was detained after reporting on Sonko's arrest.¹⁸ The government's repressive actions are reflected in the FSI's human rights indicator, which worsened from 4.6 in 2023 to 4.7 in 2024,¹⁹ highlighting the shrinking space for free expression and political dissent. The FSI further captures this repression through the factionalized elite's indicator, which rose from 7.0 in 2023 to 7.4 in 2024,²⁰ reflecting the intensifying divisions among political actors and the concentration of power within the ruling party.

Political Violence: The political turmoil in Senegal was accompanied by violent protests and the use of excessive force by security forces. Between March and June 2023, demonstrations against President Sall's attempts to delay the elections escalated, with security forces using tear gas, rubber bullets, and even live ammunition to disperse crowds.²¹ In June alone, 16 deaths were reported, and over 500 people were arrested.²²

The government's heavy-handed response to protests, including the deployment of the military in June 2023, further inflamed tensions, undermining the state's legitimacy in the eyes of many Senegalese citizens. Political violence, particularly the use of lethal force against protestors, marked a significant departure from Senegal's traditionally peaceful political environment and contributed to the country's deteriorating security and political situation. This is reflected in the FSI's security apparatus score, which rose from 4.5 in 2023 to 4.6 in 2024,²³ signaling growing instability and the militarization of state responses to political challenges.

Social and Economic Grievances: Although Senegal's FSI economy score improved slightly from 7.5 in 2023 to 7.2 in 2024,²⁴ this remains a high figure by the country's historical standards,

reflecting persistent economic discontent that was a major driver of the 2023 protests. The country's economic situation, exacerbated by the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, high inflation, and youth unemployment, left many citizens frustrated with the government's inability to address pressing economic issues.²⁵ While the Senegalese economy showed resilience with an estimated growth of 4.3% in 2023, inflation remained a significant burden.²⁶ The reduction in purchasing power, particularly in urban areas, intensified social grievances, with many citizens unable to cope with the high cost of living.²⁷ In fact, inflation, particularly in food and energy prices, disproportionately impacted the poor, and the national poverty rate remained high at 9.9%.²⁸

Moreover, youth unemployment remains a critical issue, with around 4.12% of the workforce aged 15-24 actively seeking work in 2023.²⁹ The inability of the formal job sector to absorb young graduates, further fuels frustration,³⁰ particularly among urban youth, who have been at the forefront of protests. This economic frustration provided a potent backdrop to the political unrest, as protesters linked their economic grievances to the broader failures of the political system.

Protecting Democracy and Rule of Law

Senegal's vibrant and strong civil society coupled with its deep democratic culture and resilient electoral institutions all played a critical role in ensuring adherence to the established electoral calendar. This culminated in the peaceful transfer of power to Bassirou Diomaye Faye following the March 24, 2024, presidential elections.³² Since its independence, Senegal has held presidential elections every five years, demonstrating its strong commitment to and respect for democratic processes.³³ As such, when President Sall decided to postpone the February 25, 2024, presidential elections by decree, the Constitutional Council, essentially the supreme electoral court, rejected

the postponement, ruling Sall's decree unconstitutional, and requested that a new date be set for the election, underscoring its commitment to the rule of law.³⁴ The Council also withstood political pressure to revisit the cases of excluded candidates who did not meet the qualification criteria, bolstering its position as a "defender of constitutional democratic principles".³⁵ Civil society was also a major force in advocating for and protecting democratic norms and principles in the lead up to and during the elections.

Civil society undertook numerous initiatives, such as: establishing digital platforms to facilitate communication and mobilize citizens; forming groups to advocate for citizens' concerns and impact political decisions; and organizing forums to raise awareness and mobilize people to ensure the electoral calendar was followed.³⁶ Civil society also arranged meetings with presidential candidates to discuss their proposals and through press articles kept the public informed on electoral matters.³⁷

Supported by international NGOs, the Collective of Civil Society Organizations for Elections (Collectif des Organisations de la Société Civile pour les Elections, COSCE) – a coalition of 12 civil society organizations working on domestic election observation since 2012 – served as a "neutral facilitator" on several occasions to help ease tensions and support political dialogue during times of crises.³⁸ For example, when civil unrest ensued following the trial of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, COSCE and its partners worked to maintain dialogue between opposing parties.³⁹ They also engaged religious leaders such as the Caliph-General of the Mourides whose insistence for peace and dialogue with political leaders played a key role in alleviating tensions.⁴⁰

In response to Sall's decision to postpone the

elections, civil society organizations quickly mobilized to establish a platform, Aar Sunu Elections (Protect Our Elections), comprising a broad alliance of over 100 organizations.⁴¹ By utilizing its wide-ranging networks, COSCE also brought together a large segment of civil society groups including, “...unions, academics, social movements, religious leaders, election observers, and other civil society organizations” under the Aar Sunu umbrella. Complemented by young protestors and the efforts of religious leaders, Aar Sunu Elections advocated for safeguarding democratic principles in Senegal. Their actions ranged from pressuring the Sall administration to adhere to the law and carry out the elections in a timely manner, to working with the media, and raising awareness at the national and international levels about Senegal’s constitutional crisis. They organized⁴³ the “Great Million March of Dakar” and also sent a public letter to the President as part of their advocacy efforts.⁴⁴

The March 24, 2024, presidential elections were characterized as being “secure, transparent and credible,”⁴⁵ with 61 percent voter turnout,⁴⁶ ending with the peaceful transfer of power to the opposition. This outcome is a testament to the pivotal role that Senegalese civil society played and the strength of Senegal’s democratic institutions. Senegalese civil society organized and mobilized to collectively defend their democracy and rule of law, demonstrating how a strong, resilient civil society can serve as a counterweight to potential abuse of power during times of political crisis. Senegal survived its constitutional crisis and offers lessons and hope for other countries in the region and around the world grappling with similar challenges.

Lessons Learned for Protecting Democracy in Times of Crisis

Senegal’s 2023-2024 political and constitutional crisis was a multifaceted challenge driven by

political manipulation, legal persecution, economic hardship, and government repression. The decline in state legitimacy, reflected in its worsening FSI scores, highlights the fragility of Senegal’s political system. However, the resilience of civil society, combined with a commitment to constitutional integrity by the judiciary, offers a roadmap for restoring democracy in Senegal and other fragile states. Senegal’s political crisis offers important lessons for protecting and promoting democracy and maintaining stability in fragile states. This includes:

Constitutional integrity. The judiciary plays a critical role in safeguarding democratic principles by enforcing constitutional norms, particularly around term limits and election schedules.

In Senegal, the judiciary stood firm by rejecting delays to the electoral process, acting as a crucial check on executive power. This impact was amplified by civil society, which mobilized to hold the executive accountable and pressure compliance with judicial decisions. However, if the judiciary has already capitulated to executive influence, the ability to uphold these norms becomes significantly more challenging, placing an even greater burden on civil society. Together, an independent judiciary and a vigilant civil society form a powerful defense against constitutional erosion, helping to prevent any slide toward authoritarianism.

Political inclusion. Senegal’s longstanding legacy of political inclusion has historically been a source of resilience, fostering a culture of democratic engagement and pluralism. However, this inclusive tradition faced a critical test during the 2023-2024 crisis when the government’s perceived targeting of opposition leaders signaled a potential shift away from these norms. This perceived threat to political inclusion sparked a strong backlash, as citizens

who were accustomed to open political competition and freedom of expression mobilized in defense of these values. This context shows that when inclusive practices are threatened, societies with a history of political openness are likely to rally in defense, demonstrating how established norms of inclusion can serve as a powerful force for stability and democratic resilience.

Economic justice. Economic equity is a stabilizing force in any society. In Senegal, rising inflation, youth unemployment, and unequal growth aggravated political discontent. Democracies under pressure should prioritize inclusive economic policies that address systemic disparities, ensuring that marginalized communities feel the benefits of growth and reducing the economic drivers of unrest.


Civil society. A vibrant civil society is crucial for democratic resilience, especially in times of crisis. In Senegal, civil society organizations mediated conflicts, advocated for democratic principles, and mobilized citizens to demand accountability. Supporting robust and independent civil society organizations helps bolster democratic norms and provides a crucial check on executive overreach.

In a time when many countries around the world—both fragile and established democracies—face a concerning slide toward autocracy, Senegal's experience offers a valuable example of resilience. Despite pressures and setbacks, the response of Senegal's judiciary, civil society, and citizens shows how democratic institutions and norms can be defended even amid significant challenges. The backlash against perceived threats to political inclusion and constitutional integrity highlights the power of established democratic values to mobilize societies to protect their freedoms. Senegal's story serves as a reminder that while autocratic trends may be growing globally, a committed judiciary, engaged civil society, and vigilant citizenry can collectively resist these pressures and uphold

democratic governance.



Bridging the Divide: Toward a Sustainable Resolution in Balochistan



Pakistan

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

91.7

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

27th

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+1.8

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

-2.5

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

-11.3

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Zainab Ali

The Baloch insurgency, one of Pakistan's most persistent conflicts, traces its roots to events following Balochistan's integration into Pakistan in 1948. The Baloch people—an indigenous ethnic group with a distinct language, culture, and tribal identity—have expressed grievances, economic neglect, and limited political representation.¹ Their demands for autonomy and local control over natural resources have contributed to recurring tensions, including during Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government in the 1970s and again after the 2006 death of prominent Baloch leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti, in a military operation.² Bugti's death intensified calls for greater autonomy, with many Baloch activists pointing to development initiatives such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as emblematic of ongoing economic and political marginalization. This complex situation continues to underscore the intersecting issues of economic disparity, security challenges, and nationalist aspirations in Balochistan.

Over a decade into the insurgency, Pakistan faces a crisis exacerbated by the central government's reliance on militarization and intensified group grievances in Balochistan. While inclusive political dialogue is a necessary piece of the solution, the intricate dynamics of Balochistan's political climate and Pakistan's institutional inertia have obstruct such efforts so far. The government's focus on securitization over negotiations, combined with maximalist Baloch goals has created gridlock,

further complicated by Balochistan's natural resources and geopolitical significance. Pakistan's Fragile States Index (FSI) score has improved significantly since 2015. However, in recent years there has once again been an uptick in fragility. From a score of 90.8 in 2018, the score rose to 91.8 in 2023, indicating a worsening trend, particularly in group grievances and security concerns. A multifaceted approach that addresses security concerns, economic disparities, and the political grievances of the Baloch people could be essential for fostering a sustainable resolution.

Pakistan's reliance on militarization in Balochistan has strained relations between Baloch groups and the central government. Over the past decade, Pakistan's Security Apparatus Indicator on the FSI has reached as high as 9.9 out of 10, reflecting the military's deep role in governance. This reliance can create a feedback loop where institutional inability to protect civilian interests fuels resistance to reforms, increased separatist sentiments, and heightened security threats, leading to further militarization.³ This vicious cycle contributes to ongoing conflict and state fragility, reinforcing among Baloch nationalists the belief that peaceful solutions are ineffective. Additionally, the military's suppression of Baloch demands for autonomy, and related human rights concerns, further question the state's legitimacy.

Human rights violations in Balochistan have become a persistent issue, with widespread reports of enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and the suppression of political dissent.⁴ In recent years, Pakistan's Human Rights Indicator score on the FSI has worsened, reaching a high of 7.8 in 2024, signalling a decline in the protection of human rights across the country. Over five thousand Baloch civilians have been reported missing since 2006. Human-rights activists such as Karima Baloch⁵ and journalists such as Sajid Hussain⁶ have died in this conflict, and despite calls for independent investigations of their deaths, little progress on their cases has been made. Human rights violations in Balochistan are not solely attributed to the state; Baloch insurgent groups have also been reported to be responsible for abuses. Some of these groups have targeted civilians, especially non-Baloch settlers, with acts of violence, while also forcibly recruiting individuals and taking hostages.⁷

Despite supplying 40% of Pakistan's natural gas, many Baloch homes lack access to this essential resource.⁸ Balochistan's exclusion from its resource wealth has fuelled economic inequality and a sense of disenfranchisement, widening the divide between the province and the central government. The UN Development Program's Multidimensional Poverty Index reveals that Balochistan's poverty rate is more than double the national average at 71.2%.⁹ The province faces high school drop-out rates, wide gender disparities in education and health, inadequate water supply, food insecurity, and insufficient infrastructure.¹⁰ As the largest province in Pakistan by area, but with the smallest and sparsely distributed population, Balochistan's complex demographics and challenging geography make it difficult to provide public infrastructure and to implement healthcare and education programs. However, the unequal distribution of benefits from development projects, such as the Gwadar Port and CPEC, remains a significant point of contention.

The presence of military personnel and checkpoints to protect CPEC stakeholders has reinforced the perceptions that Balochistan's strategic and economic value is being exploited for national interests without adequate reinvestment into the province and that the Baloch locals are considered a threat. The development of the Gwadar port has further strained relations, due to the compulsory acquisition of land, while most of the economic benefits of the project are seen to be accrued by Chinese and Punjabi workers.¹¹ This sense of exploitation fuels demands for greater autonomy and control over local resources, often escalating into demands of a separate state.

The Baloch population is not homogenous. Tribal dynamics and leadership play significant roles in shaping their perspectives. Some tribal leaders push for separatist agendas, while most work within the framework of the Pakistani state and support remaining within Pakistan, especially if reforms addressing economic inequality, political representation, and local governance are implemented. One indicator of the Baloch people's willingness to stay with Pakistan is their participation in elections. Despite the insurgency, political parties that seek more provincial autonomy within the state's framework, such as the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) and the National Party, have contested and won seats in provincial and national assemblies.¹² This suggests that a large portion of the Baloch population believes in engaging with the political process rather than seeking outright secession. Similarly, many Pakistani civilians support addressing Baloch grievances, as seen in the backing for Baloch protesters in Islamabad led by Dr. Mahrung Baloch.¹³ This unity and amity amongst civilians could be a critical step towards an inclusive political dialogue.

The enduring conflict in Balochistan reflects a

complex interplay of economic marginalization, political exclusion, and human rights concerns, further strained by a long-standing reliance on military presence and fragmented nationalist aspirations. To foster a sustainable resolution Pakistan must embrace a more inclusive and equitable approach that prioritizes human rights, economic investment, and political dialogue. Addressing disparities on resource distribution, facilitating local governance, and engaging with diverse Baloch voices through a genuine, open dialogue—including neutral mediators—are essential steps to building trust. A comprehensive strategy that balances security with socioeconomic development could lay the groundwork for a unified and resilient Pakistan.



South Sudan's Election Delay: A Gamble for Stability or a Path to Chaos?



South
Sudan

TOTAL SCORE
FSI Score 2024

109.0

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2024

3rd

(OF 179 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+0.5

(POINTS SINCE 2023)

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

-3.2

(POINTS SINCE 2019)

LONG-TERM
TREND

-3.9

(POINTS SINCE 2014)

Hani Ahmed

The decision to delay South Sudan's first-ever national election, initially planned for December 2024, underscores the precarious balance between maintaining stability and exacerbating fragility. By pushing the election to 2026, the government aims to avoid the dangers of an election held without a solid consensus on the rules or robust institutions to mediate the process. However, as President Salva Kiir approaches 20 years in power by 2026, this delay could deepen political disillusionment, entrench the dominance of the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), and provoke more unrest among rival factions. South Sudan's already volatile political climate, which contributes to its ranking as the world's third most fragile state three years running, could deteriorate further with this postponement.

The government's rationale for postponing the election is that it needs more time to implement the peace agreement and build electoral infrastructure. This gamble offers another window of opportunity for the government to fulfill prerequisites like drafting a permanent constitution, establishing functional and adequately funded electoral institutions, unifying security forces, and guaranteeing safety for all citizens.¹ However, this will only be beneficial if tangible, inclusive steps are taken to address growing public grievances.

While it can be dangerous to rush elections in a country unprepared for them, continuous delays pave the way for potential impatience, public dissatisfaction, disillusionment, and rebellion, further dividing the country's political elite. South Sudan's score of 9.2 out of 10 for factionalized elites in the Fragile State Index (FSI) shows that the peace deal in 2018 hasn't mended the widening cracks among their political class. Recently, a new round of talks began between the government of national unity and opposition forces in the diaspora—who are not part of the 2018 peace deal—in Nairobi, Kenya. Critics say the talks paused in July are mere attempts by President Salva Kirr to diminish the power of his rival, Vice President Riek Machar, by incorporating opposition into the government fold.²

These political tensions have exacerbated South Sudan's deteriorating economy, which is primarily driven by its reliance on oil exports that have been disrupted by conflict in neighboring Sudan. South Sudan's economic lifeline, oil, relies on Sudan's pipelines and ports, which remain damaged from the conflict.³ The prospect of oil exports has been a unifying force for South Sudan's rival political elites, aligning them toward a shared objective.⁴ Exports have not resumed for months after the disruption,⁵ deepening economic and political tensions.

As oil revenue diminishes, the likelihood of violence between Kiir and Machar, two key figures in South Sudan's politics and their camps, is high.

Shrinking oil revenue worsens inflation and limits the government's ability to provide basic services, further fueling the country's humanitarian crisis. A significant concern is that the slide of the South Sudanese pound could deteriorate the humanitarian catastrophe, given that the population largely depends on imported food. Out of the country's population of 12 million people, 7.1 million people face a hunger crisis, and the influx of more than half a million returnees, refugees, and asylum seekers from Sudan degenerated the hunger crisis.⁶ With plummeting petrodollars and reduced buying power of donor funds,⁷ IDPs and refugees from Sudan are forced to compete for scarce resources, further challenging the fragile peace in the country.

Climate change is also playing a big role in exasperating South Sudan's fragility. Since its independence in 2011, the country has suffered from severe droughts (2011, 2015) and floods (2014, 2017, 2019, 2020, 2021, and 2022), resulting in high numbers of fatalities, displacements, and loss of livestock, which have severely impacted people's livelihoods.⁸ Ongoing political deadlock impaired by the postponement of the election risks sidelining efforts to address these climatic and environmental challenges. Thus, failure to address these issues could intensify inter-communal conflicts and deepen the humanitarian crisis, adding another layer of pressure to the country's fragile peace.

The government contends that postponing the election offers a crucial opportunity to implement the remaining protocols in the Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), such as the permanent constitution process, the national census, and the registration of political parties. However, if these

initiatives are perceived as superficial or self-serving, the chance for lasting peace will be lost, and the country risks descending into violence again.

Given the heightened risk of escalation, South Sudan's government must take immediate and concrete steps to prevent further instability. Priority should be placed on strengthening key institutions, including the judiciary, electoral bodies, and security forces, while intensifying negotiations and building consensus among political actors, ethnic groups, and civil society regarding the transition period. These efforts are crucial to paving the way toward a more stable, sustainable future, where inclusive governance can begin to address longstanding grievances.



Listen to the People: The Influence of Group Grievance on State Fragility

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In a discussion about the state of the world, American poet and civil rights activist Maya Angelou shared her belief that the root cause of many problems is, “Ignorance, of course. But most, polarization.”¹ She saw polarization as a way for groups to dehumanize each other, thereby paving the way to enact structural, direct, or cultural violence against each other. Our political and social worlds are rapidly polarizing, and a key to stability lies not in silence, or in calling people out, but in reaching across the divide to call people in, so that collectively we can address grievances and injustices, lest they tear apart our societal fabrics. A way to address this polarization is to listen to and address group grievances. When left unaddressed, group grievances work to undermine state legitimacy while hindering governance. These factors stem from discrimination, a sense of injustice, and marginalization based on gender, ethnicity, religion, and other social groups. They increase social tension, while eroding social cohesion. They encourage extremism, impact the economy negatively, and attract international intervention, because unresolved tensions can destabilize regions, prompting international actors to step in to restore order, protect human rights, or safeguard their own strategic interests. Groups typically form around social identities like youth, gender, religion, minorities, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. Often these identities intersect with each other and compound grievances within and between groups. Members of these groups tend to experience similar injustices or rights violations, and consequently feel a sense of collective solidarity. However, group grievances are much more than a laundry list of complaints; they

manifest as collective resentment, degrading mental health, and difficulty transcending an “us” vs. “them” perspective.

Below are the states that scored in the top seven for group grievance. While they range in terms of state fragility scoring, their troubling scores on group grievance indicate a need for deeper, richer investigation into why groups are aggrieved and what authorities are or are not doing to address it. While all the indicators point toward issues that contribute to state fragility, group grievance is a significant red flag. When groups feel wronged, communication breaks down, trust diminishes, and conflict is allowed to fester.

Sudan is ranked 2nd most fragile on the Fragile States Index, but scores the highest in group grievance. It has been in the top eight for this indicator since 2006. With a history of violent conflict and mass atrocity, environmental catastrophe, coup, and a current civil war, humanitarian conditions have declined, and groups are highly aggrieved. As the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) compete for military and political control of the country, peace negotiations have collapsed and hundreds of Masalit people in western Darfur have been killed.² Hospitals have been destroyed, disease is rampant, and gender-based violence against women and girls has increased dramatically.³ Not only do these issues impair governance and lead to further corruption, they have already led to an increase in social tension. This ongoing conflict has

attracted international attention for good and ill; Libya and Türkiye have tried to mediate, Iran has supplied the SAF with drones, and the United Arab Emirates is directly supporting the RSF financially, militarily, and politically. Whether or not these interventions contribute to peaceful outcomes or influence fragility will largely rely on which groups are empowered, and which groups' grievances are addressed.

Saudi Arabia ranks at 103rd for state fragility, but 2nd for group grievance. While overall fragility has oscillated between worsening and improving over the last ten years, the group grievance score has been steadily worsening. While other indicators may be improving, it is critical to keep an eye on group grievance as it can undermine the state's legitimacy in the long run. In 2023 alone, human rights defenders, activists, and public intellectuals who criticized the state were arrested and continue to serve long prison sentences. Peaceful expressions on social media were punished harshly, even with death, and hundreds of Ethiopian migrants and asylum seekers were killed by Saudi Arabian forces. Additionally, in 2022, the first codified law on personal status enshrined male guardianship over women, thereby stripping women of agency while also facilitating domestic violence.⁴ When swaths of the population feel that their state is unjust, it will not only erode legitimacy, but will also weaken the state's ability to maintain order and enforce laws.

Bahrain is a strategic ally and neighbor to Saudi Arabia, and has also seen a steady worsening in group grievance score. Ranked 100th for fragility, it is 3rd for group grievance due to restrictions on expression and assembly, unfair trials, frustration over worker's rights, and religious restriction.⁵ Notably, human rights defenders Abdulhadi al-Khawaja and Abduljalil al-Singace, who have become symbols for human rights and political reform in the country, have faced hardship in prison and inadequate medical care.⁶ Political repression

and unfair treatment contributes to a fragile social fabric which worsens when coupled with the government's heavy-handed response, negatively affecting political stability and legitimacy. Bahrain is majority Shi'a, yet the political and economic elite are Sunni, which may cause further division if grievances are allowed to fester. Twice last June, Sunni-lead Bahraini authorities blocked worshipers at a Shi'a mosque shortly after also detaining prominent Shi'a cleric, Sheikh Mohammad Sanqoor. This came on the heels of Saudi Arabia executing two Shi'a Bahrainis. Not only could these actions deepen sectarian divides, particularly with the Shi'a community in Bahrain, and further erode social cohesion, it has created social unrest and could lead to challenges to state legitimacy.

Myanmar faces a mix of political, ethnic, and gender issues that contribute to its group grievance score. 4th in group grievance, Myanmar is 11th in fragility and has only slightly improved in the last several years. The 2021 military coup left parts of the country under martial law with catastrophic human rights and humanitarian consequences. The junta's systematic human rights abuses of arbitrarily arresting, torturing, and killing civilians, coupled with the 600,000 Rohingya living in apartheid conditions, have given much cause for grievance concerning state fragility. Under the military junta, women and girls have experienced a rise in sexual violence and gender harassment and are particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence. Additionally, women report a decline in political participation and education.⁷ These ongoing human rights abuses, long standing conflicts involving ethnicity, and social division have deeply eroded trust in the state.

Iran faces a potent mix of political and gender grievances. Ranked 43rd in fragility, Iran is 5th in group grievance. An authoritarian theocracy, the

state rules through a Shi'a interpretation of sharia law that increases social tension and erodes social cohesion. Not only does Iran rank 5th for group grievance, it is also the at the top of the list for human rights abuses and a fragile rule of law. Harsh restrictions against women and the LGBTQI+ community causes severe social tension. This tension exploded when Mahsa Jina Amini was taken into custody by the morality police and killed while in custody. The “woman, life, freedom” protests illustrated the consequences of group grievance on the global stage, but Iranian authorities killed hundreds and arrested thousands in response. Not only did the state dismiss these expressions of grievance, it expanded hijab laws and continues to target family members of protestors. High use of the death penalty and severely restricted freedom of assembly and expression further exacerbate grievance.⁸ Additionally, Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 85 years old and is rumored to be in declining health which, coupled with unaddressed group grievances, could mean that Iran is facing a quickly smoldering tinder box, if not handled constructively.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ranks 5th in state fragility and 6th in group grievance. Despite a slight improvement over the last five years, civilians continue to bear the brunt of the ongoing armed conflicts. Millions of Congolese are displaced, and authorities not only suppress the media and political opposition but have failed to end cycles of corruption and impunity.⁹ Gender based violence has consistently shaped the conflict in DRC. In 2023 alone, women and girls have reported a dramatic increase in sexual violence, five times more than in 2022. It is one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a woman or child.¹⁰ When sexual violence is used in armed conflict, it represents a breakdown of societal norms and effective state control. This cycle of violence and instability further undermines the legitimacy of the government and entrenches state fragility.

Bhutan's fragility indicators have dropped significantly across the board in the last two decades, placing it at 98th on the Index, but remains 7th for group grievance. Touting its philosophy of “Gross National Happiness” Bhutan is seemingly dedicated to the wellbeing of all citizens, particularly vulnerable groups. However, the group grievance score may indicate that this overarching ideology has yet to be fully realized by some groups. Politically, Bhutan has worked toward gender equality with policies aimed at sexual and reproductive health, yet gender-based violence remains a significant issue. Inadequate finances and harmful gender stereotypes and behaviors prevent many of these policies from being implemented.¹¹ Bhutan's legal system is based in aspects of Buddhism, like compassion, yet political prisoners who were arrested in the 1990s for “offences against the Tsa-Wa-Sum (king, country and people)” continue to live in poor conditions with inadequate access to basic needs like food, water, and medical care.¹² Preceding this, the 1980s and 90s also saw the expulsion and forcibly renounced citizenship of 100,000 Lhotshampa from the country, while more became political prisoners, resulting in a protracted and forgotten refugee crisis.¹³ This, alongside harassment of non-Buddhists and constrained religious practices, creates tensions and weakens the social fabric. Additionally, Bhutan's press freedom has dropped dramatically, from 33rd to 90th in the world. This is largely due to self-censorship from online harassment campaigns.¹⁴ While these grievances may not seem as dire when compared to those in Sudan or the DRC, for example, they illustrate the importance of understanding group grievance as related to the respective state and culture and how they can specifically undermine a state's fragility in that specific case.

Intra-state politics and socio-cultural issues in the 21st century are growing increasingly

polarized. This polarization, coupled with unaddressed group grievance, can lead to dysfunctional political, social, and economic relationships, which contribute to unpredictability, social and violent conflict, and instability. This is particularly so with cascading and compounding crises. For example, the United States had more than enough resources to sufficiently deal with the Covid-19 crises due to its strong health systems, high GDP, and public services, but instead experienced a disproportionately high infection and mortality rate.¹⁵ Polarization along political lines created distrust and led to the spread of misinformation, inconsistent local and state responses, and a fragmented national strategy. Communication broke down and with it a cohesive response. As the 2021 Fragile States Index Annual Report shows, this was due to cascading and compounding effects from the virus along with an economic downturn, protests, and violence, which led to the US having the largest year-on-year worsening in fragility overall.¹⁶

Resiliency is not necessarily the absence of group grievance, but rather the way a state and society address the grievance. Canada's Truth and Reconciliation Commission addressing Indigenous rights, Chile's constitutional process in 2019 allowing citizens to voice their concerns about inequalities and social injustices, the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States that led to nationwide discussions as well as policy decisions about racial injustice, and New Zealand's response to the 2019 Christchurch mosque shootings that quickly led to stricter gun laws as well as set the stage for nationwide discussions about religious tolerance, are examples of how states can actively address grievances, while working toward resiliency.

While these examples are not perfect nor are they a panacea for fragility, by including women, youth, the LGBTQI+ community, religious, ethnic, and other groups in social and political decision-making

discussions, social tension eases and cohesion between groups can grow. Groups are then better able to handle major shocks, like a worldwide pandemic or extreme weather events, and support each other across divides instead of polarizing. Better understanding and addressing group grievance also significantly influences peacebuilding practices and upstream violence prevention efforts. Take, for instance, The Great Green Wall Initiative,¹⁷ launched by the African Union in 2007, to address desertification in the Sahel. This initiative engages the local communities in planning efforts, addresses food and water shortages aimed at reducing grievances, encourages the incorporation of traditional knowledge, and requires multiple states to work together collaboratively. This is a powerful model to not only address grievance, but also integrates environmental restoration with social and political stability.



ENDNOTES

Facing the Climate Crisis: Somalia's Urgent Need for Adaptation to Combat Fragility

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Listen to the People: The Influence of Group Grievance on State Fragility

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THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

In a highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises emerge from ethnic tensions; some are civil wars; others take on the form of revolutions; and many result in complex humanitarian emergencies.

Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin.

Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. A mixed approach integrating qualitative and quantitative data sources is needed to establish patterns and trends. With the right data and analysis it is possible to identify problems that may be simmering below the surface. Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The

Fund for Peace (FFP) is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index — and the social science framework and data analysis tools upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, FFP collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

ORIGINS OF THE FSI: THE CAST FRAMEWORK

The genesis of most indices is to begin with a concept of what needs to be measured, followed by the development of a methodology that hopes to perform that measurement. The FSI followed a very different trajectory, whereby the idea for the Index occurred subsequently to the development of its own methodology.

The FSI traces its origins to the creation of FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which was developed in the 1990s as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers

and dynamics in complex environments.


The CAST framework has been widely peer reviewed, and the continued usage of the framework by many of those same professionals, as well as now by local civil society and community groups in conflict-affected areas, is testament to the framework's enduring relevance. In 2004, the CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, as researchers wished to determine whether state fragility could be assessed and ranked at a national level using the existing framework.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE FSI ANALYTICAL PROCESS

Though at the ground level the CAST framework is applied using various practices such as individual incident reporting and observation by field monitors, the sheer volume of data to be analyzed at an international level required a different approach. To that end, technology was employed to enable researchers to process large volumes of data to perform the national level assessments that feed into the FSI.

Based on CAST's comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. Content Analysis: Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-



language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.

2. Quantitative Data: Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase. Depending on the degree to which the Content Analysis and the Quantitative Data agree, the provisional scores are confirmed, or where they disagree, are reconciled based on a set of rules that dictate allowable movements in score in the event of disagreement between the two data

streams.

3. Qualitative Review: Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.

These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source are checked by the others. Though the basic data underpinning of the Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources. Final indicator scores for each country are then produced from this process. A panel review is then conducted by the research team of the final Index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user. Though an index inherently ranks different countries – making some more fragile than others – ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state's resiliency. To that end, the following section outlines what each indicator seeks to measure in

the Index – as well as providing guiding questions for deeper levels of analysis and inquiry by the user.



UNDERSTANDING THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 179 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace’s proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

INTERPRETING THE FSI SCORES

The 2024 FSI, the 19th edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2023 and December 31, 2023 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2024 are not covered by the 2024 Index. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. FFP attempts as much as possible to de-emphasize rankings, as it is our firm belief that a country’s overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country’s performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time. Hence, our analysis focuses more on specific indicator scores or trend lines over time rather than just rankings. Ultimately,

the FSI is an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis by civil society, government, businesses and practitioners alike — to understand more about a state’s capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience.

COHESION INDICATORS		
Security Apparatus	Fractionalized Elites	Group Grievance
ECONOMIC INDICATORS		
Economic Decline	Uneven Development	Human Flight & Brain Drain
POLITICAL INDICATORS		
State Legitimacy	Public Services	Human Rights & Rule of Law
SOCIAL + CROSS-CUTTING INDICATORS		
Demographic Pressures	Refugees & IDPs	External Intervention

THE INDICATORS: COHESION

SECURITY APPARATUS



The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus indicator also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a state can include a “deep state”, that may consist of secret intelligence units, or other irregular security forces, that serve the interests of a political leader or clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Questions to consider may include:*

Monopoly on the Use of Force

- Is the military under civilian control?
- Do private militias exist against the state?
- Is there paramilitary activity?
- Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry

- Are the police considered to be professional?
- Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

Force

- Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms

- Is there a high availability of weapons?
- If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

FACTIONALIZED ELITES



The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinkmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors in the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions and, where elections occur, will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class).

**Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

Questions to consider may include:*

Representative Leadership

- Is leadership fairly elected? Is leadership representative of the population?
- Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- Is there a political reconciliation process?
- Is the military representative of the population?

Identity

- Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- Does hate speech via radio and media exist?
- Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- Does cross-cultural respect exist?

Resource Distribution

- Is wealth concentrated in hands of a few?
- Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through taxes?

Equality and Equity

- Are the laws democratic or reasonable?
- Is the system representative of the population?

GROUP GRIEVANCE



The Group Grievance indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group's role in society and relationships with other groups. This history may in turn be shaped by patterns of real or perceived atrocities or “crimes” committed with apparent impunity against communal groups. Groups may also feel aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence to which they believe they are entitled. The indicator also considers where specific groups are singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression, or where there is public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power “illegitimately,” which may manifest itself in the emergence of fiery rhetoric, such as through “hate” radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political speech.

Questions to consider may include:*

Post-Conflict Response

- Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one needed?
- Have groups been reintegrated?
- Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- Are victims of past atrocities compensated (or is there a plan to)?
- Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted?
- Has amnesty been granted?

Equality

- Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?

Divisions

- Are there feelings/reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- Is there history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of religiously motivated violence?

Communal Violence

- Is vigilante justice reported?
- Are there reports of mass violence and/or killings?

THE INDICATORS: ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC DECLINE



Economic Decline indicator considers factors related to economic decline within a country. For example, the indicator looks at patterns of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. It also takes into account sudden drops in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment, and any collapse or devaluation of the national currency. The Economic Decline indicator further considers the responses to economic conditions and their consequences, such as extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs, or perceived increasing group inequalities. The Economic Decline indicator is focused on the formal economy as well as illicit trade, including the drug and human trafficking, and capital flight, or levels of corruption and illicit transactions such as money laundering or embezzlement.

Questions to consider may include:*

Public Finances

- What level is the government debt?

Economic Conditions

- How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- What is the level of productivity?
- What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?

Economic Climate

- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- How do experts view the economy?
- Is the business climate attractive to Foreign Direct Investment?
- Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Economic Diversification

- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT



The **Uneven Economic Development** indicator considers inequality within the economy, irrespective of the actual performance of an economy. For example, the Indicator looks at structural inequality that is based on group (such as racial, ethnic, religious, or other identity group) or based on education, economic status, or region (such as urban-rural divide). The Indicator considers not only actual inequality, but also perceptions of inequality, recognizing that perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievance as much as real inequality, and can reinforce communal tensions or nationalistic rhetoric. Further to measuring economic inequality, the Indicator also takes into account the opportunities for groups to improve their economic status, such as through access to employment, education, or job training such that, even if there is economic inequality present, to what degree it is structural and reinforcing?

**Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

Questions to consider may include*:

Economic Equality

- *Economic Equality: Is there a large economic gap?*
- *Is the economic system discriminatory?*
- *Does economic justice exist?*
- *Are hiring practices generally fair –legally and perceived?*
- *Do equal rights exist in the society?*
- *Are there laws protecting equal rights?*

Economic Opportunity

- *Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?*
- *Is the education provided relatively equal?*
- *Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?*
- *Do programs for job training exist?*
- *Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?*

Socio-Economic Dynamics

- *Do ghettos and slums exist?*

HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN



The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator considers the economic impact of human displacement (for economic or political reasons) and the consequences this may have on a country's development. On the one hand, this may involve the voluntary emigration of the middle class – particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, or skilled workers such as physicians – due to economic deterioration in their home country and the hope of better opportunities farther afield. On the other hand, it may involve the forced displacement of professionals or intellectuals who are fleeing their country due to actual or feared persecution or repression. The indicator specifically measures the economic impact that displacement may wreak on an economy through the loss of productive, skilled professional labor.

Questions to consider may include*:

Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital

- *Are professionals leaving the country?*
- *Are politicians or political elites leaving the country?*
- *Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?*
- *Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?*

Economics

- *Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?*

Diaspora

- *Is there growth of a country's exiled communities or diasporas abroad?*
- *Does the diaspora have an impact on the home state economy, or on politics in the home state?*

THE INDICATORS: POLITICAL

STATE LEGITIMACY



The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions and, where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population's confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

Questions to consider may include:*

Confidence in the Political Process

- Does the government have the confidence of the people?

Political Opposition

- Have demonstrations occurred?
- Have riots or uprisings occurred?

Transparency

- Is there evidence of corruption on the part of government officials?
- Are national and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the Political Process

- Do all parties enjoy political rights?
- Is the government representative of the population?
- Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- What is the longer term history of power transitions?
- Are elections perceived free and fair?
- Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?

Political Violence

- Are there reports of politically motivated attacks, assassinations?
- Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- Have there been terrorist attacks and how likely are they?

PUBLIC SERVICES



The Public Services Indicator refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. On the one hand, this may include the provision of essential services, such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet and connectivity. On the other hand, it may include the state's ability to protect its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through perceived effective policing. Further, even where basic state functions and services are provided, the Indicator further considers to whom – whether the state narrowly serves the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, or the diplomatic service, while failing to provide comparable levels of service to the general populace – such as rural versus urban populations. The Indicator also considers the level and maintenance of general infrastructure to the extent that its absence would negatively affect the country's actual or potential development.

**Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

Questions to consider may include*:

General Provision of Public Services

- Is there equal access to public services?
- What are the general conditions of public services?

Health

- Is there adequate access to medicines?
- Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for all people?
- Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- Is sanitation system adequate?

Education

- What is the level of school enrollment? Is it different by gender?
- What are the literacy rates? Is it different by gender?

Shelter

- Do the poor have access to housing?
- Are housing costs in line with economy?

Infrastructure

- Are roads adequate and safe?
- Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?
- Is there an adequate supply of fuel?

Equality

- Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?

HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include*:

Civil and Political Rights and Freedoms

- Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- Is the right to life protected or all?
- Is freedom of speech protected?
- Is there freedom of movement?
- Does religious freedom exist?

Violation of Rights

- Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or others?
- Are there reports of state- or group- sponsored torture?
- Are there labor laws or reports of forced labor or child labor?
- Are groups forced to relocate? Is there proper compensation?

Openness

- Does independent media exist?
- Do reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- Is there equal access to information?

Justice

- If rights aren't protected, is there a legal system in which they can be addressed?
- Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention?
- How are the prison conditions?

THE INDICATORS: SOCIAL AND CROSS-CUTTING

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES



The Demographic Pressures Indicator considers pressures up-

on the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high population growth rates or skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic, and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also takes into account pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

Questions to consider may include:*

Population

- Is the population growth rate sustainable? Is the current and projected distribution reasonable?
- Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there a high orphan population?

Public Health

- Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases, pandemics?
- Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases of epidemics?

Food and Nutrition

- Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?
- Is there are likelihood of droughts?
- Is there a short-term food shortage or longer-term starvation?
- Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?

Environment

- Do sound environmental policies exist and are current practices sustainable?
- Is natural disaster likely, recurring?
- If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?
- Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests?

REFUGEES AND IDPS



The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator meas-

ures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources. The Indicator also measures the internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state’s population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year on year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

**Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

Questions to consider may include:*

Resources

- Does resource competition exist?
- Does land competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate disputes?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?

Refugees

- Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- Are conditions safe in refugee camps?

Internally Displaced Persons

- How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?

Response to Displacement

- *Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?*
- *Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?*

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include:*

Political Intervention

- Is there external support for factions opposed to the government?















Force Intervention















- Are foreign troops present?
- Are military attacks from other countries occurring?
- Is there external military assistance?
- Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?
- Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?
- Is there external support for police training?
- Are covert operations taking place?

Economic Intervention

- Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid?
- Is the country dependent on economic aid?

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2024

															Total	Change from Previous Year
Afghanistan	9.2	8.7	8.0	9.6	8.3	7.0	9.6	9.7	8.8	8.9	8.1	8.0	103.9	2.7		
Albania	4.5	6.2	4.0	5.8	3.0	8.3	4.9	3.6	3.3	3.8	2.5	6.0	55.9	0.9		
Algeria	5.5	6.9	7.1	6.3	4.9	4.6	7.6	4.7	7.4	4.9	5.9	2.8	68.6	1.4		
Angola	6.3	7.2	8.6	8.2	8.8	5.3	8.0	8.7	6.4	9.4	5.0	3.7	85.6	1.3		
Antigua and Barbuda	4.8	3.7	3.6	6.3	4.8	6.1	3.3	3.6	4.1	3.4	2.4	5.8	51.9	1.9		
Argentina	4.0	2.8	2.9	6.7	5.4	2.4	3.2	3.9	2.4	5.4	1.7	3.4	44.2	2.2		
Armenia	5.4	6.4	6.9	6.1	2.7	6.9	6.0	3.9	5.5	3.5	7.3	7.5	68.1	-0.6		
Australia	1.8	1.7	2.6	1.3	2.9	0.3	0.3	1.7	1.9	3.5	1.4	0.2	19.6	2.4		
Austria	1.1	3.2	3.0	1.4	2.6	1.6	0.6	1.4	0.4	3.3	4.3	0.2	23.1	1.3		
Azerbaijan	5.5	7.9	6.4	4.5	4.2	4.5	9.3	5.2	7.6	3.6	6.6	7.5	72.8	-0.1		
Bahamas	4.6	4.5	2.0	4.0	5.0	4.3	1.5	5.3	4.8	6.0	2.2	3.8	48.0	1.2		
Bahrain	5.0	7.6	9.5	3.3	6.0	2.9	8.0	2.4	8.4	3.8	1.7	5.6	64.2	0.9		
Bangladesh	6.9	9.6	8.9	5.3	5.8	6.7	7.8	7.6	7.4	7.2	7.6	5.1	85.9	-0.7		
Barbados	4.1	4.2	2.0	5.7	5.3	4.8	1.1	3.4	2.8	4.0	2.1	5.2	44.7	0.7		
Belarus	5.9	9.9	5.6	4.9	3.0	4.2	9.1	2.4	8.0	4.5	3.1	8.1	68.7	1.2		
Belgium	2.6	4.4	3.2	4.3	2.1	2.6	0.6	2.2	1.3	3.9	2.4	0.7	30.3	1.1		
Belze	6.9	4.3	4.7	6.6	3.3	3.9	3.1	5.2	5.8	4.5	2.9	5.8	57.0	2.8		
Benin	5.0	7.0	2.4	6.6	7.7	5.8	5.3	8.2	6.0	7.9	6.0	4.6	72.5	0.8		
Bhutan	2.4	7.5	9.4	5.6	4.0	5.4	2.8	5.3	5.3	5.1	5.5	6.2	64.5	1.9		
Bolivia	5.0	8.2	6.7	5.8	7.5	5.3	6.5	6.0	5.4	7.0	2.3	3.7	69.4	1.3		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.1	8.7	7.5	6.3	3.6	7.2	6.1	3.9	4.2	5.8	6.9	6.7	71.0	1.3		
Botswana	3.5	3.3	3.4	6.3	6.4	4.2	2.5	6.2	5.3	7.5	3.0	2.0	53.6	1.7		
Brazil	5.9	6.1	7.5	6.1	6.3	3.2	6.6	6.9	7.4	8.4	3.2	2.7	70.3	4.2		
Brunei Darussalam	3.6	7.4	7.4	2.9	6.9	2.9	8.0	1.7	6.6	2.9	0.8	2.8	53.9	0.8		
Bulgaria	3.8	5.3	3.7	4.1	4.8	4.9	3.2	3.6	3.1	5.1	4.4	3.4	49.4	2.4		
Burkina Faso	9.5	8.2	5.9	7.1	8.4	6.9	7.1	8.7	7.1	8.6	8.3	8.4	94.2	-0.2		
Burundi	7.5	8.5	6.4	8.5	7.1	4.9	9.3	7.9	8.7	8.8	7.7	7.3	92.6	1.6		
Cambodia	6.1	8.7	5.3	5.5	6.3	5.7	9.2	7.1	8.4	5.9	3.7	6.7	78.6	-1.85		
Cameroon	7.8	9.6	7.8	6.5	7.3	6.6	9.2	8.4	7.4	9.3	8.1	6.3	94.3	-1.40		
Canada	2.4	2.5	1.7	1.3	2.5	0.7	0.3	1.4	1.9	1.4	2.3	0.2	18.6	75.4		
Cape Verde	3.9	5.5	2.1	5.9	4.8	7.7	3.2	5.3	2.0	5.9	3.3	7.6	57.2	-38.3		
Central African Republic	7.5	9.9	7.8	7.7	9.3	6.0	9.4	10.0	8.7	8.9	9.6	9.1	103.9	1.8		
Chad	8.4	9.5	8.4	8.1	8.4	7.4	8.7	9.6	8.1	9.0	9.5	7.6	102.7	1.9		
Chile	3.9	2.2	4.1	4.1	4.7	3.0	4.1	3.6	3.3	5.6	1.7	0.8	41.1	0.7		
China	4.6	7.2	6.2	3.8	6.2	3.3	8.1	4.8	9.4	6.2	2.8	1.8	64.4	1.1		
Colombia	6.5	7.6	6.9	6.3	6.2	4.5	5.0	5.7	7.3	7.5	7.5	4.6	75.6	2.5		
Comoros	5.3	8.0	5.1	7.3	8.0	7.1	8.1	7.7	6.0	8.0	5.2	5.9	81.7	0.5		
Congo Democratic Republic	8.3	9.9	9.4	8.2	8.5	6.3	9.4	9.2	9.0	9.8	9.9	8.8	106.7	0.5		
Congo Republic	6.1	6.7	8.9	9.2	7.4	6.1	9.1	8.8	6.9	8.7	6.2	6.1	90.2	0.5		
Costa Rica	3.1	3.8	2.1	5.1	5.1	2.7	1.2	4.2	1.5	2.4	5.0	3.2	39.4	1.0		
Cote d'Ivoire	6.3	9.9	6.4	5.9	7.2	5.5	7.0	8.2	6.6	8.9	6.1	7.3	85.3	1.8		
Croatia	1.7	4.4	4.0	5.4	2.9	5.8	2.2	2.6	1.7	4.5	6.5	4.2	45.9	2.8		
Cuba	3.1	7.0	2.5	5.7	3.7	5.7	7.8	4.6	6.0	5.4	3.5	4.1	59.1	0.4		
Cyprus	2.9	7.9	4.2	5.1	4.0	3.2	3.9	3.0	3.2	3.1	5.6	8.0	54.1	2.9		
Czech Republic	1.7	5.3	3.7	4.5	1.9	3.0	3.4	2.6	1.7	2.9	4.0	3.0	37.7	2.5		

															Total	Change from Previous Year
Denmark	0.8	1.4	2.8	0.7	2.0	0.8	0.2	1.4	0.3	2.0	2.6	0.9	15.9	2.0		
Djibouti	5.0	7.7	5.6	6.9	7.1	3.9	8.9	7.9	7.6	6.8	6.9	7.3	81.6	0.6		
Dominican Republic	5.2	6.2	4.3	4.6	4.6	6.4	5.1	6.7	4.2	6.7	2.9	3.3	60.2	0.6		
Ecuador	6.1	8.2	5.6	5.7	6.0	4.3	6.5	5.7	4.6	6.4	4.7	4.2	68.0	1.4		
Egypt	7.3	9.4	7.4	7.2	4.4	4.7	8.5	5.7	8.9	6.5	6.0	6.8	82.8	-1.2		
El Salvador	5.7	4.8	5.3	5.5	5.1	8.6	5.7	5.9	5.9	6.5	5.0	4.7	68.7	0.6		
Equatorial Guinea	5.6	8.2	7.8	7.2	7.3	3.4	9.8	8.6	7.9	9.4	5.2	3.3	83.7	0.7		
Eritrea	5.7	8.4	8.4	6.8	7.6	8.7	9.7	7.9	8.9	7.4	6.3	6.3	92.1	2.4		
Estonia	1.4	5.8	6.5	3.2	2.9	4.4	0.7	1.6	1.5	2.6	2.5	3.4	36.5	2.1		
Eswatini	4.2	6.8	1.9	9.1	7.5	5.7	8.8	7.4	8.2	8.4	3.8	5.8	77.6	1.5		
Ethiopia	7.9	9.3	8.6	6.5	7.8	5.9	8.0	8.9	8.5	9.9	9.0	7.8	98.1	2.3		
Fiji	6.1	8.2	4.9	7.0	4.7	7.3	5.8	3.9	5.0	4.3	2.9	6.3	66.4	3.8		
Finland	1.7	1.4	0.2	2.8	1.7	1.4	0.2	0.7	0.3	1.4	1.8	0.7	14.3	1.7		
France	2.8	1.9	6.5	3.5	2.8	1.8	1.1	1.3	1.0	2.8	2.5	0.3	28.3	0.5		
Gabon	7.9	8.5	2.8	6.0	5.9	4.3	8.6	7.0	6.3	6.6	2.7	3.6	70.2	-4.7		
Gambia	5.4	7.7	2.5	7.7	6.2	6.8	6.1	7.8	7.0	8.2	5.5	5.2	76.1	0.0		
Georgia	4.7	8.8	6.8	5.0	4.2	6.8	7.7	3.5	4.7	4.4	6.2	6.5	69.3	2.6		
Germany	2.6	2.3	3.1	1.6	2.8	1.6	0.5	1.3	0.7	2.0	5.0	0.5	24.0	0.6		
Ghana	3.7	5.9	2.7	6.0	6.8	6.5	3.3	6.5	3.5	7.5	3.2	5.2	60.8	1.5		
Greece	3.1	4.1	3.7	5.5	5.3	3.3	4.1	5.5	4.6	4.0	4.6	5.4	58.4	0.4		
Grenada	4.5	5.6	3.6	5.6	4.6	7.4	3.4	4.2	1.7	3.8	1.9	5.6	51.9	1.8		
Guatemala	5.8	7.1	9.1	4.4	6.0	6.2	7.0	6.5	7.9	6.8	5.0	3.1	74.9	2.4		
Guinea	8.7	10.0	9.2	7.5	7.2	6.0	9.4	9.2	7.3	9.1	5.9	6.9	96.4	2.1		
Guinea Bissau	7.6	9.9	3.8	6.9	8.6	6.4	8.8	9.1	6.3	8.9	5.2	6.9	88.4	1.5		
Guyana	6.2	4.8	5.6	3.3	3.4	7.9	4.3	5.6	3.7	5.5	2.7	6.2	59.2	2.4		
Haiti	7.0	9.7	5.8	8.6	8.9	8.0	10.0	9.9	9.2	8.9	7.8	9.7	103.5	-0.6		
Honduras	6.5	7.0	4.6	6.0	6.7	6.8	6.7	7.5	7.8	6.6	5.9	6.0	78.1	1.5		
Hungary	1.5	5.3	3.0	4.5	2.6	3.6	5.9	2.5	5.4	3.2	5.1	3.6	46.2	2.6		
Iceland	0.3	1.8	0.3	2.7	1.7	1.5	0.4	0.6	0.2	1.6	1.8	2.3	15.2	0.5		
India	5.7	7.3	8.2	5.9	5.7	4.8	4.5	7.0	7.6	8.2	3.8	3.6	72.3	1.8		
Indonesia	4.9	7.1	6.6	3.8	4.2	5.4	4.8	5.6	6.7	7.1	4.1	3.4	63.7	1.9		
Iran	6.7	9.6	9.4	7.3	4.4	4.6	9.5	3.8	10.0	6.5	5.3	5.8	82.9	2.5		
Iraq	7.2	9.6	7.7	6.0	5.6	5.8	8.3	8.0	7.5	7.9	7.4	7.6	88.6	2.8		
Ireland	1.8	1.5	0.3	1.4	2.1	2.4	0.3	2.0	1.5	2.5	2.1	0.7	18.6	0.9		
Israel	3.6	8.3	7.2	1.5	3.7	2.3	4.8	1.8	4.0	4.5	3.0	6.8	51.5	-7.4		
Italy	4.6	4.9	3.4	5.1	3.2	2.2	1.7	3.6	0.8	4.3	4.4	2.9	41.1	1.5		
Jamaica	7.0	3.7	1.3	6.6	5.2	9.2	3.9	6.7	5.0	4.5	2.0	4.2	59.3	2.6		
Japan	1.8	2.6	1.6	3.4	3.2	2.4	0.3	1.5	2.8	5.6	2.7	2.3	30.2	0.3		
Jordan	4.3	6.9	8.2	6.2	4.1	6.0	6.8	4.5	7.0	6.0	8.1	6.2	74.3	1.4		
Kazakhstan	3.7	7.9	7.1	4.6	2.3	4.4	8.1	3.7	6.8	4.3	2.1	2.8	57.8	2.3		
Kenya	6.9	8.6	7.7	6.3	7.5	6.3	7.4	7.7	6.0	8.1	7.4	6.6	86.5	1.8		
Kuwait	2.1	7.5	4.7	2.3	4.7	2.3	6.9	3.0	7.1	4.1	1.9	2.7	49.3	1.9		
Kyrgyz Republic	5.3	8.2	8.1	6.6	4.6	6.4	8.2	5.2	6.3	5.8	3.6	6.6	74.9	0.7		
Laos	3.6	8.3	7.5	5.2	5.2	6.3	9.0	6.0	7.1	6.1	5.1	4.4	73.8	0.9		
Latvia	1.7	4.3	7.4	3.6	3.9	5.5	1.5	3.0	1.7	2.9	3.5	2.4	41.4	1.9		

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2024

Lebanon	7.5	9.6	8.1	9.3	6.8	6.8	7.7	7.3	6.8	5.5	8.9	8.4	92.7	-0.9
Lesotho	5.5	7.3	2.8	8.1	7.6	7.2	4.5	7.4	4.9	8.9	3.9	6.5	74.6	1.7
Liberia	6.5	9.3	4.3	8.0	7.8	6.2	6.0	8.8	7.2	8.7	6.9	7.2	86.9	2.0
Libya	9.2	9.0	7.0	8.4	6.9	4.9	9.3	7.7	9.4	7.0	8.4	9.3	96.5	-0.4
Lithuania	1.9	3.0	2.4	3.4	4.0	5.3	1.2	3.4	1.8	3.3	3.2	4.5	37.4	2.0
Luxembourg	0.3	3.4	1.2	2.7	2.1	1.6	0.2	1.4	1.0	2.1	2.5	0.2	18.7	0.8
Macedonia	3.8	7.3	5.1	6.0	4.2	5.6	4.3	3.9	2.5	3.9	6.0	4.6	58.1	23.6
Madagascar	5.8	7.8	3.7	7.4	8.9	5.6	6.8	9.3	5.7	9.4	4.7	4.7	79.8	3.4
Malawi	4.0	8.7	3.8	7.9	7.5	6.1	7.2	7.9	4.8	9.3	6.1	7.2	80.5	-25.5
Malaysia	4.5	6.8	4.5	3.1	3.8	4.2	6.2	3.4	7.2	4.8	2.9	1.7	53.1	9.8
Maldives	4.6	8.1	3.2	4.9	2.5	4.9	6.6	5.1	7.0	4.9	3.2	5.3	60.3	39.2
Mali	9.7	7.6	8.2	7.0	6.9	7.4	8.7	8.9	7.6	9.1	8.2	8.0	97.3	-64.3
Malta	1.5	2.0	1.8	3.1	2.6	3.6	2.6	1.5	3.3	3.4	3.5	2.2	31.1	55.9
Mauritania	5.4	8.8	7.9	6.2	7.5	5.6	7.7	8.1	6.9	8.6	8.4	5.9	87.0	-49.0
Mauritius	1.2	3.1	5.3	4.7	3.3	3.9	2.4	3.0	3.4	3.0	1.8	2.7	37.8	32.0
Mexico	8.0	5.9	6.1	4.2	5.8	4.6	6.4	6.8	5.3	7.0	5.2	3.7	69.0	0.3
Micronesia	2.8	5.6	3.7	7.8	6.9	8.1	3.8	5.9	3.4	5.5	3.9	9.5	66.9	0.5
Moldova	4.2	7.8	5.5	5.9	3.3	7.6	4.4	4.3	3.6	5.1	6.3	6.7	64.7	-13.4
Mongolia	3.0	5.5	2.4	5.1	5.1	3.9	4.0	4.7	4.4	4.9	2.0	5.7	50.7	7.3
Montenegro	3.7	6.5	9.0	5.5	2.7	5.7	3.8	3.5	2.8	3.8	3.9	6.0	56.9	11.3
Morocco	4.0	6.6	8.0	5.6	4.7	6.8	6.8	4.8	5.1	5.9	5.6	4.9	68.8	25.2
Mozambique	6.5	6.3	7.5	7.2	9.1	7.1	7.6	9.4	6.9	9.7	7.4	7.8	92.5	7.7
Myanmar	9.3	9.0	9.4	7.8	7.2	6.0	9.5	9.2	9.6	7.1	8.9	7.0	100.0	-39.7
Namibia	3.9	3.5	3.9	6.9	6.8	5.6	3.1	6.9	2.5	8.3	3.6	4.3	59.3	20.9
Nepal	5.2	8.8	8.9	5.2	5.0	6.1	6.3	6.8	6.0	7.8	6.3	5.6	78.0	-57.0
Netherlands	1.5	3.4	2.7	1.7	2.0	1.8	0.2	0.9	0.5	2.2	2.4	0.2	19.5	-2.8
New Zealand	1.3	1.4	1.7	2.7	2.8	1.6	0.3	1.2	0.5	0.8	1.3	0.3	15.9	61.8
Nicaragua	5.3	7.1	6.0	5.7	6.7	7.0	9.3	6.6	7.6	4.7	4.8	5.9	76.7	16.7
Niger	9.0	9.9	7.4	7.0	7.7	6.3	6.7	9.6	6.8	8.8	8.0	8.0	95.2	2.8
Nigeria	8.7	9.6	8.3	8.9	8.0	6.6	8.3	8.9	8.3	9.6	6.1	5.3	96.6	-9.6
North Korea	7.1	9.2	4.8	8.4	7.2	2.9	9.8	7.7	9.3	7.0	2.9	8.6	84.9	-24.6
Norway	1.1	1.1	2.8	1.1	1.7	0.4	0.2	0.7	0.2	1.1	2.0	0.3	12.7	1.8
Oman	2.1	6.6	3.2	4.1	4.2	1.1	7.4	2.8	6.6	4.2	1.3	3.8	47.4	1.3
Pakistan	7.9	9.3	9.1	8.0	5.0	5.5	8.0	7.6	7.8	7.8	7.3	8.4	91.7	-1.8
Palestine	8.0	8.3	6.2	7.0	7.0	9.4	8.8	8.0	8.1	9.0	8.0	10.0	97.8	-9.9
Panama	4.3	2.7	6.5	3.2	5.9	3.3	3.8	4.7	4.7	4.6	2.5	1.5	47.7	1.0
Papua New Guinea	7.0	7.1	5.0	6.8	7.9	5.8	5.7	9.2	7.0	7.6	5.0	4.7	78.8	-0.7
Paraguay	5.4	7.8	4.4	4.6	6.6	4.4	6.5	5.4	5.3	5.4	2.8	2.9	61.5	2.2
Peru	5.7	8.4	8.1	4.3	5.9	5.7	7.7	6.9	5.8	7.7	4.3	1.5	72.0	1.1
Philippines	8.8	8.0	6.5	4.1	4.8	4.6	6.5	6.2	7.2	7.4	5.5	5.5	75.1	3.7
Poland	1.5	4.2	4.7	3.3	2.5	4.3	3.4	2.7	4.1	3.5	5.0	2.5	41.7	3.5
Portugal	0.2	2.5	1.0	4.0	2.9	3.2	0.8	2.4	1.3	3.7	1.7	2.2	25.9	-0.2
Qatar	0.7	5.0	2.5	0.8	5.6	0.8	6.4	2.6	5.2	2.7	1.5	6.0	39.8	0.7
Romania	1.6	5.7	5.2	4.0	4.2	5.3	4.1	4.7	4.4	4.0	3.7	4.1	51.0	2.0
Russia	8.6	8.9	7.9	6.7	5.1	3.8	9.3	4.7	9.4	4.9	4.5	7.8	81.6	-0.9



Total

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Rwanda	5.5	8.3	8.7	6.3	7.5	5.8	6.6	6.4	6.5	7.4	7.4	5.4	81.8	0.5
Samoa	3.3	5.1	5.4	6.6	3.8	10.0	3.8	4.6	4.0	4.7	3.2	9.4	63.9	1.2
Sao Tome and Principe	4.4	6.3	4.2	8.6	6.9	6.8	3.5	6.4	2.7	6.8	4.9	7.0	68.5	1.2
Saudi Arabia	4.8	8.5	9.6	3.7	4.5	2.4	7.5	3.5	7.8	4.0	2.9	4.0	63.2	2.1
Senegal	4.6	7.4	5.1	7.2	6.2	6.8	7.2	7.7	4.7	7.2	5.5	4.6	74.2	-2.7
Serbia	4.4	8.9	7.9	5.8	4.2	5.9	6.1	3.6	3.5	3.8	6.5	7.2	67.8	0.1
Seychelles	4.9	6.0	3.7	3.9	5.1	5.0	3.2	2.1	4.3	4.3	2.0	6.5	51.0	2.3
Sierra Leone	5.6	8.2	5.5	8.6	7.4	6.5	5.6	8.7	5.3	8.3	7.1	5.8	82.6	-1.2
Singapore	0.2	4.0	2.6	1.1	3.9	1.0	3.7	0.7	4.6	2.6	0.8	0.2	25.4	0.1
Slovak Republic	0.9	4.7	5.2	3.8	2.1	3.9	2.9	2.3	2.2	2.3	3.2	1.8	35.3	2.5
Slovenia	0.2	2.0	2.7	2.9	2.9	3.3	1.3	2.1	1.1	3.7	2.7	1.2	26.1	1.2
Solomon Islands	4.7	8.7	5.2	5.8	7.3	5.6	5.9	8.2	4.3	7.2	4.7	10.0	77.6	2.0
Somalia	9.7	10.0	9.0	9.2	9.0	8.5	9.7	9.5	8.7	10.0	9.0	9.0	111.3	0.6
South Africa	6.3	6.8	5.7	8.2	6.8	4.3	5.8	6.8	5.1	7.3	3.7	2.8	69.6	2.4
South Korea	1.2	3.9	2.5	1.6	3.1	3.1	2.1	2.1	3.2	2.2	1.3	3.5	29.8	1.7
South Sudan	10.0	9.2	8.7	8.6	8.6	6.4	9.9	9.8	8.8	9.7	10.0	9.3	109.0	-0.5
Spain	2.7	6.9	7.6	4.2	3.4	1.3	6.0	3.2	2.1	3.4	2.2	1.0	44.0	-0.5
Sri Lanka	6.5	9.1	8.1	8.4	6.1	7.5	7.5	5.7	8.1	6.9	6.3	8.0	88.2	2.1
Sudan	9.3	9.6	9.6	9.4	8.8	8.0	9.5	9.0	9.3	8.9	9.7	8.2	109.3	-3.1
Suriname	3.1	5.8	7.5	7.4	4.4	5.6	4.1	4.4	4.2	5.2	3.0	4.1	58.8	0.9
Sweden	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.6	2.4	0.6	0.6	0.9	1.8	2.7	3.4	0.2	20.6	0.0
Switzerland	1.1	1.0	1.8	1.3	2.6	0.9	0.2	1.3	0.3	2.1	3.4	0.2	16.2	1.0
Syria	9.7	9.9	8.8	9.9	6.6	7.7	10.0	9.1	8.8	8.4	9.2	10.0	108.1	-1.6
Tajikistan	5.2	8.4	6.9	5.8	4.2	5.1	9.5	4.4	8.3	7.1	3.5	4.4	72.8	1.4
Tanzania	4.3	6.5	5.2	5.7	7.5	6.3	6.6	8.1	5.3	8.8	5.9	5.5	75.7	0.9
Thailand	7.7	10.0	6.8	3.3	4.0	3.4	7.6	3.4	7.5	5.8	5.0	1.7	66.2	1.8
Timor-Leste	5.3	8.3	4.7	7.2	5.8	6.3	4.6	6.9	4.2	8.4	5.4	7.7	74.8	2.7
Togo	5.5	7.6	6.9	6.7	8.1	6.2	7.5	7.9	6.6	7.5	5.6	5.0	81.1	1.0
Trinidad and Tobago	7.6	5.6	3.6	3.6	5.2	6.7	3.2	4.0	3.8	4.2	3.0	3.0	53.5	-0.6
Tunisia	6.6	7.2	7.0	7.7	4.0	5.7	5.8	4.9	7.0	4.0	3.0	4.3	67.2	-0.8
Turkey	6.3	8.8	9.2	7.5	7.1	3.6	7.4	4.9	7.7	6.0	8.7	6.8	84.0	-2.8
Turkmenistan	4.2	7.8	5.2	4.8	5.3	3.8	9.8	3.8	8.2	5.3	2.0	2.0	62.2	2.3
Uganda	6.4	8.9	7.9	6.3	7.6	6.0	8.1	7.7	7.3	8.9	9.0	7.0	91.1	0.4
Ukraine	9.7	8.3	7.1	8.0	4.6	8.4	6.3	7.0	7.5	7.0	9.5	9.7	93.1	2.8
United Arab Emirates	2.0	3.6	2.3	1.3	2.8	1.8	6.4	1.8	6.5	3.3	1.4	1.5	34.7	2.3
United Kingdom	2.9	5.8	6.1	5.1	3.6	2.3	3.3	2.3	2.9	3.1	2.4	1.0	40.8	1.1
United States	4.4	7.4	6.2	2.0	3.9	1.4	4.2	1.9	4.3	5.3	2.4	1.1	44.5	0.8
Uruguay	3.4	2.7	2.0	3.8	3.6	3.1	0.4	3.3	3.9	3.1	2.1	2.3	33.7	0.7
Uzbekistan	5.3	8.8	5.1	5.4	5.0	4.0	9.1	3.7	7.4	4.4	3.5	3.1	64.8	2.0
Venezuela	6.4	9.4	6.2	9.5	6.9	6.4	9.6	8.4	8.6	6.0	6.2	5.4	89.0	1.5
Vietnam	3.2	6.9	5.1	3.3	3.6	4.4	7.9	3.5	7.2	4.1	3.6	3.4	56.2	2.1
Yemen	8.1	9.9	8.8	9.6	7.6	6.2	9.8	9.7	9.3	9.3	9.3	9.0	106.6	2.3
Zambia	3.9	5.6	6.2	8.0	8.8	6.0	6.8	7.6	8.2	9.6	4.6	5.9	81.2	0.6
Zimbabwe	8.1	10.0	5.6	9.3	8.0	7.0	9.1	8.5	7.9	8.5	7.3	6.4	95.7	1.2



Total

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