



FRAGILE STATES INDEX ANNUAL REPORT 2020



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
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FRAGILE STATES INDEX




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COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS

AE	U.A.E.	DJ	Djibouti	LV	Latvia
AL	Albania	DK	Denmark	LX	Luxembourg
AM	Armenia	EE	Estonia	MD	Moldova
AT	Austria	ER	Eritrea	ME	Montenegro
AZ	Azerbaijan	GE	Georgia	MK	North Macedonia
BA	Bosnia & Herz.	GQ	Eq. Guinea	MW	Malawi
BD	Bangladesh	GR	Greece	NL	Netherlands
BE	Belgium	HU	Hungary	QA	Qatar
BF	Burkina Faso	HV	Croatia	RS	Serbia
BG	Bulgaria	IL	Israel	RW	Rwanda
BH	Bahrain	JO	Jordan	SG	Singapore
BI	Burundi	KG	Kyrgyz Republic	SI	Slovenia
BT	Bhutan	KH	Cambodia	SK	Slovakia
CG	Congo (Rep.)	KW	Kuwait	TJ	Tajikistan
CH	Switzerland	LA	Laos	TN	Tunisia
CY	Cyprus	LB	Lebanon	UG	Uganda
CZ	Czechia	LI	Lithuania		

THE WORLD IN 2020





FRAGILE STATES INDEX

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VERY SUSTAINABLE

- 14.6 Finland (178) ▲
- 16.2 Norway (177) ▲
- 17.1 Switzerland (176) ▲
- 17.2 Denmark (175) ▲
- 17.8 Iceland (174) ▲
- 17.9 New Zealand (173) ▲
- 18.2 Sweden (172) ▲
- 18.7 Canada (171) ▲
- 18.8 Luxembourg (170) ▲
- 19.7 Australia (169) =
- 19.9 Ireland (168) ▲

SUSTAINABLE

- 22.9 Netherlands (167) ▲
- 23.2 Germany (166) ▲
- 23.5 Portugal (165) ▲
- 24.1 Austria (164) ▲
- 25.8 Slovenia (163) ▲
- 26.3 Singapore (162) ▲
- 27.1 Belgium (161) ▲

VERY STABLE

- 30.5 France (160) ▲
- 32.0 South Korea (159) ▲
- 32.3 Japan (158) ▲
- 33.4 Uruguay (157) ▲
- 33.6 Malta (156) ▲
- 35.7 Czechia (155) ▲
- 36.5 Lithuania (154) ▲
- 37.2 Mauritius (153) ▲
- 38.1 United Arab Emirates (152) ▲
- 38.2 Slovak Republic (151) ▲
- 38.3 United Kingdom (=149) ▼
- 38.3 United States (=149) ▼
- 38.5 Estonia (148) ▲

MORE STABLE

- 40.2 Costa Rica (147) ▲
- 40.4 Spain (146) ▲
- 41.0 Poland (145) ▲
- 42.3 Latvia (144) ▲
- 42.4 Italy (143) ▲
- 42.5 Chile (142) ▼
- 43.7 Qatar (141) ▲
- 46.0 Panama (140) ▲
- 46.1 Argentina (139) ▼
- 46.1 Croatia (138) ▲
- 46.4 Barbados (137) ▲
- 46.7 Romania (136) ▲
- 47.6 Hungary (135) ▲
- 48.0 Oman (134) ▲
- 49.2 Bulgaria (133) ▲
- 49.9 Bahamas (132) ▼

MORE STABLE

- 50.9 Kuwait (131) ▲
- 51.9 Mongolia (=129) ▲
- 51.9 Trinidad & Tobago (=129) ▲
- 52.1 Antigua & Barbuda (=127) ▲
- 52.1 Greece (=127) ▲
- 54.7 Seychelles (126) ▲
- 55.2 Grenada (125) ▲
- 55.5 Montenegro (124) ▼
- 56.1 Cyprus (123) ▲
- 56.6 Brunei Darussalam (122) ▲
- 57.1 Botswana (121) ▲
- 57.6 Malaysia (120) ▲
- 58.8 Albania (119) ▲
- 59.2 Cuba (118) ▲
- 59.8 Kazakhstan (117) ▲

WARNING

- 60.0 Jamaica (116) ▲
- 60.1 Suriname (115) ▲
- 60.8 Belize (114) ▲
- 62.1 North Macedonia (113) ▲
- 63.3 Samoa (112) ▲
- 63.9 Vietnam (111) ▲
- 63.9 Bahrain (110) ▼
- 64.2 Ghana (=108) ▲
- 64.2 Armenia (=108) ▲
- 64.4 Dominican Republic (107) ▲
- 64.8 Cape Verde (106) ▲
- 65.1 Namibia (105) ▲
- 65.2 Paraguay (104) ▲
- 65.8 Belarus (103) ▲
- 66.0 Guyana (=101) ▲
- 66.0 Moldova (=101) ▲
- 66.1 Serbia (100) ▲
- 66.2 Maldives (99) ▲
- 67.2 Mexico (98) ▲
- 67.6 Peru (97) ▲
- 67.8 Indonesia (96) ▲
- 68.1 Tunisia (95) ▲
- 68.8 Saudi Arabia (94) ▲
- 68.9 El Salvador (93) ▲
- 69.0 Ukraine (92) ▲
- 69.1 Gabon (=90) ▲
- 69.1 Turkmenistan (=90) ▲
- 69.4 Ecuador (89) ▲
- 69.5 Bhutan (88) ▲
- 69.9 China (=86) ▲
- 69.9 Fiji (=86) ▲

2020 SCORES

ELEVATED WARNING

70.1		South Africa (85) ▲
70.2		Bosnia & Herzegovina (84) ▲
70.3		Sao Tome & Principe. (83) ▲
70.8		Thailand (82) ▲
71.2		Georgia (=79) ▲
71.2		Micronesia (=79) ▲
71.2		Morocco (=79) ▲
71.3		Azerbaijan (78) ▲
72.5		Benin (77) ▲
72.6		Russia (76) ▲
73.0		Brazil (75) ▼
73.1		Uzbekistan (74) ▲
73.9		Kyrgyz Republic (73) ▲
74.6		Algeria (=71) ▲
74.6		Senegal (=71) ▲
75.0		Bolivia (70) ▼
75.1		Israel / West Bank (69) ▲
75.3		India (68) ▼
75.4		Jordan (67) ▲
75.5		Tajikistan (66) ▲
76.6		Colombia (65) ▼
76.8		Honduras (64) ▲
76.9		Laos (63) ▲
77.1		Nicaragua (62) ▲
78.1		Tanzania (61) ▲
78.3		Lesotho (60) ▲
79.1		Turkey (59) ▲
79.2		Guatemala (58) ▲
79.5		Madagascar (57) ▲
79.7		Solomon Islands (56) ▲

HIGH WARNING

80.3		Cambodia (55) ▲
81.0		Philippines (54) ▲
81.2		Comoros (53) ▲
81.8		Sri Lanka (52) ▲
82.2		The Gambia (51) ▲
82.3		Papua New Guinea (50) ▲
82.6		Nepal (49) ▲
82.7		Timor-Leste (=47) ▲
82.7		Djibouti (=47) ▲
83.0		Equatorial Guinea (=45) ▼
83.0		Eswatini (=45) ▲
83.4		Iran (44) ▼
84.0		Malawi (43) ▼
84.4		Sierra Leone (42) ▲
84.5		Zambia (41) ▲
84.7		Lebanon (40) ▲
85.7		Bangladesh (39) ▲
85.8		Togo (38) ▲
85.9		Burkina Faso (37) ▼
86.0		Egypt (=35) ▲
86.0		Rwanda (=35) ▲
87.3		Angola (34) ▲
88.7		Mauritania (33) ▲
89.7		Côte d'Ivoire (32) △

ALERT

90.0		Liberia (31) ▲
90.2		North Korea (30) ▲
90.3		Kenya (29) ▲
91.2		Venezuela (28) ▼
91.7		Mozambique (27) ▼
92.1		Congo (Republic) (=25) ▲
92.1		Pakistan (=25) ▲
92.8		Uganda (24) ▲
92.9		Guinea Bissau (23) ▲
94.0		Myanmar (22) ▲
94.6		Ethiopia (21) ▼
95.2		Libya (20) ▼
95.3		Niger (19) ▲
95.8		Eritrea (18) ▲
95.9		Iraq (17) ▲
96.0		Mali (16) ▼
97.2		Guinea (15) ▲
97.3		Nigeria (14) ▲
97.7		Haiti (13) ▲
97.9		Burundi (12) ▲
97.9		Cameroon (11) ▼
99.2		Zimbabwe (10) ▲

HIGH ALERT

102.9		Afghanistan (9) ▲
104.8		Sudan (8) ▲
106.4		Chad (7) ▲
107.5		Central African Republic (6) ▲
109.4		Congo (Democratic Republic) (5) ▲

VERY HIGH ALERT

110.7		Syria (4) ▲
110.8		South Sudan (3) ▲
110.9		Somalia (2) ▲
112.4		Yemen (1) ▲

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Security Standard Compliance



Security Risk Assessments



Training and Capacity Building



Publicly Available Data

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THERE IS NO COVID-19 HERE

J.J. MESSNER DE LATOUR

As many countries continue to suffer thousands of deaths and millions experience social isolation and economic hardship due to the COVID-19 crisis, the 2020 Fragile States Index (FSI) will not provide any data or analysis of how the crisis is affecting the social, economic, and political fortunes of the 178 countries it measures. For some who are experiencing COVID-19 fatigue, perhaps this will come as an enormous relief.

Perhaps one of the most limiting aspects of an annual index is that it is by definition retrospective. By the time the numbers are crunched, the data is analyzed, and all the fancy graphics are published, something new and unexpected has captured the public's attention and the findings of the index no longer seem particularly relevant.

Indeed, the 2012 Fragile States Index (FSI) was published just as Middle Eastern and North African nations were in the grips of the Arab Spring – the FSI assessment period for the preceding year had closed only 13 days after Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire in response to police abuse, igniting an Arab Spring that would soon consume wide swaths of North Africa and the Middle East. The FSI was released with barely a register of the revolutions to come, just as the eyes of the world were focused on mass protests spreading rapidly across Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Now, with COVID-19 pandemic, there is a sense of déjà vu for the FSI, as the crisis that currently grips the world is not explicit in the current FSI data.

MOST WORSENEDED COUNTRIES 2020

+3.6 ↗  Chile (42.5)	+1.4 ↗  Mali (96.0)
+3.1 ↗  Mozambique (91.7)	+1.2 ↗  Brazil (73.0)
+3.1 ↗  Libya (95.2)	+1.1 ↗  Bahamas (49.9)
+2.1 ↗  Bolivia (75.0)	+1.0 ↗  India (75.3)
+2.1 ↗  Burkina Faso (85.9)	+0.9 ↗  Cameroon (97.9)
+1.9 ↗  Venezuela (91.2)	+0.9 ↗  Colombia (76.6)
+1.7 ↗  U.K. (38.3)	+0.6 ↗  Malawi (84.0)

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES 2020

-3.5 ↘  Maldives (66.2)	-2.5 ↘  Uganda (92.8)
-3.3 ↘  Kenya (90.3)	-2.5 ↘  North Korea (90.2)
-3.2 ↘  Iraq (95.9)	-2.5 ↘  Armenia (85.5)
-3.1 ↘  Sudan (104.8)	-2.5 ↘  N. Macedonia (62.1)
-2.9 ↘  Malaysia (57.6)	-2.4 ↘  Sierra Leone (84.4)
-2.8 ↘  Timor-Leste (82.7)	-2.4 ↘  Djibouti (82.7)
-2.7 ↘  Senegal (74.6)	-2.4 ↘  Bhutan (69.5)
-2.6 ↘  Uzbekistan (73.1)	-2.4 ↘  Mexico (67.2)
-2.6 ↘  Indonesia (67.8)	-2.4 ↘  Belarus (65.8)
-2.5 ↘  Guinea Bissau (92.9)	-2.4 ↘  Botswana (57.1)

However, this is not to say the FSI tells us nothing about the present or the future.

The utility of data sets such as the FSI is not found in simply reflecting the CNN ticker back to us. The FSI does not add much value in telling us that Yemen, Somalia, Syria, or Libya are fragile states. It is most definitely not helpful in telling us that Scandinavian countries are generally extremely stable. And today, the FSI would not have added much value in measuring COVID-19's impacts in the middle of an unfolding crisis. Rather, it is the long-term trends of the FSI that are uniquely helpful in guiding policy makers and implementers on understanding where risk exists and is increasing, or where quiet, steady improvement is marching forward.

Looked at in this way, the Index can be used to shed light on the context in which a crisis such as the Arab Spring, the COVID 19 Pandemic, or any other shock or potential emergency might take place. In a situation of high demographic pressures, for example, how will the country manage the extra stress on their health systems? In a situation of high group grievance, how will society mobilize the necessary collective effort to respond?

MOST WORSENEDED COUNTRIES

The most-worsened country in the 2020 FSI is Chile, a remarkable turnaround for a country that had otherwise been demonstrating steady gains to previously rank within the 30 most stable countries on the Index. However, recent protests over economic and social inequality, met with heavy-handed government responses, highlighted underlying vulnerabilities that had served to undermine the durability of Chile's recent improvements. The second most worsened country for 2020 is Mozambique – which also rates as the sixth most worsened country over the past decade of the FSI – in the wake of severe natural disasters that exposed the country's long unaddressed vulnerabilities and sparking renewed conflict in the north of the country.

Among the other most worsened countries for 2020, Libya, Burkina Faso, and Mali saw a continuation of conflict and violence that has wracked each of those countries for a prolonged period; Bolivia, Brazil and Venezuela witnessed political instability and questionable leadership; Colombia's peace agreement continued to unravel; the Bahamas were hit by natural disaster; and India and Cameroon saw increased repression of, and violence against, minority groups. Another notable case was the United Kingdom, which continued its long-term worsening trend as Brexit reached its crescendo, leaving the country to rate as the seventh most worsened on the index.

Over the long-term, the most worsened countries of the past decade come as no surprise, as Libya, Syria, Mali, Yemen, and Venezuela have continued to unravel amidst varying levels of protracted conflict and instability. Though it would be easy to assume that the most worsened countries of the FSI are either lesser-developed or the scene of conflict (or both), the Top 20 most worsened since 2010 includes the United Kingdom and the United States, both of which have experienced years of tumultuous politics and social division.

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES

Meanwhile, the most-improved country in 2020 is the Maldives, which continued a long-term trend of near-constant improvement that has seen the country move from being ranked 66th in 2007 (when it was first included in the FSI) to 99th in 2020. Three countries – Sudan, Iraq, and Kenya – tied for second most improved country in 2020, all improving from previous bouts of conflict, instability, and repression. By no means should any of these three countries be considered as necessarily more stable – after all, they rank 8th, 17th, and 29th respectively on the FSI – however such gains should be cause for cautious optimism and representative of tentative steps on a positive path.

Unlike the most worsened countries, the most improved over

the past decade have not been headline grabbers, as countries like Cuba, Georgia, Uzbekistan and Moldova have made quiet, consistent improvement over time. Though, it must be viewed within the broader context that it is more likely that a country is able to make significant gains if its starting point is well behind that of its peers. It is therefore likely no accident that six of the ten most improved are former Soviet states (Georgia, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyz Republic).

A WORD ABOUT RANKINGS

Sixteen years ago, when the first Failed States Index was published in Foreign Policy magazine, much of the emphasis and attention was focused on the rankings. The question was invariably, ‘who is the world’s most failed state?’ However, a decade-and-a-half later, now armed with 16 years of trend data, the discourse is fortunately far more nuanced and now the focus is much more on trends and rate-of-change — and, more importantly, measuring a country’s performance over time against itself rather than against its peers.

Nevertheless, the temptation to rank countries — particularly wherever quantitative data is involved — is nearly inescapable. This year, Yemen again claimed the top position as a result of its continuing civil war and humanitarian catastrophe. Meanwhile, at the other end of the Index, Finland has ranked as the world’s least fragile state for the tenth year in a row (when it first overtook its neighbor, Norway). Though there may be some level of interest in who is first and who is worst, ultimately such an observation is largely meaningless in terms of giving any degree of insight on specific strengths and vulnerabilities, nuance, let alone long-term trends, of the 178 countries that we assess annually.

* * *

Looking forward to 2021, there is little doubt the FSI will be dominated by the social, economic, and political fallout of

LONG-TERM MOST WORSENEDED 2010-2020

+25.8 ↗  Libya	+4.7 ↗  United Kingdom
+20.9 ↗  Syria	+4.3 ↗  United States
+17.3 ↗  Mali	+3.9 ↗  Brazil
+14.3 ↗  Yemen	+3.2 ↗  The Gambia
+11.7 ↗  Venezuela	+2.7 ↗  South Africa
+11.0 ↗  Mozambique	+2.6 ↗  Cameroon
+6.0 ↗  Greece	+2.3 ↗  Angola
+5.5 ↗  Eritrea	+2.2 ↗  Burundi
+5.0 ↗  Chile	+2.1 ↗  Djibouti
+4.9 ↗  Bahrain	+2.1 ↗  C.A.R.

LONG-TERM MOST IMPROVED 2010-2020

-21.4 ↘  Cuba	-14.8 ↘  Trinidad & Tob.
-20.6 ↘  Georgia	-14.8 ↘  Tajikistan
-19.7 ↘  Uzbekistan	-14.8 ↘  Zimbabwe
-19.1 ↘  Moldova	-14.7 ↘  China
-17.8 ↘  Bhutan	-14.6 ↘  Romania
-16.5 ↘  Belarus	-14.5 ↘  Timor-Leste
-16.3 ↘  Indonesia	-14.0 ↘  Croatia
-15.2 ↘  Turkmenistan	-13.7 ↘  Cape Verde
-15.2 ↘  Malta	-13.7 ↘  Panama
-15.2 ↘  Kyrgyz Republic	-13.7 ↘  U.A.E.
-14.9 ↘  Sri Lanka	

COVID-19. It is highly likely that some of the countries most heavily impacted so far – such as China, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Italy – will register significantly increased pressure. As the impacts of the pandemic, both direct and indirect, filter through the global system it is equally likely that much of the world will be affected – more so should the crisis worsen, or if there are additional waves of the pandemic in months to come.

Nevertheless, it will be important in the longer-term to understand the deeper societal vulnerabilities that the crisis has uncovered, and data will be critical in being able to tell that story soberly. It is only through a sober and critical evaluation of the underlying vulnerabilities that COVID-19 is laying bare globally, will we be able to rise above the justifiable panic accompanying coverage of the pandemic to understand how we recover and, perhaps more importantly, plan and prepare for the inevitable next crisis.



DEMOCRACIES UNDER PRESSURE

NATE HAKEN

On debate stages, behind pulpits, in lecture halls, journals, books, and op-ed pages, experts and politicians grapple with causes, implications, and solutions to the issue of growing divisiveness across the world's democracies. Some point to growing inequality and the need for safety nets in the face of demographic pressures and climate change. Others focus on antiquated or inadequate political structures, the breakdown in institutions, social fragmentation, or even moral decadence. But in the last 10 years, two major global shocks seem to have accelerated the overall trend. And now, with COVID 19, we face a third.

First, the 2008 financial crisis unleashed a wave of populism across the world's democracies. While many political leaders and technocrats devised policies and plans to address the structural causes and help the affected, others sought villains to punish and scapegoats to banish. Second, in 2014, as millions fled war-torn Syria at an unprecedented scale, xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment further complicated the urgency of the challenge. These two shocks have made it much more difficult to harness the political and social capital necessary to make the individual and collective sacrifices necessary to not only bounce back from shocks, but also to make fundamental changes to adjust to upheaval.

In support of the general diagnosis (if not necessarily offering a prescription), the Fragile States Index (FSI) finds that 16 percent of all democracies¹ worsened significantly in both the

Group Grievance and Factionalized Elites indicators between 2008-2019. This worsening is noticeable both in the West (particularly so in American politics and the Brexit campaign and outcome) as well as in Eastern European countries in proximity to Russia, which has fanned the flames to great effect, and continues to today.

This is not to say that all these countries are worsening overall on the FSI. Several, in fact, have a long-term trend of improvement (when you include indicators such as economic recovery and public services). And history does suggest that political consensus can, in some circumstances, be even more damaging than division – a consensus position can also be wrong. However, in cases where polarization leads to brinkmanship and/or gridlock, it becomes that much more difficult to take the necessary collective action to address deep structural challenges or to manage large-scale emergencies. Inclusive leadership and consensus-building must play a role.

In situations of fragmentation, the usual brokers (media, state institutions, opinion leaders, religious and community leaders) lose relevance and legitimacy, making consensus building difficult with no shared vision or context to build from and organize around. This can be further exacerbated by intentional or unintentional proliferation of misinformation and disinformation in the public sphere, including by partisan or external actors.

In the Baltic states for example, the intersection of partisanship and disinformation has entrenched divisions and populist

sentiment. Latvia and Estonia are ethnically and politically divided, each with large Russian minorities. Estonia is famous for being among the first victims of a massive cyber onslaught in 2007, during which banks, newspapers, ministries, and other organizations were all targeted with denial of service and spamming, allegedly by groups associated with Russia. Long on the frontlines of information warfare, Estonia has become adept at resisting propaganda in the intervening years, yet polarization has nevertheless continued to grow. The nativist Conservative People's Party of Estonia (EKRE) has incrementally gained in popularity through 2019, when it had the third largest representation in parliament with 19 MPs. In Latvia, the 2018 hacking of a Draugiem.lv, a popular social network, as well as the proliferation of Eurosceptic messages generally, has added to an environment of division and distrust, particularly during elections.

In Poland, the rightwing populist Law and Justice Party, headed by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has emerged as the largest political party in parliament and has had an adversarial posture towards the judiciary, and flirted with nativism and authoritarianism. Reminiscent of American politics is the way in which both the liberal and conservative parties in Poland accuse each other of complicity with political and election interference by Russia. In the Czech Republic, anti-immigration and Euroscepticism has been a feature of the political landscape in recent years. President Miloš Zeman, in fact, has been dubbed the “troll president” for making controversial pro-Russia statements as well as performing stunts such as the ceremonial burning of a large pair of underpants and waving a fake machine gun at reporters. In 2019, there were massive protests in Prague against Prime Minister Andrej Babis for alleged corruption in connection to EU subsidies for a resort owned by a member of his family, among other scandals. In this context sensationalist media, “fake news,” and partisan spin, even in major online

publications such as *Parlamentní listy* have reportedly added to the general confusion. Polarization in Slovakia spiked with the murder of journalist Ján Kuciak in 2018, who had been reporting on corrupt politicians, leading to massive street protests and the resignation of Prime Minister Robert Fico. Similarly, Hungary under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has also experienced a rise in nativism and a weakening of the democratic institutions of the state.

Meanwhile, in the West, many of the same dynamics are at play, whether that be toying with Euroscepticism, nativism, and anti-immigration, even to the point of electing leaders who take great pleasure in trolling the opposition through controversial statements and performative stunts. Institutions have been undermined. Constitutional crises have escalated. The media landscape has been rendered almost maximally partisan. In this environment, it is much easier to succumb to political scapegoating, deflection, and denial than to rally the Herculean effort necessary to address climate change, healthcare reform, inequality, and education, let alone a Coronavirus pandemic, or whatever happens next.

As we head into the new landscape that a global pandemic presents, collective action is more necessary than ever. Yet it remains to be seen whether out of the ashes of three global shocks in little more than a decade, citizens of the many global democracies under fire will rise to the challenge to find what unites us, or persist in allowing the politics of polarization and scapegoating to continue to divide us.

Endnotes

1. Democracies are defined as those designated by the Economist Intelligence Unit as “full” or “flawed” democracies in their 2008 report <https://graphics.eiu.com/PDF/Democracy%20Index%202008.pdf>



A POT BOILING OVER: CHILE MOST-WORSENERD IN 2020



CHARLES FIERTZ

On October 7, in the Santiago metro, a group of students began jumping turnstiles to protest a four percent rise in peak-time fares announced the day before. This was the second increase in fares for public transportation, which were already more than twice as expensive as those in neighboring Buenos Aires or Lima. While the Economy Minister blithely suggested workers wake up earlier to avoid the increase, the protest grew rapidly. On October 18, the day after an interview was published in which President Sebastián Piñera described Chile as an oasis, the capital Santiago was in flames. For the first time since the fall of Chile’s former dictator General Augusto Pinochet, a state of emergency was declared due to political unrest. This did little to quell the unrest and, seven days later, around 20 percent of Santiago’s population took to the streets, with more protests occurring in other cities. These protests were the largest since Chile’s return to democracy, surpassing the records set by the May 2011 protests against inequality in the education sector during Piñera’s previous term. It is against the backdrop of this social unrest that Chile rates as the most worsened country on the 2020 Fragile States Index (FSI).

Piñera’s initial response to the protests attempted to combine both carrot and stick. Along with reversing both the fare

increase and a recent hike in electricity prices, Piñera also announced a series of measures aimed at helping the poor and middle class cope with the rising cost of living, including increases in government-subsidized pensions and the minimum wage, as well lowering the price of medicine for the elderly. However, Piñera also declared the country “at war with a powerful and uncompromising enemy” and deployed the army and military police into the streets of Santiago. By the end of the year, over 30,000 people had been arrested and the National Human Rights Institute leveled nearly a thousand criminal complaints – including of torture, rape, and homicide – against the security forces.

Piñera’s description of Chile as an oasis – while spectacularly poorly timed – matched the widespread external perception of the country’s economy. Since 1990, Chile has gone from being one of the poorest countries in South America to being the richest,¹ poverty has fallen from 38.6 percent to 7.8 percent, and the middle class has grown to become a majority of the population. However, these successes have masked growing structural problems. According to the World Inequality Database, by 2015 the share of income captured by the 1 percent had grown to levels not seen since before the turn of the century while between 2006 and 2017, the income of the top 10 percent of households grew from 30 times that of the bottom 10% to 40 times. The median salary is below the

poverty line for a family of four and just 20 percent of the population earns more than they spend on food, transport, housing, and basic services. Unemployment has been rising since 2015; a push to expand privatized tertiary education has left a legacy of high student debt while unemployment for those with advanced education has climbed above that of those with a basic education.

While most Chileans have been struggling with high prices and low wages, the elites have worked to further tilt the playing field in their direction. The 543 wealthiest households in Chile, a group which includes Piñera in its highest echelons, receive ten percent of the total income, often from a single company dominating key markets, such as beer, tobacco, and domestic air travel. In other markets companies colluded to raise prices, but this went unpunished because it was not defined as a crime under Chile's legal system. This situation has increasingly corrupted the political system. In recent years, revelations have emerged of companies bribing lawmakers in direct quid pro quos and the illegal funding of political campaigns on the both the left and right, but punishments have been few and far between. Even the police force was hit by a major scandal in 2017, with over 100 people implicated in a scheme to redirect as much as 25 billion Chilean pesos from the institution to the personal accounts of individual officers.

Support for the protests as a necessary corrective against this inequality and corruption was widespread; most polls showed that three-quarters of Chileans supported the protest movement and with an even higher number in favor of their demand for constitutional reforms.

Chile's worsening on the 2020 FSI is a step backwards from a previously improving overall trend that saw the country do better year-on-year in six of the last seven years. It is notable that indicators including Uneven Economic Development and Security Apparatus – two highly relevant indicators for the current situation – were steadily worsening despite Chile's overall improving trend, wherein its total FSI score improved by 3.4 points between 2012 and 2019. The Chilean example again demonstrates the importance of considering individual indicator trends as much as a country's overall trend. Further, Chile further demonstrates that long-term improvement is rarely linear, and improvements in some aspects – particularly economic development – can sometimes obscure underlying brittleness or vulnerabilities.

A referendum on whether to revise the constitution is scheduled for April 2020, but with political parties having an even lower approval rating than Piñera, it is unclear how Chile's political institutions will manage this popular anger. In the best case, this will prove to be an opportunity to institute some sorely needed structural reforms that will help the country to be a model for the rest of the region. In the worst, the intransigence of the elites could set the stage for the emergence of a demagogue like Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro or former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.

Endnotes

1. As measured by GDP per capita, PPP.



EXIT FROM BREXIT: U.K. CONTINUES RAPID FALL



J.J. MESSNER DE LATOUR
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Brexit. In many ways, it would be easy to sum up the fortunes of the United Kingdom over the last five years with this one widely known portmanteau that has not only been the catchphrase for Britain’s exit from the European Union, but has also become a catchphrase for wider division and instability besetting the world’s seventh-largest economy. Without a doubt, the Brexit issue was a leading driver behind the U.K. rating as one of the ten most worsened countries on the Fragile States Index (FSI) in 2020, now for the second year in a row. This is perhaps unsurprising, as the country experienced a historic year as parliament and the governments of Prime Minister Theresa May and later Boris Johnson struggled to agree on the best terms for leaving the European Union.

The search for internal agreement on the terms of a Brexit deal resulted in political deadlock as Brexit hardliners were unwilling to accept former Prime Minister Theresa May’s Brexit deal. As a result, the original Brexit date of March 29, 2019 was pushed back multiple times, to April 12, then October 31, and then again to January 31, 2020. In turn, this period was punctuated with the intervening departure of May and the ascension of Johnson, with hopes that a new Prime Minister could have better success in delivering a deal. This

period also witnessed extreme political polarization, reflected in an increase in the Factionalized Elites indicator.

More uncertainty was to follow as Johnson requested the Queen to prorogue, or suspend, parliament for five weeks from the beginning of September until mid-October. This request was both usual and unusual. Despite not occurring since 2017, such a temporary shut-down of parliament typically happens ceremonially every Autumn. What made this request exceptional was the length of time that the requested prorogation would suspend parliament, and its occurrence despite a clear urgency that parliament continue to go about its business ahead of the upcoming Brexit decision deadline. Johnson was subsequently rebuked by a court ruling that unanimously held that the request was unlawful, in that it prevented parliament from carrying out its normal duties amidst the oncoming Brexit decision. Though political maneuvering and machinations are hardly new or unique to any particular country or political system, what made this episode remarkable was its erosion of the common, shared acceptance of constitutional norms all within a vacuum of any written constitution. The U.K.’s unique unwritten constitutional system relies on a shared value system, and it becomes vulnerable once that value system, or the ‘rules of the game,’ is no longer shared or agreed.

It would be wrong to suggest that Brexit is a singular issue driving Britain's difficulties. Though Brexit was certainly the headline act of British politics in 2020, the circumstances around it -- including the failure to deliver Brexit within the year and an unorthodox prorogation of parliament -- revealed cracks in the United Kingdom's governmental system and a lack of certainty around its hitherto unwritten constitution. Indeed, when the Brexit referendum first delivered its somewhat unexpected result in 2016, Fund for Peace wrote just after the referendum that "as painful as Brexit will undoubtedly be politically and economically, it is perhaps the tip of a much larger iceberg, socially."¹ We identified that the Brexit referendum occurred after a five-year trend of worsening cohesion indicators (which includes Security Apparatus, Group Grievance, and Factionalized Elites) that was at the time the seventh most worsened of any country for that time period, pointing to deep social, economic, and political divisions that preceded, and were independent of, the Brexit campaign. In this year's FSI rankings, the United Kingdom saw its indicator scores worsen for State Legitimacy (by 0.6 points), and Human Rights, Factionalized Elites, and Security Apparatus (each by 0.3 points). Group grievance has been steadily worsening since 2010, with a score of 4.1 in 2010 and 6.4 from 2017 onwards. Additionally, the Factionalized Elites Indicator steeply worsened 2.3 points in the past four years.

While the temptation may be to focus on Brexit as the primary disruption to social cohesion in the country, and while it obviously has played a significant role in how politics and social division have played out, it is important to look at the frailty of the government as a whole. Brexit is not just a catalyst of a polarized, gridlocked system, but a symptom of it. Again, this is a condition that Fund for Peace foresaw in 2016 —

"The Brexit vote presents enormous challenges for the British and for Europe — and in turn, for the world. But as unsettling as the political and economic ramifications are for Britain and Europe, what is perhaps more so are the underlying socio-economic and political conditions of worsening division within Britain, being fueled by divisive politics. The British will have their hands full over the

coming months and years with managing their exit from the European Union as smoothly as possible. What will take longer to manage is decontaminating toxic political discourse and unifying a divided society."²

Beyond the social and political pressures, the United Kingdom's Economy indicator worsened in 2019 for the first time since 2013 as economic growth slowed to barely above zero in the last quarter of 2019. This was the worst economic growth slowdown in the country's history outside of a recession in the post-war period. The economy is likely to face only more uncertainty as the U.K. is now in an 11-month transition period where it still abides by the European bloc rules and regulations until the terms of the Brexit deal are decided. Business investment has steeply declined since 2017 and will continue to do so even if a Brexit deal is agreed upon. Further, economic activity is predicted to be below trend and unemployment will continue to increase, as will public deficit. Undoubtedly, the ramifications of COVID-19, the scale of which remain unclear, will likely further weigh heavily on the British economic outlook.

Looking forward, there is clearly much uncertainty still, and much work to be done. Though the Brexit process is nearing its conclusion, this is less the beginning of the end and more likely the end of the beginning as the U.K. now faces a new political and economic reality. Brexit is not the sole cause of the U.K.'s current instability — it is both a catalyst and a symptom of increasingly dysfunctional politics and decreasingly harmonious social order. However, perhaps the greatest legacy of Brexit will be to have laid bare the simmering social tensions, economic frailties, and political vulnerabilities of an unexpectedly brittle system, problems that will likely persist well after the Brexit process has concluded.

Endnotes

1. Underlying Concerns Create a Worrying Outlook for Britain Beyond Brexit. URL located at: <https://fundforpeace.org/2016/06/24/underlying-concerns-create-a-worrying-outlook-for-britain-beyond-brexit/>
2. Ibid.



REGIONAL INSTABILITY DRIVES WORSENING IN BURKINA FASO



MARCEL MAGLO
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Burkina Faso, formerly considered one of West Africa's most stable countries, now rates as the fourth most worsened country in the 2020 Fragile States Index (FSI). The country has seen mounting threats to its peace and security over the past five years, despite government efforts to manage the pressures. Much of this is from wider regional instability that has spilled across Burkina Faso's borders. In 2019, Burkina Faso witnessed more violence than any other year in its recent history, bringing to a halt the slow but incremental improvements the country has enjoyed across many of the FSI indicators since 2013.

Despite its relative stability, Burkina Faso has not been immune from violence over recent years, particularly as the situation in Mali has continued to deteriorate. For example, 2015-2016 saw a serious uptick in fatalities following a series of terrorist attacks linked to al-Qaeda and groups affiliated with the Islamic State. Since then, there has been a gradual and sustained increase in fatalities resulting from terrorism violence against civilians, with over 3,000 casualties reported between 2016 and 2019, accompanied by an unprecedented humanitarian crisis resulting in over 600,000 displacements and 2,000 school

closures.¹ Due to the spillover effects of the security crisis in Mali (which itself rates as the 8th most worsened country on the 2020 FSI), violence has grown exponentially, involving al-Qaeda affiliates such as the Group for Support to Islam and Muslims (GSIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). These organizations operate between Niger, Mali and far into the Northern, Eastern, and Sahel regions of Burkina Faso and carry out indiscriminate attacks against civilians and the Burkinabé security and defense forces, contributing to the deteriorating security landscape.

Furthermore, the weak presence of the state at the sub-national level has contributed to persisting tensions, which continue to erode existing traditional resilience mechanisms. The governance gaps in rural areas have led to bitter intercommunal conflicts over land and resources, which often degenerate into score-settling and violence. In turn, local authorities have been weakened and incapable of defending the communities against the attacks and reprisals perpetrated by the various armed groups, including the security forces and self-defense groups. Between 2015 and 2019, there were 283 terrorist attacks that resulted in 524 deaths and wounded 308 more.² This worsening trend has been reflected in the indicator scores for Group Grievance, External Intervention, and Refugees and IDPs.

While the rise in insecurity has been linked to myriad structural vulnerabilities, exacerbated by event-driven risks, the ongoing situation can also be attributed to a series of endogenous factors that continue to undermine the country's ability to deliver on its development agenda. The overthrow of President Blaise Compaoré in 2014, ending his 27-year authoritarian rule, brought to the fore longstanding grievances rooted in years of neglect and marginalization, reflected in Burkina Faso's steadily worsening scores in the cohesion indicators. Inequality remains a salient issue, driven by poverty, unemployment and a high cost of living. Data shows that Burkina Faso has been experiencing mounting demographic pressures (3 percent annual population growth), with a large youth population frustrated by a lack of employment opportunities and significant unmet social demands. While Burkina Faso's youth could be an important asset for economic development and social progress, the growing restiveness continues to inhibit progress. According to the Ministry of Labor, in 2019, more than one million young graduates competed in the national civil service exam to fill about 5,000 job openings.

The Economy indicator shows that in some areas, the country continues to demonstrate resilience, with real GDP growth estimated at 6 percent for 2019, driven by a strong agricultural sector and high internal demand, according to the African Development Bank (AfDB). However, the country has struggled to provide access to basic social services for much of the population. Despite strong overall GDP growth, more than half of Burkina Faso's population lives below the poverty line with significant disparities between the urban and rural areas. Poverty remains endemic, making young people increasingly vulnerable to the lure of the extremist groups which offer

attractive alternatives to feelings of marginalization. The unequal distribution of state resources outside the capital, compounded with widening income inequality, continues to feed a growing popular dissatisfaction with the inability of the government to deliver far-reaching socioeconomic reforms.

In the current context of widening regional instability, these mounting pressures represent a ticking time bomb. The counter-insurgency measures and military campaigns undertaken by the government and its partners against the armed groups are proving inadequate against a backdrop of increased internal pressures. While the current insecurity will likely require a continued security and counterterrorism focus, this needs to be combined with meaningful political and policy action. In this way, building upon existing resiliencies will be key to pursuing both development and security policies that engage stakeholders around the most pressing, structural issues that, in turn, give rise to manifestations of violence. Further, despite a regional approach to combating terrorism, there also needs to be a similar regional approach to combating its economic, social, and political fallout. Only through taking bold, inclusive steps both within and outside of its borders will Burkina Faso be able to address the full range of human security challenges confronting it and diffuse the ticking time bomb it faces in 2020. But the time to act is now.

Endnotes

1. The Guardian. URL located at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/aug/23/violence-forces-19-million-children-out-of-classes-africa>
2. African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism. URL located at: <https://caert.org.dz/?p=2811>



COLOMBIA'S PEACE DEAL UNRAVELS



CHARLES FIERTZ

Colombia saw its worst year-on-year change in the history of the Fragile States Index (FSI) in 2020, breaking a trend of almost uninterrupted improvement since the Index's inauguration. The 2016 peace deal between Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government is looking increasingly fragile, with faith in the process failing amongst the government, the former rebels, and the Colombian public. Membership in armed groups has grown, coca cultivation has rebounded, and social leaders have been targeted in increasing numbers. While there were failures in the implementation of the peace deal under the preceding Santos administration, the deterioration of the agreement has accelerated under President Duque, who has been openly hostile towards it. The resulting erosion of the peace deal has been felt primarily in five provinces in Colombia's north and southwest.

Since the beginning of the peace process, some former members of FARC, declaring themselves "dissidents," abandoned the process and again took up arms. In December 2016, the month after the peace deal was signed, several key members of FARC's former Eastern Bloc returned to their former territory in the eastern plains and the Amazon, which

sits along key trafficking routes to Venezuela and Brazil, to rebuild their operation. Over the following years, increasing numbers of former FARC members left the peace process; by mid-2019, they numbered around 3,000 and had a presence in 18 of Colombia's 32 departments. In August, Iván Márquez, FARC's second-in-command, joined these "dissidents" and attempted to unify the former rebels under a single command. However these attempts were not successful – former FARC members exist in disparate groups that have largely abandoned their leftist ideology, becoming more akin to traditional organized crime groups. At the same time, the National Liberation Army (ELN), has taken advantage of FARC's demobilization, the collapse of Venezuela, and the failure of the Colombian state, to increase their numbers from 1,400 members in 2017 to over 4,000 today, transforming into a hybrid Colombian-Venezuelan revolutionary army.

This growth of the armed groups has fueled, and has in turn been fueled by, increases in coca cultivation. Cultivation had fallen to a low in 2012-2013 according to UN figures, but it grew quickly in the following years, increasing by over 250 percent between 2013 and 2018, the last year for which there is data. Cocaine production followed a similar pattern, but more exaggerated, notably dropping off through 2013 and subsequently increasing more rapidly, hitting record highs. Cultivation has been concentrated, with nearly 80 percent

located in the states of Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, Cauca, and Antioquia. The coca substitution program (PNIS), a key part of the peace agreement, was initially successful in slowing the increase after 2016 – nearly 100,000 families enrolled in the plan, which saw 94 percent compliance and just a 0.6 percent replanting rate. However, despite this initial success, as of 2019, nearly 90,000 families had yet to receive the full payment promised as part of the program, and over 40,000 had not received any payments. Furthermore, President Duque has cut back on even the limited support given to the program in favor of increased emphasis on forced eradication, despite this strategy having a 35 percent replanting rate.

The effort to help farmers move away from coca cultivation has sparked retaliatory violence, with armed groups vying to establish hegemony over the areas and revenue streams that FARC vacated when they demobilized. This violence has often targeted social leaders, such as union organizers, indigenous leaders, community activists, and human rights defenders. According to the Institute for Development and Peace Studies, nearly 900 such people were killed between the beginning of 2016 and September 2019. Most of these killings occurred in regions that FARC had controlled before the peace deal, where their demobilization left a security vacuum that the Colombian state failed to fill. The violence has been particularly acute in the same five provinces where coca cultivation is highest and, in 2019, also broadened to include the targeting of state representatives. For example, the buildup to the October municipal elections saw the highest rate of murdered politicians since 2015.

The Colombian peace process has always been fragile and the deal itself required two referendums to be approved. However, insufficient funding and distracted focus – on the part of both the Colombian government and the international community, who wanted to believe that the peace deal was the end of a process rather than the beginning of a new one – meant that the gains that were achieved were never institutionalized and sustained. The ascension of Duque, who has always been openly hostile to key elements of the peace deal, convinced many former FARC members that the government did not intend to honor the promises it had made. With the collapse of the Venezuelan state, and the subsequent rise of ungoverned spaces to organize outside of the control of state authority, an ocean of desperate potential recruits and record cocaine production offering windfall profits has filled the vacuum. In these lawless zones, thousands of former rebels have returned to the field, either as part of one of the FARC successor groups or the resurgent ELN.

While there is still time to rescue the peace process and curtail the revival of the armed groups that have plagued Colombia for decades, criminal entrepreneurship and violence is increasingly taking hold in several parts of the country. It will take a concerted effort by the government and its regional and international partners to return Colombia to the path of gradual improvement it was so recently on.



WHAT ELSE COULD GO WRONG? MOZAMBIQUE CONTINUES WORSENING TREND



CHARLES FIERTZ

A combination of natural disasters, insurgent attacks, and a contested election resulted in another challenging year for Mozambique, which tied with Libya for the second-most worsened country on the 2020 Fragile States Index (FSI). Already beset by increasing structural pressures across multiple indicators, Mozambique’s steady worsening over the past several years in the FSI – the world’s six-most worsened country over the past decade – has highlighted its high vulnerability to event-driven risks. In 2019, this combination of structural vulnerability and risk combined to create a humanitarian disaster when the country was hit by two of the worst cyclones in modern history.

On March 14, central Mozambique was struck by Cyclone Idai, one of the worst tropical cyclones to affect the Southern Hemisphere. Idai destroyed 90 percent of Beira, Mozambique’s fourth-largest city and home to over half a million people. More than 600 people died nationwide and over 100,000 people needed emergency evacuation in Beira and the surrounding Buzi District. Widespread damage to schools and homes left hundreds of thousands internally displaced. In the aftermath, there were outbreaks of cholera and malaria, though prompt action by the government and the WHO

prevented them from becoming full-blown epidemics. A month later, the northern province of Cabo Delgado was hit by Cyclone Kenneth, which destroyed another 30,000 houses and left 160,000 people displaced. Together, the two storms left 2.2 million in need of urgent assistance and caused an estimated US\$3 billion in damage. Further compounding the crisis was the destruction of 715,000 hectares of crops, while the south of the country experienced the second consecutive season of drought.

When Cyclone Kenneth hit Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique, it struck a province that has been dealing with an insurgency since late 2017. Once the birthplace of the ruling Frelimo party and the national liberation struggle, Cabo Delgado is today colloquially known as Cabo Esquecido, the Forgotten Cape, ranking at the bottom of most social and economic indicators. Despite substantial reserves of natural gas, the province is characterized by widespread poverty, lack of education, and the absence of basic public services. In this vacuum, powerful criminal networks have risen, fueling illicit trade in heroin, gemstones, poached wildlife, and more. Political figures and members of the ruling party have openly benefited from these illicit networks, further undermining state legitimacy.

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado began in October 2017, when

a group of armed men attacked three police stations in Moçimboa da Praia. Initially unsophisticated and using rudimentary weapons such as machetes, the attacks have grown in number, brutality, and sophistication, including the first use of an IED in March 2019. This increasing sophistication has been accompanied by allegations that members of the security forces have provided weapons and training to the insurgents.

Journalists have been arrested and barred from working in the region, while public officials have been contradictory, alternatively blaming bandits, artisanal miners, and global jihadism. The insurgents, on the other hand, have not put forth any official ideology or list of grievances. While some believe they are linked to a group that split from the Islamic Council of Mozambique in the early 2000s to promote a stricter form of Islam, others are skeptical. The seemingly indiscriminate attacks have made a religious motivation difficult to discern, and some aid officials and researchers working in the region believe there are actually multiple distinct groups operating in the province.

The government response to the insurgency has been heavily reliant on repressive approaches such as arbitrary arrests, indiscriminate violence, and the closure of mosques. These measures – combined with security forces rendered ineffective due to lack of training, morale, and equipment – have further alienated the local population. The Mozambican military launched offensive operations in October 2019 with the support of Russian mercenaries, but reports suggest that this merely dispersed the insurgents into smaller groups, with reported violence against civilians increasing sharply the following month.

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado was erupting just as conflict between the Frelimo party, which has ruled Mozambique since

independence, and the opposition Renamo party reignited. The two fought a brutal civil war between 1977 and 1992, with sporadic clashes arising between 2013 and 2016. A renewed peace process, which persisted even through the death of Renamo's leader Alfonso Dhlakama, culminated in a new peace treaty that was signed in August 2019. Although an armed faction of Renamo refused to disarm, hopes for sustainable peace were high.

Those hopes are now in danger after the general elections of October. At least 44 people were killed and U.S. and European Union observers noted attacks on opposition candidates, the exclusion of independent observers, fraud, and intimidation. The election itself was a rout; incumbent president Felipe Nyusi won 73 percent of the vote and Frelimo was victorious in all ten provincial assemblies, including the three Renamo had won in the 2014 elections. The results were also a major departure from those of local elections a year earlier in which Frelimo had won only 51 percent of the vote. Both Renamo and MDM, Mozambique's third largest political party, rejected the results and requested the election be annulled, an appeal rejected by the Constitutional Court. Reports now suggest that key elements of Renamo feel that the peace treaty has been broken, with some members considering a return to the party's wartime base.

The severe long-term worsening trend in Mozambique, as detailed previously in the FSI, should already have raised the alarm on the country's political, social, and economic fortunes. However, even beyond Mozambique's increasing structural pressures and vulnerabilities – not to mention the recent alleged embezzlement of US\$2.2 billion by various government officials and their family members, as well as decimation by natural disasters – the potential re-heating of the country's long-running conflict presents an ever greater risk for Mozambique into 2020, with little relief in sight.



DIVISION IN INDIA



CHARLES FIERTZ

In 1989, foreshadowing events to come, India's current ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) issued the Palampur Resolution, throwing their support behind the construction of a temple devoted to the Hindu deity Rama on the site of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. This was a remarkable gamble at the time, as the BJP was less than a decade old and held merely two of the Lok Sabha's 533 seats. The controversy surrounding the temple's construction sparked anti-Muslim riots throughout the country, but paid off for the BJP, as inflaming growing Hindu nationalist sentiment worked to steadily increase their power, culminating in winning 161 seats in 1996. The BJP's embrace of this populist sentiment, and its violent manifestations, has impacted India's performance on the Fragile States Index (FSI) in 2020, reflected in a significant worsening in the country's Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator, and ultimately leading to India rating at the world's 11th most worsened country overall.

In 2002, then-Chief Minister of Gujarat – and now India's Prime Minister – Narendra Modi oversaw three months of widespread anti-Muslim violence throughout the state that was "carried out with the complicity of the state government and officers of the law."¹ He then proceeded to ride the resulting popularity to increased electoral majorities in the state and

ultimately leadership of the BJP nationally. As Chief Minister, Modi also cultivated a reputation for successful economic management, though critics noted that Gujarat has always been one of India's fastest growing states, despite the state ranking relatively poorly on human development metrics such as access to clean water and child malnourishment. Nonetheless, Modi leveraged his reputation and the support of the business community to be elected as prime minister in 2014 on the back of the strongest ever showing for the BJP.

In his first term, Modi introduced major initiatives to improve public services, including a multibillion-dollar campaign of road construction and a nationwide campaign to build public toilets in every school. Modi also launched a series of controversial dramatic reforms, most notably demonetization, which invalidated 86 percent of existing currency in a purported attempt to flush out and punish those who had accumulated ill-gotten and untaxed wealth. Poor implementation led to an acute cash shortage in one of the most cash-based economies in the world, hurting growth while largely failing to accomplish the reform's purported goals. Due in part to this and other poorly thought out and implemented reforms, India's economic growth has slowed, declining to its lowest nominal level since 1978. Modi's response – an embrace of protectionism, higher government investment, bank lending targets, and direct export assistance – has been unable to reverse this trend.

Unable to tout his economic record, during the 2019 general elections, Modi embraced the type of hardline Hindutva that had fueled previous success for the BJP at the national level. With anti-Muslim hate crimes having already soared during Modi's first term, the BJP promised to extend the National Registry of Citizens (NRC) to the entire country. In a country where paperwork is limited, especially in rural areas, the NRC put 1.9 million predominantly Muslim residents of Assam at risk of being rendered stateless unless they could provide official documentation proving citizenship. In April, the BJP's president, Amit Shah, referred to undocumented Muslim immigrants as "termites" and promised to "throw them into the Bay of Bengal." Shortly after winning a resounding re-election, Modi's government began building 10 mass detention camps to hold those who had their citizenship stripped away.

In August, Modi revoked Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which guaranteed special status to the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir. Modi sent 35,000 additional soldiers into Kashmir ahead of the announcement, adding to the 500,000 already stationed there, and arbitrarily detained nearly 4,000 people, including over 200 politicians and two former chief ministers of the state.² The government also implemented a complete communications blackout for six months, the longest such blackout ever in a democracy.

In December, Modi's government fulfilled another campaign promise when it passed the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB), which created an expedited path to citizenship for migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, provided they are Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jain, Sikh, or Zoroastrian. The law sparked widespread protests across the country from a broad cross-section of people; Mamata Banerjee, the chief minister of West Bengal and head of the All India Trinamool Congress, the fourth-largest party in Parliament, led a series of massive rallies in West Bengal's capital of Kolkata against the NRC and CAB, saying they would be implemented in the state "over [her] dead body".³ The government has taken to routinely blocking access to the internet in response to protests against the NRC and CAB. In February 2020, BJP

politicians egged on a mob into attacking protesters in Delhi, setting off days of anti-Muslim violence that left more than 40 dead and over 200 injured while the city's police, controlled by the Home Ministry, either stood by or assisted the mobs.

Modi's actions have been facilitated by a media that has been largely cowed over the course of his first term. In 2016, his administration pulled all government advertising from NDTV, one of the most credible and popular news channels, and pressured private companies to do the same. By the end of 2017, NDTV was forced to cut up to 25 percent of its staff, with further cuts expected. Modi and the BJP have also reportedly pushed both broadcast and print media to remove prominent critical journalists. As a result, media coverage has been almost uniformly positive in the Indian press, exemplified by reporting that the situation in Kashmir was returning to normalcy just weeks after the revocation of Article 370, during a time when phone and internet service were cut off, schools were closed, Friday prayers were banned, and the only signs of life on the streets were the robust military presence.

Some forecasts are now projecting that India's already flailing economy will grow by just 1 percent in 2020 due in part to COVID-19 quarantine and lockdown measures. Ongoing internet restrictions in Kashmir and the shrinking of the independent media have curtailed the free flow of information and limited oversight of the government. Finally, rising Hindu nationalism, inflamed by the BJP, has widened internal divisions ahead of a period that demands high levels of social solidarity. Taken together, India is facing a dangerous dynamic in the upcoming year.

Endnotes

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LIBYA CONTINUES PATH AS THE DECADE'S MOST WORSENERD COUNTRY



PATRICIA TAFT

Libya's long-running conflict and instability has been well documented by the Fragile States Index (FSI), wherein it rates as the most-worsened country in the world for the past decade, and also holds the record for the greatest year-on-year worsening, when it worsened by 25.8 points in the 2012 FSI. In the 2020 FSI, Libya has again featured among the most-worsened countries, tying with Mozambique for the second most worsened country for the year.

Despite a surge of hope in January 2019, when a meeting in Berlin brought the main warring factions together with international stakeholders in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to secure a ceasefire, chaos continued to reign for most of the year. With an estimated 300,000 Libyans displaced¹ since the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and thousands killed and injured by indiscriminate attacks on civilian population centers, Libya remained one of the world's most dangerous conflicts in 2019. And as the year closed, hopes for peace remained as elusive as ever.

The war in Libya is one of overlapping conflicts fueled by multiple, often competing, internal and external interests. The two main warring parties are the internationally recognized

and Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Interim Government, which operates out of the east of the country and is supported by the Libyan House of Representatives (HOR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. According to a UN report released in December, other parties to the conflict include various internally and externally-supported militias based in Sudan and Chad, fighters from ISIL splinter groups, as well as shadowy paramilitary actors, such as the allegedly Moscow-backed Wagner Group. In addition to these actors, in 2019, foreign powers such as Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Russia have also taken sides, throwing their political weight behind and sending support in the form of military and financial aid, to various militia groups. Late in the year, reports began circulating that Turkey was sending battle-hardened fighters from Syria to Libya in an attempt to dislodge Haftar, adding yet another deadly dynamic to the conflict.

Libya's ongoing conflict has been enabled and compounded by long standing structural and institutional weaknesses. As Syria and previously Iraq have demonstrated, extreme factionalization and group-based grievances allowed to fester and become malignant under authoritarian leadership often portends the type of humanitarian disaster unfolding in Libya. For decades under Gaddafi, dissent was treated as treason and tribal and group-based allegiances were prized above bureaucratic

competency or functionality. With oil revenues helping to keep the regime in power for decades along with selective and ever-shifting internal and external alliances, the true nature of Libya's internal fragility and systemic brittleness was often disguised. With the 2011, so-called "Arab Spring" uprising, and the NATO-backed ouster of Gaddafi, Libya's house of cards began to fall. Unlike some of its north African neighbors, however, the revolutionary unity that brought people together at the start of the uprising quickly dissolved, despite the internationally supported government in Tripoli and millions of dollars in foreign investment.

These systemic weaknesses have also served to both exacerbate the conflict and slow efforts towards peace. In a general environment of chaos, absent a functioning government or the rule of law, indiscriminate killing of civilians and impunity for those who commit war crimes prevails. This was tragically highlighted in April when Haftar's forces launched an ultimately unsuccessful attack to take Tripoli, hitting private homes, hospitals, and other civilian centers. The offensive, which lasted for most of the year, killed nearly 300 civilians and 2,000 combatants, and displaced an estimated 140,000, according to the UN. Further, as highlighted in reports by the International Crisis Group and the UN in 2019, the war in Libya has become one of both maximalist positions and cyclical retribution, with civilians invariably caught in the crossfire.

Beyond the civil war that has raged in Libya for the better part of a decade, the country is also the main transit point for sub-

Saharan African migrants seeking a better life in Europe. The plight of these migrants, who are often fleeing war themselves, has been brought to the fore in recent years through images broadcast of their horrible mistreatment and deaths at the hands of various groups, from pro-government forces to rival militias and ISIL-affiliated terrorist groups. According to a special report by PBS Newshour in late 2018, the profits from the trafficking of these migrants and other vulnerable populations often go directly to ISIL-affiliated terror groups who work in cooperation with human traffickers. As in other war zones and areas which lack any real government oversight, profit is the common ground where the interests of human traffickers and terrorists converge, at the very real cost of human lives and immense suffering.

While securing a ceasefire remains key to bringing an end to Libya's near constant cycle of conflict escalation and resultant misery, without a concurrent focus on addressing the deep structural weaknesses of the Libyan state, it is unlikely true peace will ever take hold. And with so many competing external and internal interests, which seem to be compounding and growing daily, it appears that chaos will continue to reign in Libya for the foreseeable future.

Endnotes

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FROM ONE CRISIS TO THE NEXT IN LEBANON



WENDY WILSON

Once the scene of a deadly civil war, Lebanon has more recently been hailed for its resilience, having endured the region’s geopolitical upheaval, staved off the revolutionary tide of the 2011 Arab Spring, and seemingly absorbed the spill over effects of the Syrian Civil War. This celebrated resilience – based on the country’s perceived economic and financial strength in the face of shocks and a strictly defined ethno-religious social contract that has prevented a backslide into civil war – has been rocked, pulling back the curtain on Lebanon’s structural vulnerabilities. Though Lebanon’s overall Fragile States Index (FSI) score remained largely stable in 2020, the country saw declines in various indicators, most of all the Economy indicator, which worsened by one full point.

Lebanese citizens stormed the streets of Beirut in October 2019, in response to a proposed tax on WhatsApp calls. This movement would thus evolve into months of nationwide protests, the largest since the 2015 “You Stink” movement over issues of governance and garbage collection. The proposed tax, along with a series of austerity measures, were Beirut’s solutions to tackle the acute economic pressures that had Lebanon hurtling towards financial collapse. However, for the protestors, these measures were short-sighted responses

which favored the elites at the expense of the poor and middle class, thereby failing to address longstanding underlying economic issues.

Following the end of the 15-year civil war in 1990 that decimated its socio-economic infrastructure, the Lebanese government of Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri launched an ambitious reconstruction program meant to restore infrastructure and revive the economy. The recovery program, accompanied by macroeconomic stabilization policies to address inflation and the various currency crises of the war period, was financed by internal and external borrowing, laying the groundwork for Lebanon’s eventual rise as one the world’s most indebted nations. The Hariri-led reconstruction effort yielded immediate post-war economic growth. However, Beirut’s subscription to certain fiscal, monetary, and central bank policies ultimately failed to foster long-term economic growth at a pace needed to reduce the balance of payments deficit. Against the backdrop of budget deficits and a growing public debt, a reduction of tax rates to attract investment led to budgetary austerity which, in turn, led to the use of indirect taxes to account for budgetary shortfalls, and reduced investment in social services. Additionally, subsidies to commercial banks and attractive interest rates to foreign depositors to shore up foreign currency reserves resulted in huge fiscal costs, with the payment of high interest rates by the

central bank failing to garner enough returns for interest and capital repayment. The dollar peg also proved to be problematic in the long-term, gradually depleting dollar reserves. Such policies and practices, along with the clientelist nature of the political structure, resulted in an unproductive rentier economy and undiversified productive sector that favored elites, entrenched inequality, and worsened poverty levels. According to a World Inequality Database study, the top 10 percent of Lebanese earners amassed, on average, 56 percent of the total income earned from 2005 to 2014, while the bottom 50 percent accounted for 11 percent in the same time period.

The Lebanese economic model, after years of mounting issues, found itself in a truly precarious position in 2019. Its account deficit stood at approximately 25 percent of GDP, according to the IMF. Stagnating growth and reduced inflows of remittances placed it at risk of defaulting on its large debt load, estimated at 50 percent of government revenues.¹ The central bank faced challenges in maintaining the dollar parity and resorted to the hoarding of U.S. dollars due to shortages, resulting in low confidence and a rising black market exchange rate. As of mid-September, Lebanon's foreign currency reserves had fallen by 17 percent from 2017's record high of US\$36.8bn.² The negative economic trends are reflected in a significant worsening of the Economic Decline indicator, with Lebanon as the most worsened state under this indicator in the 2020 FSI.

Years of perceived government mismanagement and inability to efficiently address the mounting economic problems, and the resulting pressures of the Syrian Civil War that pushed Lebanon towards the precipice of financial collapse in 2019, emboldened the disaffected citizenry to confront the other pillar of Lebanese resilience: political sectarianism. Specifically,

the economic protests that began in October transformed into mass non-sectarian anti-government protests, an unprecedented move in post-war Lebanon. Thunderous chants of “all of them means all of them”, demands for a complete overhaul of the sectarian structure, rare demonstrations in Hezbollah strongholds, and the firm rejection of austerity measures illustrated the fervour and scale of public anger, plunging Lebanon into a political crisis. For protesters, political sectarianism was a double-edged sword, with the associated unfavorable consequences far outweighing the positives. The resulting clientelism, corruption, and recurrent political stalemates were viewed as contributing to the descent into economic freefall.

Lebanon now finds itself at a pivotal moment in its trajectory as the economic crisis and the anti-sectarian protests place it at a strategic crossroads. While past crises have been averted with the help of Gulf governments who have worked to shore up investor confidence, Beirut is unlikely to escape this current crisis with similar stopgaps. Given the sheer magnitude of the economic situation, set to be worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the uncertain support from Gulf allies, the country will be forced to usher in long overdue credible reforms, to implement sustained fiscal policies to broaden its tax base and to remove widespread exemptions in order to stimulate growth and improve the odds for an inclusive and sustainable recovery. As the instability from late 2019 spills over into 2020, Lebanon's performance will likely seriously worsen in the 2021 FSI.

Endnotes

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UZBEKISTAN: THE QUIET ACHIEVER



KEENAN IULIANO

When countries worsen significantly on the Fragile States Index (FSI), the deterioration can sometimes be rapid and dramatic and is nearly always headline news. However, significant improvement tends to be more steady, gradual, long-term, and can often go unnoticed. Uzbekistan is one such country that has made significant but quiet improvement; its overall FSI score having improved every year since 2010, moving from the 36th most fragile country at the start of the decade to 74th at its end. This improvement has led Central Asia’s most populous nation to be the fourth most improved country of the 2010s, bettered only by Cuba, Georgia, and Moldova. And Uzbekistan’s improvement has been consistent – the country has improved by at least one full point for each of the 12 FSI indicators over the past decade.

Though Uzbekistan has been steadily improving for the past ten years, the bulk of Uzbekistan’s improvement happened more in the latter half of the decade. Since 2015, Uzbekistan has seen the largest improvement of any country on the FSI and is the only state to rank within the top sixteen most improved for each year, improving by an average of approximately 2.4 points per year. Its 2020 score change of -2.6 is the second largest improvement for the country over the

history of the FSI, behind only the -3.4 it registered in the 2019 Index.

But why the marked improvement? A significant catalyst for these improvements was the 2016 change in leadership, when Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev replaced President Islam Karimov after the latter’s death. Karimov had led Uzbekistan since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and supervised an authoritarian regime that was corrupt, abusive, and sheltered from the international community. Karimov regularly won lopsided elections while presiding over human rights abuses against the Uzbek people. Uzbekistan was notorious for its deplorable labor conditions – over 1 million people, including children, were forcibly mobilized yearly to work for the state in cotton fields. Karimov also cracked down on religious expression and freedom of speech, imprisoning and torturing dissidents and killing protestors. Karimov’s regime was widely condemned, with the United Nations describing the country’s human rights abuses as “institutionalized, systematic, and rampant torture.”¹

In contrast, Mirziyoyev has used his presidency to implement significant reforms, marking a sharp change from Karimov’s twenty-five-year rule. Since entering office, Mirziyoyev has slowly opened the nation to international visitors and lifted restrictions on currency exchange. His regional policy has

improved relations with Uzbekistan's Central Asian neighbors, some of which were considered 'sworn enemies' under Karimov. International trade with both Asian and European partners has grown, increasing by 26.2% from 2018 to 2019.

Mirziyoyev has also verbally committed to democratizing Uzbekistan and working towards human rights improvements, with some demonstrable progress. A -1.8-point change in the Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator since 2016 has been Uzbekistan's most substantial FSI indicator-level improvement over that period. Mirziyoyev's reforms have led to a reduction of false imprisonments, the release of political prisoners, and in August 2019 the notorious Jaslyk prison was closed. Both prison and labor conditions have improved after the president targeted and reduced state usage of torture and forced labor. Religious expression has become more commonplace after decades of repression under Karimov, who feared Islam in the public setting would popularize Islamism. Similarly, political debate, social critiques, and independent media are gradually returning to public forums. Recently, the government lifted a ban on several critical websites and officially acknowledged the importance of social media and bloggers as key arbiters of public opinion. Mirziyoyev has additionally loosened the grip of the state's notorious security service, working to alleviate fear and build trust between Uzbek citizens and law enforcement.

However, Uzbekistan's improvements should be viewed as relative. The country still faces a litany of ongoing gaps and challenges. Critics outside Uzbekistan argue Mirziyoyev has only committed to reforms in the name of attracting foreign investment and boosting the Uzbek economy, suggesting that there may be a lack of genuine commitment behind the improvements in human rights and that they may be vulnerable

to shifts in the financial climate. Uzbekistan's score of 7.6 in the Human Rights and Rule of Law indicator is tied for 39th with India, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua, despite its recent improvement. Torture has not been comprehensively eliminated, and the reformed security apparatus continues to abuse its powers via harassment and unjustified charges of treason. New workplace regulations have improved conditions but have not fully ended forced and child labor.

Further, the core of Uzbekistan's political system is largely unchanged. In December 2016, Mirziyoyev won his first electoral bid with 88.6% of the vote. The country's State Legitimacy indicator score of 9.4 is among the world's worst; in parliamentary elections in 2019 – the first since Mirziyoyev became president – no real opposition parties were allowed to run. In addition, the opposition Erik party and its leader Muhammad Solih remain banned in the country.

While Uzbekistan has made significant progress, especially in the last five years, it still faces major challenges. Mirziyoyev's five-year term expires in 2021, which will be an opportunity to evaluate his regime's commitment to its reform agenda. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan's progress demonstrates the slow and steady trajectory of quiet improvement that occurs in many countries and though not immediately perfect at least represent a slightly better reality tomorrow than yesterday. Hopefully, the gradual and continued opening of civil space can help support continued improvements in one of the bright spots of the FSI's past decade.

Endnotes

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WOMEN OF SUDAN BRING A GLIMMER OF HOPE



PATRICIA TAFT WENDY WILSON

In April 2019, a photograph of a woman dressed in white, standing atop a car and rallying a large group of protestors went viral. The woman, a student named Alaa Salah, had had enough. And by the size and passion of those chanting with her, so had many others. While the image of a woman leading a large-scale protest movement should not come as a surprise as women are often at the frontlines of such movements around the world, it was especially poignant in this case. Alaa Salah was mobilizing a movement against one of the most brutal and entrenched authoritarian regimes in the world. Alaa Salah, a previously unknown 22-year old engineering student, was taking on the generals of Sudan.

Sparked by the rising cost of bread, the 2018-2019 uprising began as an economic protest in a stronghold of former President Omar al-Bashir and quickly swept through the nation, taking on political and social dimensions as well. With broad-based appeal as an independent and unaffiliated movement, the demonstrations were unlike past movements in scale, fervor, and composition, with women outnumbering men by 70 percent, according to the BBC. Channeling the legacy of the warrior Nubian queens, kandakas, contemporary Sudanese

women formed the frontlines of resistance in the protest space. Their firm refusal to conform to imposed gendered roles in the protest space served as the stepping-stone for the pivotal confrontation against the government. As women gained momentum by occupying the frontlines of sit-ins and serving as protest leaders, they moved to take on the government directly, demanding an overhaul of the political structure and an opening of civic space. In a sign of how critical women were to the protests, and the threat they posed to the regime, the security services scaled up the arsenal of attacks, initiating a targeted campaign of gender-based violence. According to Physicians for Human Rights, this included psychological abuse, rape, and the mobilization and dissemination of compromising images. However, Sudanese women were resolute in their call for structural change.

Sudan may be turning a corner. Sudan has occupied the top five most-fragile countries of the Fragile States Index (FSI) for most of the Index's 16-year history, and appeared to be so mired in intractable conflicts and corruption, few saw hope for systemic change. To be sure, in early 2019, it appeared that despite the large-scale protests started in December 2018, the country was reverting to the familiar. Despite ousting the indicted war criminal and beleaguered president Omar al-Bashir in April, the military quickly moved to consolidate power again with defense minister and accused Darfur war criminal Lt. General

Awad Mohamed Ahmed Ibn Auf. It seemed for a time that Sudan was going to follow the Egyptian model, where one dictator was simply replaced with another, while real, systemic change would once again elude Africa's third largest nation. However, this time was to be different, due in no small part to the thousands of resolute Sudanese women like Alaa Salah who refused to back down.

The story of women in Sudanese history has been one of pronounced socio-political agency against a backdrop of formidable structures of patriarchy and fundamentalism. Nowhere was this more evident than during the 30-year despotic rule of al-Bashir. Under his regime, severe restrictions and discriminatory actions against women (both in practice and in law) were commonplace, such as the 1992 Public Order Act wherein the female behavior, including style of dress and association, was regulated and criminalized in an effort to force the populace to subscribe to the government's brand of fundamentalism. The Act also granted the male-dominated Public Order Police carte blanche in the loose interpretation and enforcement of the law. Consequently, 45,000 women were prosecuted in 2016 alone, according to the group, No to Oppression of Women Initiative. Coupled with endemic gender-based violence, partly driven by the lack of protections for women, the Act championed the dehumanization of women and facilitated the growth of an uncompromising patriarchal structure. Nevertheless, remarkable courage was demonstrated in the face of prolonged repression through advocacy and periodic episodes of localized civil disobedience, culminating in the protests of 2018-2019.

The unwavering determination of protesters and international condemnation of the brutal crackdowns led to talks between protest leaders and the Transitional Military Council. The resulting August power-sharing agreement and the selection as prime minister of Abdalla Hamdok, a technocrat with no ties to the vestiges of the al-Bashir regime, were momentous. In the 2020 FSI, this liberalization was reflected in the improvement in State Legitimacy indicator. During the first hundred days of the Hamdok-led transition government,

Khartoum initiated various reform measures and engaged in diplomatic missions intended to steer the country towards social, economic, and political change. These included the repeal of the Public Order Act, as well as other key initiatives such as the extension of religious freedoms to the Christian minority, the liberalization of the gold sector, a framework agreement for peace talks with the Darfur, and the cessation of fighting between the government and the rebels of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan. While these fledgling economic reforms did not immediately impact the Economic Decline and Uneven Economic Development indicators (as such outcomes are slow-moving in the realization of structural change) socio-political reforms were reflected in a marked improvement in the political and cohesion indicators.

Although Sudan appears to have rejected the Egyptian model for the immediate term, its path towards democracy must still be viewed through a lens of cautious optimism. Nevertheless, the 1964 and 1985 uprisings, wherein the country previously slipped into military-led autocratic rule in the wake of successful social movements, should be seen as a brake on too much optimism lest history repeat itself. The military, the bulwark of al-Bashir's regime, remains in place and largely untouched, increasing the risk of the consolidation and re-establishment of its power. Additionally, while the protests have ushered in some immediate changes, the task of reforming Sudan's fragile economic, social, and political structures remains monumental, particularly for a novice leadership. Should the government's efforts be deemed too slow-moving in effecting tangible change, Khartoum may soon be faced with a disaffected citizenry clamoring for change and a military poised to capitalize on popular frustrations and cleavages. Finally, as the 2019 protests demonstrated, for Sudan to succeed in this democratic experiment, the country's third attempt, it must embrace inclusive policies and offer real decision-making power to women. It appears to have made some initial headway in this regard by naming two women to the 11-member Sovereign Council, overturning the Public

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FIFTEEN YEARS ON, COTE D'IVOIRE COMES BACK FROM THE BRINK



MARCEL MAGLO
FIONA GRATHWOHL

In the very first Failed States Index (FSI) in 2005, Côte d'Ivoire was ranked as the world's most fragile state. Sixteen years later, the country once ravaged by two civil conflicts bears little resemblance to its past when it was torn along political and ethnic lines as Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) and Alassane Ouattara of the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) fought bitterly for power. Though group grievance and political tensions persist, few post-conflict countries have experienced as rapid economic recovery as Côte d'Ivoire has in recent years. As one of the fastest growing economies in the world, Côte d'Ivoire has shown similar improvements on the FSI, with a cumulative 19.5 point improvement since 2006).

During the two civil conflicts, Côte d'Ivoire was a country fraught with political instability, economic slow-down and insecurity. Several factors contributed to this situation. The fragility of the country's institutional and governance systems rendered them unable to cope with mounting pressures surrounding issues of resource management and, in particular, land conflicts. This, in turn, fueled a political crisis where existing cleavages around ethnicity, nationality and religion

were manipulated and exploited by politicians trying to gain and consolidate power. In an already sensitive socio-political environment still reeling from years of conflict, the divisive politization of identity based on national origin undermined national unity and tore through the social fabric of the once prosperous country. After ten years of civil strife, a power-sharing deal brokered between Gbagbo and Ouattara paved the way for the presidential elections of 2010. Following the highly contested ballot results that led to the demise of Laurent Gbagbo, the country again descended into chaos which culminated in a spasm of post-electoral violence causing 3,000 deaths and displacing an estimated 500,000. The rise in violence prompted the deployment of an international peacekeeping operation to de-escalate tensions and help restore peace and security. Following the withdrawal of the peacekeepers in 2017, the overall security environment has continued to improve despite the systemic challenges, a shift captured in the Security Apparatus indicator score.

Though Côte d'Ivoire's scores on the FSI have gradually improved on most indicators between 2010 and 2019, one has stood out prominently: the Economy indicator. In the aftermath of the crisis, Côte d'Ivoire, with support from the donor community, embarked on an ambitious development agenda to reform the security sector, strengthen the rule of law, and improve its overall performance through a series of

economic measures aimed at attracting foreign direct investment and boosting domestic markets while laying the foundation for a medium to a long-term growth.

The country had emerged from the crisis weakened on several fronts. However, it has made steady and remarkable strides in its economic trajectory, posting a yearly growth average of eight percent since 2012, according to the African Development Bank (AfDB). The surging economic growth has primarily been driven by domestic demand for public and private investment and external demand for primary sector export products such as cocoa beans. Improved infrastructure, sustained consumption, and economic reforms also contributed to improved business environment, making the country attractive for investment opportunities.

Despite these reforms, the Uneven Development indicator score remains high. Although the economic outlook is encouraging, the country must still contend with internal pressures driven by development challenges, rising inequality and high levels of poverty. According to World Bank data, an estimated 46.3 percent of Ivorians still lived in poverty by 2015. This is in sharp contrast with the macro level growth and the day-to-day reality of many. Far-reaching reforms and inclusive economic development approaches that can tackle the underlying causes of these structural vulnerabilities will be necessary to address these disparities and lift up the economically disadvantaged and most vulnerable members of the society.

On the political front, while the number of fatalities related to violence and insecurity in 2019 still remains very low compared to 2006, a recent rise in communal strife that rocked the western, central, and other regions of the country with a history of political tension and violence led to a worsening of the Group Grievance indicator for the first time since 2012. Some of these incidents resulted from clashes over land and access to resources, compounded by longstanding feuds between community members that degenerated into violence.

As Côte d'Ivoire is entering a critical phase to consolidate its young democracy, the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for October 2020 will test the country's ability to remain united. The same structural vulnerabilities that gave rise to political tensions and conflict in the past could indeed rise again. Certainly, both the signing of a presidential ordinance in 2018 granting amnesty to detainees prosecuted for crimes related to the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis and the various other institutional reforms enacted to rebuild trust and participation in the political system are encouraging signs that could strengthen social cohesion and foster national reconciliation. In the short term, to preserve the once-again vibrant country, it will be incumbent on both government and civil society to work together by taking bold and pragmatic steps to consolidate Côte d'Ivoire's impressive gains, and not allow the past to rise up again to challenge the future.

WOMEN OF SUDAN BRING A GLIMMER OF HOPE

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Order Act, appointing four women to the 18-member cabinet, and selecting the country's first female chief of justice. However, such changes cannot be mere window dressing and must be accompanied by continued, structural, and legal reforms to both protect and promote the critical role of women in Sudan.

If the country can achieve deep and durable reforms, as well as begin to address the decades of lingering group-based grievances in a manner that does not return it to civil war, the vision and efforts of women like Alaa Salah will not have been in vain.



IRAQ'S IMPROVING TRAJECTORY



NATE HAKEN
SARAH COCKEY

Access to safe water has always been a fundamental driver of conflict around the world. The worst drought in hundreds of years preceded the Syria crisis in 2011 and fueled unrest in Yemen. Changing rain patterns and desertification have brought farmers and herders into lethal violence, killing over ten thousand in the last ten years in West Africa alone. Even the range wars in the American West in the 19th Century were largely over competition for water among the ranchers and farmers from Oklahoma to California. These conflicts are so old, they were even mythologized in the Bible with the story of Cain and Abel near the Euphrates River in modern day Iraq.

When the Fragile States Index (FSI) was first published in 2004, Saddam Hussein had just been executed and the U.S. was surging thousands of troops to stabilize a rapidly deteriorating situation following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Iraq was the fourth most fragile country in the world and was getting worse. The war was also reshaping the geopolitics of the entire Middle East and beyond, as regional powers were pulled in to defend their conflicting and overlapping interests, and locals fought for their lives and livelihoods. Since 2007, aside from a spike in violence between 2015-2017 when the Islamic State of

Iraq and Syria (ISIS) emerged, the overall trajectory in Iraq has been positive. That positive trend, however, is increasingly at risk as donor fatigue has begun to kick in and many in the international development community are shifting their focus elsewhere. Yet a deeper look at the FSI indicators suggests that there remain serious areas of concern, that if not addressed in a focused and sustained way, could lead back into a vicious cycle of fragility and crisis.

There remain very real reasons for optimism, however. According to the FSI, several indicators have significantly improved in recent years, especially Security Apparatus and Economic Decline. ISIS's decline in power has allowed the country to focus more on rebuilding its infrastructure and economy, which has been gradually improving due to a rise in crude oil production — which has nearly doubled over the past decade. The private sector is returning, as people open new restaurants, malls and cafes. Security has improved greatly. Every month, fewer civilians are killed. Iraq is now the most peaceful it has been in at least 16 years. Sectarian conflicts have decreased between Sunni and Shi'a populations, as people's attention turns toward post-conflict reconstruction, governance, and public services. A promising agreement between the government of Iraq and the government of semi-autonomous Kurdish region has been reached regarding a 2020 budget sharing arrangement.

However, there are some indicators that have not improved, or have even worsened. Behind the deterioration of many of these indicators is the issue of public services, specifically water. Iraq has a history of an unstable water supply. Its main water sources, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, flow from outside the country which puts very high stakes on transboundary water agreements and the technical implementation of those treaties, particularly given the series of dams Turkey built in the 1980s and a hydroelectric dam on the Tigris in 2019. The water issue has also been affected by changes in rainfall, exploitation of aquifers, and perhaps most notably the Iraq-Iran war and Gulf war, economic sanctions, and finally the U.S. invasion in 2003, all of which left a previously effective water management system in ruins. In short, there are years' worth of damage that must be addressed for Iraq to recover and rebuild an effective system.

Although water quality is not a new issue, especially in the Basra region, it has become considerably worse since 2018 when around a hundred thousand Iraqis were hospitalized due to poor water quality. A lack of regulation and infrastructure has led to garbage and sewage contamination of the water supply, causing crop damage and impacting the livelihoods of farmers. Those wealthy enough resort to bottled water for

cooking and drinking. Many promises have been made by the government to improve the situation, but projects have fallen through due to budgetary limitations and allegations of mismanagement.

Many of Iraq's violent protests in the past few years have been largely related to the water crisis. In 2019, protesters began by demanding better access to water and electricity, but as numbers increased and demonstrators were angered by the lethal response employed by government security forces, the range of demands grew to include issues with corruption and grievances related to the sectarian government system.

Iraq has worked hard to emerge from decades of conflict into a new and promising era. However, the issue of water is key. If this critical issue is addressed, it will lead to improved health, livelihoods, and opportunity for the Iraqi people. But if it is not, then the spread of water-borne disease and further water-related conflict will only worsen. Iraq could lose the ground it has gained and be pulled back into a vicious cycle. Even as Iraq disappears from the front pages of newspapers, development and humanitarian actors must not forget that there is vital work still to be done.



THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

In a highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises emerge from ethnic tensions; some are civil wars; others take on the form of revolutions; and many result in complex humanitarian emergencies.

Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. A mixed approach integrating qualitative and quantitative data sources is needed to establish patterns and trends. With the right data and analysis it is possible to identify problems that may be simmering below the surface. Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP) is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index — and the social science framework and data

analysis tools upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, FFP collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

ORIGINS OF THE FSI: THE CAST FRAMEWORK

The genesis of most indices is to begin with a concept of what needs to be measured, followed by the development of a methodology that hopes to perform that measurement. The FSI followed a very different trajectory, whereby the idea for the Index occurred subsequently to the development of its own methodology.

The FSI traces its origins to the creation of FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which was developed in the 1990s as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments. The CAST framework has been widely peer reviewed, and the continued usage of the framework by many of those same professionals, as well as now by local civil society and community groups in conflict-affected areas, is testament to the framework's enduring relevance. In 2004, the CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, as researchers wished to determine whether state fragility could be assessed and ranked at a national level using the existing framework.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE FSI ANALYTICAL PROCESS


Though at the ground level the CAST framework is applied using various practices such as individual incident reporting and observation by field monitors, the sheer volume of data to be analyzed at an international level required a different approach. To that end, technology was employed to enable researchers to process large volumes of data to perform the national level assessments that feed into the FSI.

Based on CAST’s comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.
2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase. Depending on the degree to which the Content Analysis

and the Quantitative Data agree, the provisional scores are confirmed, or where they disagree, are reconciled based on a set of rules that dictate allowable movements in score in the event of disagreement between the two data streams.

3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up – which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.



These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source are checked by the others. Though the basic data underpinning of the Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources. Final indicator scores for each country are then produced from this process. A panel review is then conducted

by the research team of the final Index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user. Though an index inherently ranks different countries – making some more fragile than others – ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state’s resiliency. To that end, the following section outlines what each indicator seeks to measure in the Index – as well as providing guiding questions for deeper levels of analysis and inquiry by the user.



UNDERSTANDING THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

INTERPRETING THE FSI SCORES

The 2019 FSI, the 15th edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2019 are not covered by the 2019 Index. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. FFP attempts as much as possible to de-emphasize rankings, as it is our firm belief that a country's overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country's performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time. Hence, our analysis focuses more on specific indicator scores or trend lines over time rather than just rankings. Ultimately, the FSI is an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis by civil society, government, businesses and practitioners alike — to understand more about a state's capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience.

COHESION INDICATORS



Security Apparatus



Factionalized Elites



Group Grievance

ECONOMIC INDICATORS



Economic Decline



Uneven Development



Human Flight & Brain Drain

POLITICAL INDICATORS



State Legitimacy



Public Services



Human Rights & Rule of Law

SOCIAL + CROSS-CUTTING INDICATORS



Demographic Pressures



Refugees & IDPs



External Intervention

THE INDICATORS: COHESION

SECURITY APPARATUS



The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus indicator also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a state can include a “deep state”, that may consist of secret intelligence units, or other irregular security forces, that serve the interests of a political leader or clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Questions to consider may include*:

Monopoly on the Use of Force

- Is the military under civilian control?
- Do private militias exist against the state?
- Is there paramilitary activity?
- Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry

- Are the police considered to be professional?
- Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

Force

- Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms

- Is there a high availability of weapons?
- If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

FACTIONALIZED ELITES



The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinkmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors in the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions and, where elections occur, will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class).

* Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.

GROUP GRIEVANCE

Questions to consider may include*:

Representative Leadership

- Is leadership fairly elected? Is leadership representative of the population?
- Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- Is there a political reconciliation process?
- Is the military representative of the population?

Identity

- Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- Does hate speech via radio and media exist?
- Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- Does cross-cultural respect exist?

Resource Distribution

- Is wealth concentrated in hands of a few?
- Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through taxes?

Equality and Equity

- Are the laws democratic or reasonable?
- Is the system representative of the population?



The Group Grievance indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group’s role in society and relationships with other groups. This history may in turn be shaped by patterns of real or perceived atrocities or “crimes” committed with apparent impunity against communal groups. Groups may also feel aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence to which they believe they are entitled. The indicator also considers where specific groups are singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression, or where there is public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power “illegitimately,” which may manifest itself in the emergence of fiery rhetoric, such as through “hate” radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political speech.

Questions to consider may include*:

Post-Conflict Response

- Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one needed?
- Have groups been reintegrated?
- Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- Are victims of past atrocities compensated (or is there a plan to)?
- Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted?
- Has amnesty been granted?

Equality

- Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?

Divisions

- Are there feelings/reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- Is there history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of religiously motivated violence?

Communal Violence

- Is vigilante justice reported?
- Are there reports of mass violence and/or killings?

THE INDICATORS: ECONOMIC

ECONOMIC DECLINE



Economic Decline indicator considers factors related to economic decline within a country. For example, the indicator looks at patterns of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. It also takes into account sudden drops in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment, and any collapse or devaluation of the national currency. The Economic Decline indicator further considers the responses to economic conditions and their consequences, such as extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs, or perceived increasing group inequalities. The Economic Decline indicator is focused on the formal economy as well as illicit trade, including the drug and human trafficking, and capital flight, or levels of corruption and illicit transactions such as money laundering or embezzlement.

Questions to consider may include:*

Public Finances

- What level is the government debt?

Economic Conditions

- How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- What is the level of productivity?
- What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?

Economic Climate

- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- How do experts view the economy?
- Is the business climate attractive to Foreign Direct Investment?
- Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Economic Diversification

- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT



The Uneven Economic Development indicator considers inequality within the economy, irrespective of the actual performance of an economy. For example, the Indicator looks at structural inequality that is based on group (such as racial, ethnic, religious, or other identity group) or based on education, economic status, or region (such as urban-rural divide). The Indicator considers not only actual inequality, but also perceptions of inequality, recognizing that perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievance as much as real inequality, and can reinforce communal tensions or nationalistic rhetoric. Further to measuring economic inequality, the Indicator also takes into account the opportunities for groups to improve their economic status, such as through access to employment, education, or job training such that, even if there is economic inequality present, to what degree it is structural and reinforcing?

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN

Questions to consider may include*:

Economic Equality

- Economic Equality: Is there a large economic gap?
- Is the economic system discriminatory?
- Does economic justice exist?
- Are hiring practices generally fair – legally and perceived?
- Do equal rights exist in the society?
- Are there laws protecting equal rights?

Economic Opportunity

- Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- Is the education provided relatively equal?
- Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
- Do programs for job training exist?
- Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?

Socio-Economic Dynamics

- Do ghettos and slums exist?



The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator considers the economic impact of human displacement (for economic or political reasons) and the consequences this may have on a country's development. On the one hand, this may involve the voluntary emigration of the middle class – particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, or skilled workers such as physicians – due to economic deterioration in their home country and the hope of better opportunities farther afield. On the other hand, it may involve the forced displacement of professionals or intellectuals who are fleeing their country due to actual or feared persecution or repression. The indicator specifically measures the economic impact that displacement may wreak on an economy through the loss of productive, skilled professional labor.

Questions to consider may include*:

Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital

- Are professionals leaving the country?
- Are politicians or political elites leaving the country?
- Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?

Economics

- Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

Diaspora

- Is there growth of a country's exiled communities or diasporas abroad?
- Does the diaspora have an impact on the home state economy, or on politics in the home state?

THE INDICATORS: POLITICAL

STATE LEGITIMACY



The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions and, where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population's confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

Questions to consider may include:*

Confidence in the Political Process

- Does the government have the confidence of the people?

Political Opposition

- Have demonstrations occurred?
- Have riots or uprisings occurred?

Transparency

- Is there evidence of corruption on the part of government officials?
- Are national and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the

Political Process

- Do all parties enjoy political rights?
- Is the government representative of the population?
- Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- What is the longer term history of power transitions?
- Are elections perceived free and fair?
- Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?

Political Violence

- Are there reports of politically motivated attacks, assassinations?
- Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- Have there been terrorist attacks and how likely are they?

PUBLIC SERVICES



The Public Services Indicator refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. On the one hand, this may include the provision of essential services, such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet and connectivity. On the other hand, it may include the state's ability to protect its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through perceived effective policing. Further, even where basic state functions and services are provided, the Indicator further considers to whom – whether the state narrowly serves the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, or the diplomatic service, while failing to provide comparable levels of service to the general populace – such as rural versus urban populations. The Indicator also considers the level and maintenance of general infrastructure to the extent that its absence would negatively affect the country's actual or potential development.

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

Questions to consider may include*:

General Provision of Public Services

- Is there equal access to public services?
- What are the general conditions of public services?

Health

- Is there adequate access to medicines?
- Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for all people?
- Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- Is sanitation system adequate?

Education

- What is the level of school enrollment? Is it different by gender?
- What are the literacy rates? Is it different by gender?

Shelter

- Do the poor have access to housing?
- Are housing costs in line with economy?

Infrastructure

- Are roads adequate and safe?
- Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?
- Is there an adequate supply of fuel?



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political

ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include*:

Civil and Political Rights and Freedoms

- Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- Is the right to life protected for all?
- Is freedom of speech protected?
- Is there freedom of movement?
- Does religious freedom exist?

Violation of Rights

- Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or others?
- Are there reports of state- or group-sponsored torture?
- Are there labor laws or reports of forced labor or child labor?
- Are groups forced to relocate? Is there proper compensation?

Openness

- Does independent media exist?
- Do reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- Is there equal access to information?

Justice

- If rights aren't protected, is there a legal system in which they can be addressed?
- Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention?
- How are the prison conditions?

Equality

- Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?

THE INDICATORS: SOCIAL AND CROSS-CUTTING

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES



The Demographic Pressures Indicator considers pressures upon the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high population growth

rates or skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic, and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also takes into account pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

Questions to consider may include*:

Population

- Is the population growth rate sustainable? Is the current and projected distribution reasonable?
- Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there a high orphan population?

Public Health

- Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases, pandemics?
- Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases or epidemics?

Food and Nutrition

- Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?
- Is there a likelihood of droughts?

- Is there a short-term food shortage or longer-term starvation?
- Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?

Environment

- Do sound environmental policies exist and are current practices sustainable?
- Is natural disaster likely, recurring?
- If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?
- Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests?

Resources

- Does resource competition exist?
- Does land competition exist and are there laws to arbitrate disputes?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?

REFUGEES AND IDPS



The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources. The Indicator also measures the internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state’s population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year on year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Questions to consider may include*:

Refugees

- Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- Are conditions safe in refugee camps?

Internally Displaced Persons

- How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?

Response to Displacement

- Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?
- Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?



The External Intervention Indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning – particularly security and economic – of a state. On the one hand, External Intervention focuses on security aspects of engagement from external actors, both covert and overt, in the internal affairs of a state by governments, armies, intelligence services, identity groups, or other entities that may affect the balance of power (or resolution of a conflict) within a state. On the other hand, External Intervention also focuses on economic engagement by outside actors, including multilateral organizations, through large-scale loans, development projects, or foreign aid, such as ongoing budget support, control of finances, or management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency. External Intervention also takes into account humanitarian intervention, such as the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

Questions to consider may include*:

Political Intervention

- Is there external support for factions opposed to the government?

Force Intervention

- Are foreign troops present?
- Are military attacks from other countries occurring?
- Is there external military assistance?
- Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?
- Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?
- Is there external support for police training?
- Are covert operations taking place?

Economic Intervention

- Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid?
- Is the country dependent on economic aid?

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2020

														Total	Change from Previous Year
 Afghanistan	99	89	75	83	77	75	90	95	76	90	93	86	102.9	-2.1	-0.1
 Albania	5.1	6.2	4.4	5.8	2.7	8.1	5.8	3.9	3.9	3.6	2.9	6.4	58.8	-0.1	-0.8
 Algeria	6.3	7.8	7.5	6.2	5.7	5.8	8.3	5.1	6.3	4.5	7.1	4.0	74.6	-0.5	-0.5
 Angola	7.1	7.2	7.8	6.9	9.0	6.3	8.0	8.7	6.4	8.8	6.2	4.9	87.3	-2.3	-0.5
 Antigua and Barbuda	5.7	3.7	3.6	4.8	4.2	6.2	4.5	3.4	4.2	4.0	2.6	5.2	52.1	0.1	0.1
 Argentina	5.2	2.8	4.1	5.4	4.9	2.9	3.9	3.3	3.6	3.3	2.0	4.6	46.1	-2.5	-0.9
 Armenia	5.2	7.0	5.0	6.2	3.6	6.5	6.6	3.3	6.3	2.4	6.1	6.0	64.2	0.0	0.4
 Australia	3.0	1.7	3.4	1.3	1.5	0.7	0.7	1.8	1.4	1.9	1.8	0.5	19.7	-0.9	-0.6
 Austria	1.9	3.2	4.2	1.3	2.0	1.6	0.8	1.3	0.6	1.9	4.7	0.6	24.1	-1.9	-2.3
 Azerbaijan	5.9	7.9	5.6	4.4	5.2	4.3	9.1	4.5	8.0	3.7	6.8	5.9	71.3	1.1	-1.9
 Bahamas	5.2	4.5	3.2	3.9	4.2	4.1	2.7	4.3	4.3	6.8	2.7	4.0	49.9	-1.7	0.4
 Bahrain	6.2	7.6	9.3	3.7	4.3	3.1	8.3	2.0	8.7	3.6	2.0	5.1	63.9	0.1	-1.8
 Bangladesh	7.3	9.3	8.3	5.8	6.0	7.3	7.2	7.0	7.1	7.6	5.5	85.7	-2.0	-2.3	
 Barbados	4.7	4.2	3.2	5.4	4.3	5.6	1.6	2.5	3.4	4.3	1.6	5.7	46.4	-1.6	-1.4
 Belarus	5.5	8.3	6.2	4.9	4.0	3.7	8.5	3.3	7.4	4.6	2.7	6.7	65.8	-2.4	-1.5
 Belgium	2.9	4.4	4.4	3.9	1.8	2.3	1.1	1.5	0.7	1.5	2.0	0.6	27.1	-1.7	-0.8
 Belize	7.1	4.3	4.4	6.0	4.5	6.0	4.3	5.0	5.4	4.0	2.8	7.0	60.8	-1.1	-1.5
 Benin	5.6	6.7	2.9	6.5	8.2	6.8	4.9	8.2	4.6	7.6	4.8	5.8	72.5	-2.5	-1.7
 Bhutan	3.6	7.5	8.8	5.0	5.0	6.6	3.4	5.2	5.7	5.2	6.1	7.4	69.5	2.1	-1.1
 Bolivia	6.2	9.0	5.9	5.1	8.3	6.5	7.5	5.9	6.2	6.1	3.3	4.9	75.0	-1.1	-2.4
 Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.3	8.7	6.9	5.9	4.4	6.2	6.5	3.3	5.1	3.1	6.9	7.9	70.2	-1.1	-2.4
 Botswana	3.7	3.3	4.0	5.5	6.9	5.2	2.4	6.8	4.9	7.6	3.6	3.2	57.1	-1.2	-0.9
 Brazil	7.1	6.2	7.3	5.2	7.1	4.2	6.7	6.9	7.0	7.8	3.6	3.9	73.0	-1.4	-2.2
 Brunei Darussalam	4.5	7.4	6.2	3.3	7.5	4.1	7.4	1.6	7.2	2.8	1.3	3.3	56.6	-0.9	-1.4
 Bulgaria	4.6	5.3	4.5	4.9	3.5	4.5	3.6	3.5	3.0	3.2	4.0	4.6	49.2	2.0	-0.3
 Burkina Faso	8.7	7.8	4.4	6.7	7.3	7.1	6.2	8.4	5.7	8.6	7.0	8.0	85.9	-1.4	-2.0
 Burundi	8.3	7.9	7.6	8.5	7.3	5.9	9.1	7.9	9.1	9.2	8.5	8.5	97.9	-0.3	-1.0
 Cambodia	6.7	8.6	6.0	5.0	5.9	6.9	8.4	7.7	7.3	5.9	4.8	7.1	80.3	-2.2	-0.9
 Cameroon	8.2	9.3	8.6	6.8	7.7	7.6	8.9	8.3	7.8	8.8	8.6	7.3	97.9	0.9	-1.3
 Canada	3.1	2.5	2.5	1.2	1.8	1.4	0.5	0.8	1.4	1.0	1.9	0.5	18.7	-1.8	-0.4
 Cape Verde	5.1	5.5	3.2	5.7	6.0	7.8	4.4	5.1	3.1	6.3	3.9	8.7	64.8	-1.4	-2.1
 Central African Republic	8.3	9.7	8.0	8.4	9.9	6.8	8.9	10.0	9.2	8.8	10.0	9.5	107.5	-1.4	-2.1
 Chad	9.2	9.5	8.3	8.5	8.9	8.4	9.3	9.4	8.5	9.6	9.2	7.7	106.4	-1.2	-0.7
 Chile	4.1	2.2	3.1	3.6	5.4	3.5	5.7	3.5	3.9	4.4	1.9	1.2	42.5	3.6	-1.2
 China	5.8	7.2	7.4	3.9	6.4	4.3	8.8	4.8	9.3	5.6	4.0	2.4	69.9	0.9	-0.5
 Colombia	7.2	7.6	7.2	4.8	6.5	5.3	5.8	5.6	6.5	6.5	7.9	5.7	76.6	-1.2	-0.9
 Comoros	6.5	8.0	4.5	7.3	7.0	6.5	7.4	7.5	5.8	7.9	5.8	7.1	81.2	-0.8	-1.3
 Congo Democratic Repub-	8.5	9.8	9.7	8.0	8.6	6.9	9.7	9.5	9.5	9.8	10.0	9.4	109.4	-0.4	-0.8
 Congo Republic	7.3	6.7	8.1	7.8	8.4	7.1	9.1	8.6	8.1	8.0	6.7	6.2	92.1	-1.8	-2.4
 Costa Rica	3.8	3.8	3.3	4.6	4.4	3.8	1.5	3.2	1.2	2.5	3.4	4.6	40.2	-1.4	-0.7
 Cote d'Ivoire	7.1	9.1	7.6	6.4	7.5	6.7	7.0	8.1	7.0	8.2	6.9	8.1	89.7	-1.4	-1.6
 Croatia	2.9	4.4	4.9	5.0	2.4	5.2	2.2	2.6	2.9	2.6	6.1	4.8	46.1	-1.6	-1.7
 Cuba	4.3	7.0	3.1	4.3	4.5	5.2	7.2	3.8	6.4	5.0	3.1	5.3	59.2	-1.7	-1.9
 Cyprus	3.8	7.9	5.4	5.1	5.0	3.8	3.9	2.3	2.9	2.9	5.0	8.1	56.1	-1.9	-1.9
 Czechia	2.9	5.3	4.9	3.7	1.8	3.3	4.4	1.7	2.1	0.9	2.9	1.8	35.7	-1.9	-1.9
 Denmark	1.6	1.4	4.0	1.3	0.9	1.6	0.6	0.9	1.4	1.3	1.7	0.5	17.2	-2.3	-2.4
 Djibouti	5.6	7.3	5.6	6.7	7.4	4.9	8.1	7.3	7.4	7.5	7.0	7.9	82.7	-1.8	-1.8
 Dominican Republic	6.4	6.2	6.4	4.6	5.0	6.5	6.3	6.0	5.0	6.2	2.7	4.5	64.4	-1.8	-2.4
 Ecuador	6.2	8.2	6.4	5.4	6.1	4.9	6.0	5.6	3.9	5.4	5.9	5.4	69.4	-2.4	-0.9
 Egypt	7.9	9.1	8.6	7.6	5.4	5.3	8.6	4.2	9.7	6.2	6.4	7.0	86.0	-0.9	-0.4
 El Salvador	7.1	4.3	5.8	5.1	5.5	8.5	4.1	5.7	5.4	6.7	5.3	5.4	68.9	0.4	0.4
 Equatorial Guinea	6.2	8.2	6.6	5.7	8.0	4.6	9.8	8.4	8.3	8.2	4.8	4.1	83.0	-0.6	-1.7
 Eritrea	6.5	8.1	8.0	7.4	8.6	8.8	9.4	7.5	8.7	8.2	7.7	7.0	95.8	-2.3	-2.3
 Estonia	2.6	5.9	7.7	2.8	2.3	4.6	1.8	2.0	1.4	1.9	2.2	3.4	38.5	-1.7	-0.8
 Eswatini	5.4	6.8	2.5	9.5	7.9	6.7	8.6	7.2	8.5	8.6	4.3	7.0	83.0	-1.5	-1.7
 Ethiopia	7.9	8.9	9.0	6.1	6.2	6.3	8.5	8.3	7.9	9.1	8.8	7.6	94.6	0.4	-1.8
 Fiji	6.8	7.9	6.0	5.6	5.4	7.9	6.0	4.1	6.0	4.1	2.9	7.2	69.9	-1.8	-2.3
 Finland	2.8	1.4	0.9	2.6	0.5	1.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.7	1.6	0.7	14.6	-1.5	-1.5
 France	3.8	1.9	6.7	3.4	3.1	2.2	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.9	2.5	1.2	30.5	-1.4	-1.4
 Gabon	5.1	8.3	2.9	5.7	5.6	5.5	7.8	6.0	7.2	6.6	3.6	4.8	69.1	-1.7	-1.7
 Gambia	6.0	7.7	2.9	8.1	6.0	7.6	7.5	7.2	8.1	8.4	6.3	6.4	82.2	-1.5	-1.5
 Georgia	5.9	9.1	7.6	5.3	4.6	5.2	8.5	3.4	5.1	3.0	6.6	6.9	71.2	-1.5	-1.5
 Germany	2.6	2.6	4.3	1.3	2.1	2.1	0.5	1.0	0.8	1.1	4.3	0.5	23.2	-1.7	-1.7
 Ghana	4.9	4.9	3.5	5.4	6.0	7.5	3.3	6.9	4.7	6.8	4.3	6.0	64.2	-1.8	-1.8
 Greece	4.2	4.1	4.5	5.2	2.6	3.6	5.8	3.5	3.0	3.4	5.8	6.4	52.1	-1.4	-1.4
 Grenada	5.1	5.6	3.6	5.3	4.6	7.8	4.6	3.3	2.4	3.9	2.3	6.8	55.2	-2.2	-2.2
 Guatemala	7.1	7.1	9.4	4.8	7.2	7.2	6.4	6.7	7.0	6.9	5.1	4.3	79.2	-2.2	-2.2
 Guinea	8.3	9.6	9.2	8.3	7.0	6.8	9.9	9.2	6.8	8.3	7.3	6.5	97.2	-2.2	-2.2
 Guinea Bissau	8.0	9.6	4.6	7.4	9.4	7.2	8.6	8.6	6.9	8.4	6.4	7.7	97.9	-2.6	-2.6
 Guyana	6.8	5.1	6.4	5.5	4.8	8.5	4.5	5.4	3.2	3.3	3.6	6.8	66.0	-1.6	-1.6
 Haiti	6.9	9.6	5.6	8.5	9.1	8.1	9.1	9.3	6.9	8.2	7.1	9.3	97.7	-1.0	-1.0
 Honduras	7.2	7.0	5.0	5.8	6.8	6.4	7.0	6.5	6.9	5.6	5.4	7.2	76.8	-2.0	-2.0
 Hungary	2.6	5.3	3.9	4.5	2.9	3.9	6.1	2.4	5.0	1.3	5.6	4.2	47.6	-2.0	-2.0
Iceland	1.0	1.8	0.7	2.8	1.0	2.2	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.7	3.5	17.8	-2.0	-2.0	
India	6.9	7.3	8.5	5.6	6.1	5.8	4.0	6.5	7.6	7.8	4.4	4.8	75.3	0.9	0.9
Indonesia	6.1	7.1													

FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2020

	SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX	Total	Change from Previous Year
Lebanon	7.8	9.6	8.2	7.0	4.9	5.9	7.4	4.8	6.9	4.7	8.7	8.8	84.7	-0.3
Lesotho	6.7	7.3	3.0	8.4	8.3	7.8	5.0	7.2	5.1	8.0	4.6	6.9	78.3	-1.4
Liberia	6.9	8.3	4.9	8.3	7.5	7.7	7.1	9.0	6.2	8.5	7.8	8.4	90.0	-0.2
Libya	9.5	9.7	7.8	8.0	5.3	5.2	9.8	6.9	9.4	5.3	8.0	9.8	95.2	3.0
Lithuania	3.1	3.0	3.4	3.6	3.9	4.9	1.8	2.7	2.4	1.9	1.9	3.7	36.5	-1.6
Luxembourg	1.0	3.4	2.4	1.5	1.1	1.6	0.5	1.4	1.2	1.3	2.8	0.5	18.8	-1.6
Madagascar	6.6	7.8	3.2	7.0	8.9	6.4	6.2	8.3	5.8	9.2	4.2	5.9	79.5	-1.4
Malawi	5.1	8.1	5.0	7.7	8.1	7.1	6.6	7.9	5.6	9.4	5.7	7.7	84.0	0.7
Malaysia	5.7	6.8	5.7	2.8	4.2	4.8	6.6	3.3	7.1	4.4	3.3	2.9	57.6	-2.9
Maldives	5.8	8.1	3.9	5.0	2.7	5.9	7.8	4.9	7.4	5.1	4.0	5.6	66.2	-3.6
Mali	9.5	5.7	8.4	7.3	7.0	8.0	7.0	8.8	7.7	8.6	8.4	9.6	96.0	1.5
Malta	2.7	2.0	3.0	3.4	1.7	3.8	3.4	1.4	3.1	2.5	3.7	2.8	33.6	-0.9
Mauritania	6.6	8.8	7.3	6.8	5.9	6.6	8.0	8.4	7.2	8.5	7.6	7.1	88.7	-1.4
Mauritius	1.5	3.2	4.1	4.2	2.6	4.3	2.1	2.7	3.8	2.9	2.0	3.8	37.2	-1.7
Mexico	8.8	5.4	6.3	4.2	5.0	5.0	5.6	5.9	6.0	5.2	4.9	4.9	67.2	-2.5
Micronesia	4.0	5.6	3.7	7.9	7.4	9.3	4.6	5.6	3.5	6.0	3.6	10.0	71.2	-1.8
Moldova	5.4	8.3	6.7	5.5	3.9	7.0	6.0	4.7	4.8	3.9	3.3	6.5	66.0	-1.1
Mongolia	3.2	5.5	2.9	4.5	5.5	4.0	3.8	4.7	4.0	4.7	2.3	6.9	51.9	-2.2
Montenegro	4.9	9.0	5.0	1.5	4.4	4.1	3.4	3.7	1.9	3.7	7.4	5.5	55.5	0.2
Morocco	5.2	6.6	8.8	5.2	5.1	7.6	6.8	4.6	5.9	4.3	5.6	5.5	71.2	-1.8
Mozambique	6.8	7.1	5.3	8.3	9.5	7.4	7.3	9.4	5.3	9.8	7.6	7.9	91.7	3.0
Myanmar	8.8	8.0	9.8	5.0	7.0	6.8	8.0	8.4	9.4	6.3	9.1	7.4	94.0	-0.3
Namibia	5.1	3.5	4.9	6.9	7.6	6.5	3.0	7.1	2.9	7.9	4.2	5.5	65.1	-1.3
Nepal	5.6	8.8	9.7	5.3	5.8	6.1	6.3	6.3	6.8	8.1	7.5	6.2	82.6	-2.1
Netherlands	2.4	3.4	3.9	1.8	1.3	2.5	0.7	0.8	0.9	1.6	2.9	0.7	22.9	-1.9
New Zealand	1.5	1.4	2.9	2.9	1.6	2.0	0.5	0.9	0.5	1.4	1.7	0.6	17.9	-2.2
Nicaragua	6.1	7.1	5.6	5.6	7.3	7.6	8.4	5.9	7.6	4.8	4.0	7.1	77.1	-1.0
Niger	8.8	8.9	7.8	6.8	7.7	7.3	7.0	9.2	6.9	8.7	8.4	7.8	95.3	-0.9
Nigeria	8.7	9.9	9.1	7.9	7.8	6.6	8.1	8.9	8.4	9.3	6.9	5.7	97.3	-1.2
North Korea	8.3	8.5	5.5	8.6	7.2	4.1	9.9	8.3	9.4	6.8	4.1	9.5	90.2	-2.5
North Macedonia	5.0	7.3	6.3	6.1	4.6	5.5	5.4	3.8	2.9	2.2	7.2	5.8	62.1	-2.5
Norway	1.8	1.1	3.6	1.7	0.7	1.0	0.5	1.1	0.6	0.9	2.5	0.7	16.2	-1.8
Oman	3.3	6.6	2.0	4.2	3.9	2.2	6.9	2.7	7.2	4.0	1.8	3.2	48.0	-2.0
Pakistan	8.2	9.0	9.1	7.1	7.1	5.6	6.5	7.6	7.7	7.1	7.9	7.8	92.1	-2.1
Panama	5.5	2.2	5.6	2.7	6.3	4.3	2.9	4.4	3.5	3.8	2.5	2.3	46.0	-1.0
Papua New Guinea	7.0	7.1	5.4	6.7	9.1	6.8	6.0	9.2	6.9	7.6	4.6	5.9	82.3	-0.8
Paraguay	6.2	7.8	4.9	4.6	7.0	5.3	6.5	5.3	5.4	5.0	3.0	4.1	65.2	-1.8
Peru	6.4	7.4	8.3	3.3	6.5	6.5	7.1	6.4	3.4	5.9	3.8	2.6	67.6	-0.6
Philippines	9.2	8.0	7.6	4.6	4.8	5.7	7.3	5.8	7.5	7.6	6.6	6.3	81.0	-2.1
Poland	2.7	4.2	5.9	3.5	2.1	4.6	4.2	2.0	3.9	2.1	2.7	3.1	41.0	-1.8
Portugal	0.7	2.5	1.6	4.0	1.7	2.5	0.8	1.9	0.9	1.8	1.9	3.2	23.5	-1.8
Qatar	1.7	5.0	3.7	1.2	4.6	1.8	6.4	1.4	6.1	2.9	1.7	7.3	43.7	-1.7
Romania	2.4	5.7	5.9	4.1	3.3	4.9	5.3	3.3	3.3	2.3	2.3	3.9	46.7	-1.1
Russia	8.0	8.1	8.3	4.9	5.3	3.5	8.3	3.3	8.8	4.1	4.9	5.1	72.6	-2.1
Rwanda	6.1	8.0	9.9	5.9	7.8	6.8	6.9	6.5	6.3	7.5	7.8	6.6	86.0	-1.5

	SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX	Total	Change from Previous Year
Samoa	4.1	5.1	4.2	6.0	4.0	9.8	4.6	4.2	3.6	5.2	2.6	9.8	63.3	-0.9
Sao Tome and Principe	5.0	6.3	4.2	7.9	5.7	8.2	4.7	5.6	3.0	6.4	5.1	8.2	70.3	-0.8
Saudi Arabia	6.0	8.5	8.7	3.9	4.7	3.6	8.1	2.9	8.9	4.4	4.1	5.0	68.8	-1.6
Senegal	5.4	7.0	5.5	6.9	7.0	7.4	3.8	7.2	5.1	7.1	6.4	5.8	74.6	-2.6
Serbia	4.8	8.0	7.4	5.9	4.0	5.6	5.2	3.4	3.8	3.4	7.7	6.9	66.1	-1.9
Seychelles	5.7	6.0	4.2	3.6	5.6	5.6	4.6	2.2	3.9	4.2	2.3	6.7	54.7	-0.5
Sierra Leone	4.1	7.8	5.9	8.3	8.0	7.7	6.0	8.5	5.2	8.8	7.1	7.0	84.4	-2.4
Singapore	1.0	4.0	1.7	1.1	2.9	2.4	3.8	1.0	4.3	2.0	1.0	1.0	26.3	-1.8
Slovak Republic	1.5	5.0	6.0	3.7	2.6	4.0	4.1	2.1	2.4	1.4	2.9	2.4	38.2	-2.3
Slovenia	0.7	2.0	3.9	2.9	2.5	3.6	1.8	1.4	1.2	1.4	3.1	1.4	25.8	-2.2
Solomon Islands	5.9	8.2	5.6	6.8	8.1	6.6	5.9	7.7	4.3	7.4	4.1	9.1	79.7	-2.2
Somalia	9.8	10.0	8.6	9.1	9.4	8.9	8.9	9.1	9.0	10.0	9.1	9.0	110.9	-1.4
South Africa	6.7	6.6	6.2	7.5	6.8	5.2	6.2	6.4	3.9	6.6	4.5	3.5	70.1	-1.0
South Korea	2.4	3.9	2.4	1.7	2.1	3.6	3.3	1.2	3.1	2.0	1.6	4.7	32.0	-1.7
South Sudan	9.4	9.7	9.1	9.5	9.2	6.8	9.9	9.5	9.0	9.5	9.7	9.5	110.8	-1.4
Spain	3.7	6.9	6.4	4.3	2.6	1.1	7.2	1.9	0.9	1.5	1.9	2.0	40.4	-0.3
Sri Lanka	7.1	9.1	9.1	5.2	6.2	7.0	6.6	4.2	8.1	5.7	7.5	6.0	81.8	-2.2
Sudan	8.4	9.4	9.4	8.1	8.0	9.3	8.3	8.9	9.1	9.3	8.6	10.4	104.8	-3.2
Suriname	4.3	5.8	6.1	6.7	5.6	5.9	4.1	4.7	4.0	4.8	2.8	5.3	60.1	-1.8
Sweden	3.0	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.2	0.8	0.5	0.9	0.6	1.3	4.6	0.6	18.2	-2.1
Switzerland	1.4	1.0	3.0	1.6	1.5	1.4	0.5	1.1	1.1	1.2	2.8	0.5	17.1	-1.6
Syria	9.9	9.9	10.0	8.7	7.2	8.4	10.0	9.1	10.0	7.6	10.0	10.0	110.7	-0.8
Tajikistan	6.0	8.4	6.5	6.4	4.2	5.7	9.0	4.9	8.3	7.0	3.8	5.2	75.5	-2.2
Tanzania	5.5	5.7	4.7	5.9	6.8	7.3	6.4	8.5	6.1	8.6	5.8	6.9	78.1	-2.0
Thailand	8.1	9.7	7.6	3.3	4.6	4.4	7.6	3.5	7.8	5.9	5.4	2.9	70.8	-2.3
Timor-Leste	6.5	8.3	5.6	7.2	6.5	7.3	5.8	7.6	4.4	8.9	5.7	8.9	82.7	-2.8
Togo	6.7	7.6	5.7	6.7	8.4	7.2	8.5	8.2	6.9	7.5	6.6	5.8	85.8	-1.6
Trinidad and Tobago	6.6	5.6	3.3	4.0	4.7	7.5	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.6	2.6	3.4	51.9	-1.1
Tunisia	7.4	7.8	6.8	7.2	4.6	5.9	6.2	4.0	5.6	3.3	3.8	5.5	68.1	-2.0
Turkey	7.5	8.8	10.0	4.6	5.0	4.4	7.5	4.4	8.3	4.6	8.7	5.4	79.1	-1.2
Turkmenistan	5.4	7.8	5.7	5.0	6.1	4.8	9.7	4.7	8.6	4.9	3.2	3.2	69.1	-2.3
Uganda	7.2	8.9	8.0	6.0	6.8	7.0	8.3	7.3	7.7	9.2	8.8	7.6	92.8	-2.5
Ukraine	7.0	8.0	5.8	6.2	3.3	5.5	7.1	4.0	6.3	3.3	4.4	8.1	69.0	-2.0
United Arab Emirates	2.8	3.6	2.5	1.9	2.8	2.2	6.5	1.4	7.3	3.1	1.9	2.1	38.1	-2.0
United Kingdom	3.8	6.8	6.4	4.4	3.7	2.5	2.9	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.0	38.3	1.6
United States	3.8	6.8	6.2	1.8	3.4	1.8	2.9	1.2	3.9	3.0	2.1	1.3	38.3	0.3
Uruguay	4.5	2.7	2.1	3.7	3.0	3.9	0.5	2.8	2.7	2.2	2.2	2.5	33.4	-0.6
Uzbekistan	6.5	8.8	6.3	5.5	5.9	5.2	9.4	4.1	7.6	4.8	4.7	4.3	73.1	-2.6
Venezuela	7.2	9.2	7.3	8.7	6.6	6.4	9.3	8.4	9.0	6.5	6.6	6.0	91.2	1.9
Vietnam	4.2	6.9	5.5	4.0	3.9	5.6	8.3	3.8	7.7	5.0	4.4	4.6	63.9	-2.2
Yemen	9.7	10.0	9.7	9.4	7.8	7.0	9.9	9.5	10.0	9.8	9.7	10.0	112.4	-1.1
Zambia	4.8	5.9	5.0	7.8	9.4	7.0	7.8	7.7	7.1	9.4	5.8	6.7	84.5	-1.2
Zimbabwe	8.5	10.0	6.4	8.6	7.6	7.0	9.1	8.7	8.3	9.3	8.5	7.2	99.2	-0.3



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