



FUND FOR PEACE

2018

FRAGILE
STATES
INDEX



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The Fragile States Index (FSI) is an annual ranking of 178 countries based on the different pressures they face that impact their levels of fragility. The Index is based on The Fund for Peace's proprietary Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) analytical approach. Based on comprehensive social science methodology, three primary streams of data — quantitative, qualitative, and expert validation — are triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the FSI. Millions of documents are analyzed every year, and by applying highly specialized search parameters, scores are apportioned for every country based on twelve key political, social and economic indicators and over 100 sub-indicators that are the result of years of expert social science research.

INTERPRETING THE FSI SCORES

The 2018 FSI, the 14th edition of the annual Index, comprises data collected between January 1, 2017 and December 31, 2017 — thus, certain well-publicized events that have occurred since January 1, 2018 are not covered by the 2018 Index. The FSI scores should be interpreted with the understanding that the lower the score, the better. Therefore, a reduced score indicates an improvement and greater relative stability, just as a higher score indicates greater instability. For an explanation of the various indicators and their icons, please refer to page 30. FFP attempts as much as possible to de-emphasize rankings, as it is our firm belief that a country's overall score (and indeed, its indicator scores) are a far more important and accurate barometer of a country's performance, and that as much as countries should be compared against other countries, it is more useful to compare a country against itself, over time. Hence, our analysis focuses more on specific indicator scores or trend lines over time rather than just rankings. Ultimately, the FSI is an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis by civil society, government, businesses and practitioners alike — to understand more about a state's capacities and pressures which contribute to levels of fragility and resilience.

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
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
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STATE FRAGILITY IN 2018

VERY SUSTAINABLE		MORE STABLE		WARNING		ELEVATED WARNING	
	17.9 Finland (178) ▲		40.5 Mauritius (151) ▲		60.1 Albania (122) ▲		70.1 Peru (100) ▲
	18.3 Norway (177) ▲		40.7 Chile (150) ▲		60.3 Cyprus (121) ▲		70.2 Saudi Arabia (99) ▲
	19.2 Switzerland (176) ▲		41.4 Spain (149) ▼		62.0 Botswana (120) ▲		70.4 Guyana (98) ▲
	19.8 Denmark (175) ▲		41.5 Poland (148) ▼		62.9 Cuba (119) ▲		70.5 Belarus (97) ▲
SUSTAINABLE			42.5 Slovak Republic (147) ▲		63.1 Jamaica (118) ▲		71.2 El Salvador (96) ▲
	20.3 Iceland (174) ▲		42.8 U.A.E. (146) ▲		63.4 Kazakhstan (117) ▲		71.3 Bosnia & Herz. (95) ▲
	20.7 Ireland (173) ▲		43.0 Estonia (145) ▲		63.6 Malaysia (116) ▲		71.5 Mexico (94) ▲
	20.8 Australia (=170) ▲		43.2 Costa Rica (144) ▲		63.7 Belize (115) ▲		72.1 Sao Tome & Pr. (=92) =
	20.8 Luxembourg (=170) ▲		43.8 Italy (143) ▲		64.0 Suriname (114) ▲		72.1 Tunisia (=92) ▲
	20.8 Sweden (=170) ▲		44.9 Latvia (142) ▲		64.4 Bahrain (113) ▲		72.3 Indonesia (91) ▲
	20.9 New Zealand (169) ▲		46.1 Argentina (141) ▲		64.8 Macedonia (112) ▲		72.4 China (=89) ▲
	21.5 Canada (168) ▲		48.1 Qatar (140) ▼		65.5 Samoa (111) ▲		72.4 Maldives (=89) ▲
	25.8 Germany (167) ▲		48.2 Barbados (139) ▲		68.0 Cape Verde (110) ▲		72.5 Gabon (88) ▲
	26.2 Austria (=165) ▲		48.7 Croatia (138) ▲		68.1 Ghana (=108) ▲		72.6 Ukraine (=86) ▲
	26.2 Netherlands (=165) ▲		49.4 Romania (137) ▲		68.1 Serbia (=108) ▲		72.6 Turkmenistan (=86) ▲
	27.3 Portugal (164) ▲		49.5 Panama (136) ▲		68.4 Vietnam (107) ▲		72.9 South Africa (85) ▼
	29.7 Belgium (163) ▲		50.0 Bahamas (135) ▲		68.7 Brazil (106) ▼		74.0 Georgia (=83) ▲
VERY STABLE		STABLE			68.8 Namibia (105) ▲		74.0 Morocco (=83) ▲
	30.3 Slovenia (162) ▲		50.2 Hungary (134) ▲		69.2 Dominican Rep. (104) ▼		74.2 Ecuador (82) ▲
	30.4 Singapore (161) ▲		51.7 Bulgaria (133) ▲		69.5 Armenia (=102) ▲		74.3 Bhutan (81) ▲
	32.2 France (160) ▲		52.6 Oman (132) ▼		69.5 Moldova (=102) ▲		74.4 Micronesia (80) ▲
	34.3 United Kingdom (159) ▼		54.6 Trinidad & Tobago (131) ▲		69.8 Paraguay (101) ▲		74.5 Fiji (79) ▲
	34.5 Japan (158) ▲		54.9 Mongolia (130) ▲				74.6 Azerbaijan (78) ▲
	35.4 Uruguay (157) ▲		55.3 Greece (=128) ▲				75.0 Thailand (77) ▲
	35.7 South Korea (156) ▲		55.3 Montenegro (=128) ▲				
	36.2 Malta (155) ▲		55.6 Antigua & Barbuda (127) ▼				
	37.7 United States (154) ▼		55.9 Kuwait (126) ▲				
	39.0 Czech Republic (153) ▲		56.8 Seychelles (125) ▲				
	39.4 Lithuania (152) ▲		59.8 Brunei Darussalam (124) ▲				
			59.9 Grenada (123) ▲				

ELEVATED WARNING		HIGH WARNING		ALERT		HIGH ALERT	
	75.2 Bolivia (76) ▲		80.1 Lesotho (61) ▲		90.3 Bangladesh (32) ▼		101.6 Guinea (13) ▲
	75.3 Nicaragua (75) ▲		80.7 Laos (60) ▲		92.2 Mauritania (31) ▲		102.0 Haiti (12) ▲
	75.7 Benin (74) ▲		81.8 Guatemala (59) ▲		92.6 Liberia (30) ▲		102.2 Iraq (11) ▲
	75.8 Algeria (73) ▲		82.2 Turkey (58) ▼		93.1 Congo (Republic) (29) ▲		102.3 Zimbabwe (10) ▼
	76.3 India (72) ▲		82.6 Comoros (57) ▲		93.2 North Korea (28) ▲		106.6 Afghanistan (9) ▲
	76.6 Colombia (71) ▲		83.1 Solomon Islands (56) ▲		93.6 Mali (27) ▼		108.3 Chad (8) ▲
	76.8 Jordan (70) ▲		83.4 Equatorial Guinea (55) ▲		94.6 Cote d'Ivoire (=25) ▲		108.7 Sudan (7) ▲
	77.2 Russia (69) ▲		83.6 Madagascar (54) ▲		94.6 Libya (=25) ▲	VERY HIGH ALERT	
	77.3 Honduras (68) ▲		84.0 Cambodia (53) ▲		95.1 Uganda (24) ▲		110.7 Congo (Dem. Rep.) (6) ▼
	78.5 Israel / West Bank (67) ▲		84.3 Iran (52) ▲		95.3 Cameroon (23) ▲		111.1 Central African Rep. (5) ▲
	78.6 Kyrgyz Rep. (66) ▲		84.8 Papua New Guinea (51) ▲		96.1 Myanmar (22) ▼		111.4 Syria (4) ▼
	79.1 Uzbekistan (65) ▲		84.9 Sri Lanka (50) ▲		96.2 Niger (21) ▲		112.7 Yemen (3) ▼
	79.4 Tanzania (64) ▲		85.2 Togo (49) ▼		96.3 Pakistan (20) ▲		113.2 Somalia (2) ▲
	79.5 Tajikistan (63) ▲		85.5 Malawi (=47) ▲		97.2 Eritrea (19) ▲		113.4 South Sudan (1) ▲
	79.6 Senegal (62) ▲		85.5 Philippines (=47) ▼		97.4 Burundi (=17) ▲		
			86.2 Venezuela (46) ▼		97.4 Kenya (=17) ▼		
			86.5 Burkina Faso (45) ▲		98.1 Guinea Bissau (16) ▲		
			86.8 Lebanon (44) ▲		99.6 Ethiopia (15) ▲		
			87.1 Djibouti (=42) ▲		99.9 Nigeria (14) ▲		
			87.1 The Gambia (=42) ▲				
			87.2 Zambia (41) ▲				
			87.5 Swaziland (40) ▲				
			87.9 Nepal (39) ▲				
			88.3 Timor-Leste (38) ▲				
			88.7 Egypt (=36) ▲				
			88.7 Mozambique (=36) ▲				
			89.1 Sierra Leone (35) ▲				
			89.3 Rwanda (34) ▲				
			89.4 Angola (33) ▲				

ISSUES OF FRAGILITY TOUCH THE WORLD'S RICHEST AND MOST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IN 2018

J.J. MESSNER

It certainly felt like a tumultuous year in 2017. As the wars in Syria and Yemen ratcheted up in intensity, Qatar was suddenly politically, economically and physically isolated from its neighbors, Catalonia moved forward on its attempts to separate from Spain, Venezuela fell further into chaos, the United Kingdom continued to struggle with the terms of its exit from the European Union, and the United States (in addition to being plagued by a series of natural disasters) moved from one political crisis to the next. Yet despite all of these concerns, the clear message of the Fragile States Index (FSI) in 2018 was that, on the whole, most countries around the world continue to show signs of steady improvement, and many – particularly Mexico – demonstrate resiliency in the face of enormous pressure. Nevertheless, as much as we tend to (rightly) focus on the world's trouble spots whenever we talk of state fragility, perhaps the clearest message of the 2018 FSI is that pressures can affect all states – even the world's richest and most developed.

A frequent criticism of the Fragile States Index in the past has been that it is somehow biased against the world's poorest countries. Yet the most-worsened country for 2018 is Qatar, the world's wealthiest country per capita. Though the country's considerable wealth has no doubt cushioned the blow, the move by regional neighbors Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates to impose a political and economic blockade on the small Gulf nation has exacted a significant toll on Qatar's stability. The full financial and political impacts of the blockade – which remains in place – are likely yet to be fully realized. Indeed, there is widespread concern that the move against Qatar by its neighbors may only be the beginning of a longer-term campaign by regional adversaries to undermine the al Thani family's reign over the country, a threat made greater by the apparent (and very public) political abandonment of Qatar by a purported ally, the United States.

Similarly, three of the ten most-worsened countries for 2018 are also among the world's most developed: Spain, the United States, and the United Kingdom, who are each experiencing deep internal political

divisions, albeit for different reasons. This provides clear evidence that stability cannot be taken for granted and can affect developed and developing countries alike. Though such developed countries have the significant benefit of higher levels of capacity and resilience that more fragile countries tend to lack, sharp and sustained increases in pressures should not be ignored.

As the second-most worsened country in 2018, Spain was hit by increased internal instability as the Catalonia region held an independence referendum that was, arguably, met by a cack-handed response by the central government in Madrid that likely intensified the problem. As the Spanish state sought to crack down on the separatist referendum – even resorting to violence in some cases – support for a separate Catalan state appeared to surge in defiance of Madrid's response. Though Catalan separatist sentiment has been simmering for some time, 2017 may come to be seen as a turning point – and, potentially, a point of no return for the Spanish state. In the longer term, a future disintegration of Spain could threaten to not only have more widespread consequences internally (since Catalonia is not the only region in Spain to harbor separatist tendencies) but may lead to an emboldening of other regional disintegration throughout Europe.

The United States has experienced significant political upheaval recently, and as a result has ranked as the fourth most-worsened country for 2018. Despite a remarkably strong economy, this economic success has been largely outweighed by social and political instability. However, we must be careful not to misunderstand the longer-term nature of this trend. Though some critics will likely be tempted to associate the worsening situation in the United States with the ascendance of President Trump, and what can generously be described as his Administration's divisive leadership and rhetoric, the reality is that the pressures facing the United States run far deeper. Many “inside the Beltway” in Washington have long complained of a growing extremism in American society and politics, with an increasingly disenfranchised (if not vanishing) political center. The FSI demonstrates that this is no illusion – it is definitely happening. Indeed,

on the ten-year trend of the three Cohesion Indicators (including Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and Group Grievance), the United States is the most-worsened country in the world bar none, ahead of the likes of Libya, Bahrain, Mali, Syria, South Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. To be sure, the United States has nearly unparalleled capacity and resiliency, meaning that there is little risk that the country is about to fall into the abyss. Nevertheless, these findings should serve as a wake-up call to America's political leaders (not to mention media influencers) that divisive policy-making and rhetoric that seeks to divide Americans for political gain can have very real consequences and can threaten the country's long-term stability and prosperity.

Though the challenges facing the United Kingdom are different to the United States, the two countries have nevertheless been facing a remarkably similar long-term trendline, wherein the United Kingdom is the third-most worsened country in the world for those same three Cohesion Indicators since 2013. As described in last year's FSI, the Brexit referendum came amidst unprecedented levels of division and group grievance among Britain's social and political sphere. While the painful – and seemingly near-impossible – Brexit negotiations carry on toward the country's planned exit from the European Union in 2019, the FSI provides a similar lesson to British leaders and influencers as it does for their American counterparts – that even for a developed nation, divisive policy-making and rhetoric is simply incompatible with a country's ability to thrive.

Among the other most-worsened countries for 2018, it probably comes as little surprise that Yemen and Syria, both mired in prolonged civil conflicts, continue to worsen. Both countries are now firmly entrenched among the top four countries of the Index, along with Somalia and South Sudan who have also been witness to long periods of conflict. Rounding out the most worsened countries, Venezuela ranks as the third most-worsened country in 2018 as the country spirals into chaos under the epic mismanagement of Nicolas Maduro's government that is equally further tightening its grip on power, closing civil space and silencing political opposition. Venezuela now boasts the unfortunate distinction of being the second-most fragile country in the Western Hemisphere, behind Haiti. Two other countries under the leadership of increasingly authoritarian presidents, namely Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, also continue to worsen significantly. And though South Africa also continues to worsen as a result of former President Jacob Zuma's disastrous administration, the resignation of Zuma and the election of Cyril Ramaphosa as the Head of the African National Congress Party, and hence President of the Republic, has at least

MOST WORSENEED COUNTRIES IN 2018

 +4.1  Qatar (48.1)	 +1.0  Kenya (97.4)
 +3.5  Spain (41.4)	 +0.8  Antigua & Barb. (55.6)
 +3.3  Venezuela (86.2)	 +0.8  Syria (111.4)
 +2.1  United States (37.7)	 +0.7  Zimbabwe (102.3)
 +1.6  Yemen (112.7)	 +0.7  Mali (93.6)
 +1.4  Turkey (82.2)	 +0.7  Congo, D.R. (110.7)
 +1.3  Togo (85.2)	 +0.7  Poland (41.5)
 +1.2  Bangladesh (90.3)	 +0.6  South Africa (72.9)
 +1.1  Philippines (85.5)	 +0.5  Brazil (68.7)
 +1.1  United Kingdom (34.3)	 +0.4  Myanmar (96.1)

provided a glimmer of hope that South Africa's woes may soon take a turn for the better.

Of particular concern among the most-worsened countries for 2018 is Poland. Although Poland's worsening of 0.7 points since 2017 is not of the same magnitude of some other countries, its longer-term trend is of the utmost concern, not only for Poland but for Europe more generally. As Hungary's government of Viktor Orban has become increasingly illiberal, Poland appears to be following a startlingly similar trend line to Hungary, albeit on a 4- to 5-year delay. As the situation in Poland develops, and the Eastern European region more generally demonstrates greater illiberal tendencies, the similar trends of Hungary and Poland may provide a critical case study into early warning.

Of the 178 countries assessed by the Fragile States Index, 151 demonstrated at least marginal improvement. Certainly, there remains significant fragility and instability in many different parts of the world, but overall most countries continue to move upwards on a trajectory of positive development. As the long-term trends of the FSI have shown, a country can still be fragile and yet improving. Nevertheless, this trend of improvement will not always be linear, and may be a case of constantly moving two steps forward and one step back.





































In the 2017 Fragile States Index, Mexico (along with Ethiopia) was the most-worsened country for the preceding year, fueled by economic concerns, widespread violence, and heightened uncertainty over its relations with the United States, underlined by harsh rhetoric from then-newly elected President Trump and policy objectives that threatened to isolate Mexico from its neighbor and largest trading

partner. However, in 2018, Mexico has rebounded, lurching from most-worsened in 2017 to sixth most-improved in 2018. Much of this improvement has been driven by economics – despite the threat to its economy emanating from the United States, Mexico has worked to diversify its trade relationships throughout Latin America and with Europe. Meanwhile, the country has experienced significantly less pressure from Central American migrants transiting through Mexico to its northern border, partly through improved policy and international assistance, but also potentially due to a fall in interest among migrants to attempt to enter the United States. Though Mexico continues to experience significant domestic pressures – bound to be worsened by this year’s contentious presidential election and the chance that firebrand populist and perennial candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador may emerge victorious – the country has nevertheless demonstrated significant resiliency.

It may come as a surprise to see countries such as Iraq and Haiti – both ranked 11th and 12th respectively on the Fragile States Index – as the most-improved for 2018. However, again, the FSI demonstrates clearly that a country experiencing high levels of fragility can nevertheless improve over time. Both Haiti and Iraq continue to experience high levels of instability and variously, poverty and conflict. However, the situation in both countries appears to be better than it was 12 months ago – in Haiti’s case as a disputed election was resolved with minimal conflict and the country continued its path to recovery from the ruinous earthquake of 2010; in Iraq’s case as significant victories were recorded against Daesh, and relative stability returned to some recently conflicted parts of the country. Nevertheless, both countries remain highly unstable, and could all too easily slip back and lose the gains of 2017.

As we enter into 2018, conflict continues to rage – and worsen – in Syria and Yemen. The signs of continued instability and potential conflict in many parts of the world continue, from saber-rattling in North Korea to the threat of terrorism in the Sahel and the Lake

MOST IMPROVED COUNTRIES IN 2018

 -3.3  Haiti (102.0)	 -2.6  Pakistan (96.3)
 -3.2  Iraq (102.2)	 -2.5  Malawi (85.5)
 -3.1  Nepal (87.9)	 -2.5  Georgia (74.0)
 -3.1  Ecuador (74.2)	 -2.5  Kazakhstan (63.4)
 -2.9  Japan (34.5)	 -2.5  Moldova (69.5)
 -2.8  Mexico (71.5)	 -2.4  Bahamas (50.0)
 -2.7  Senegal (79.6)	 -2.4  Uzbekistan (79.1)
 -2.6  Seychelles (56.8)	 -2.4  Malta (36.2)
 -2.6  Luxembourg (20.8)	 -2.4  Fiji (74.5)
 -2.6  Kuwait (55.9)	 -2.4  South Korea (35.7)

Chad Basin. Fractious politics in the United States, United Kingdom, and parts of Europe continue to threaten to destabilize otherwise stable, developed, and prosperous nations. And Qatar remains isolated, politically and economically, unclear on whether the embargo may end soon or if the embargo may simply be the opening salvo of a deeper, longer regional conflict.

Though the FSI does not predict unrest or turmoil, it does provide early warning of the conditions that can give rise to instability – but even then, someone has to do something with that information. It is therefore incumbent upon policy-makers, influencers, and practitioners to understand and heed the warnings of short- and long-term trends, to be mindful of the growing potential for the conditions of instability, and to take action to prevent or mitigate such deterioration. But as much as the world may overall be improving, more than anything else the FSI demonstrates that stability can never be taken for granted – even in the world’s richest and most developed countries.

ISOLATED QATAR WORSENS AMID PRESSURE FROM REGIONAL ADVERSARIES

PATRICIA TAFT

In a year of rapidly shifting priorities, alliances and politics across the greater Middle East, the small oil and gas-rich nation of Qatar took the greatest fall in the 2018 Fragile States Index (FSI). With a native population of barely 300,000 and a gross annual GDP of nearly US\$181 billion, Qatar has faced increasing pressure from its Gulf nation neighbors for several years, culminating in the 2017 blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. While the full financial and political impacts of the ongoing blockade are yet to be fully realized, the move to isolate Qatar by its neighbors has already had wide-ranging regional and international impacts.

The isolation of Qatar, which culminated in the June 2017 blockade, was a long time in coming – although, several key events during the year may have accelerated its course. For years, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have accused Qatar of supporting Iranian interests in the region and encouraging wider regional revolutionary tendencies – from financing Iranian-linked proxies in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq to supporting Egypt's deposed Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Qatari-based and financed news network, al Jazeera, has also long been a thorn in the sides of Gulf Arab monarchs, for whom its coverage is often seen as critical.

Qatar has also positioned itself as a key facilitator of highly sensitive negotiations between Western interests and hostile or politically toxic groups, including the 2015 hostage transfer between the U.S. and the Taliban for captured the captured American soldier, Bo Bergdahl. In addition to working with the United States, Qatar has also reportedly played a critical role in the release of kidnapped citizens from European and other countries, from journalists to NGO workers to unfortunate day-trippers who found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time.



QATAR

TREND LINE
2007 TO 2018



TOTAL SCORE
FSI SCORE 2018

48.1

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2018

140th

(OF 178 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+4.1

POINTS SINCE 2017

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

+1.0

POINTS SINCE 2013

LONG-TERM
TREND

-4.6

POINTS SINCE 2008


11

Ironically, it was this last scenario, of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, that may have led the monarchy itself down a collision course that would culminate in its 2017 destiny. As reported by Robert F. Worth in *The New York Times Magazine* on March 14, 2018, the little-known or publicized story of a royal Qatari bird hunting adventure gone awry in southern Iraq in late 2015 set off a chain of events that few at the time could have anticipated. As reported by Worth, following the capture of nine members of Qatar's ruling al Thani family, as well as dozens of friends and servants, by an Iranian-affiliated militia group in Iraq's Muthanna Province in November of 2015, the Qataris would embark on an unprecedented effort to get them back. This effort would span sixteen months and have significant financial and political repercussions for the region as a whole. According to the article,

"The cost to Qatar wound up far exceeding US\$360 million, but ultimately cash was less important than the deal's political dimension. In order to retrieve its hostages, Qatar was made to negotiate a tightly choreographed population exchange in Syria, using the rebel militias it finances to forcibly uproot every resident of four strategically located towns. The transfers advanced Tehran's larger goal of transforming Syria — along with Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen — into satellite states that will enshrine a dominant Iranian role across the region."¹

At the same time, the winds were shifting in Washington, D.C., with the election of Donald J. Trump as president in late 2016 and a subsequent realignment of American interests back firmly into the camp of the Saudi royal family and, in particular, the brash and ascendant Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman. "M.B.S.," as Prince Salman is widely known, the son of the current king and a self-styled reformer, has pursued a strong alliance with the Trump Administration, particularly Trump's son-in-law and Middle

QATAR: OVERALL TREND



East advisor, Jared Kushner. After feting Trump in Riyadh in May 2017 and hosting visits from Kushner where the two reportedly spent hours discussing regional politics, the Saudi's charm offensive appeared to have paid dividends. In a series of tweets following his visit that supposedly took some in his Administration, particularly then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson by surprise, Trump endorsed the hard line taken by the Saudis and their allies against Qatar, echoing accusations of Qatari support for Iranian-backed regional terrorist groups. This approach diverged sharply from that of the Obama Administration, which for the previous eight years had tried to avoid coming down firmly on the side of either the Saudis or the Qataris, mindful not only of the volatile regional politics, but also of America's reliance on Qatar as host to the largest overseas American military base in the region.

These explosive regional and international dynamics are reflected in the 2018 FSI, where Qatar took the hardest hit in the Index for the year, worsening by four points. The indicator that measures External Intervention—or the political, financial and military involvement of other countries in Qatar – was, unsurprisingly, the indicator to have deteriorated the most. Although Qatar's vast oil and gas wealth has thus far buffeted the country from the immediate financial impacts of

the blockade, its ongoing isolation in the region may come at much higher, and wider, costs. This, too, is reflected in the 2018 FSI as well as in the overall trends for the country which, over the past five years, has at times seen a deterioration in the scores that measure State Legitimacy as well as Human Rights and Rule of Law. While most of the native-born Qatari population appears to remain firmly supportive of the al Thani family, the monarchy has often come under fierce criticism for its disenfranchisement and poor treatment of foreign-born workers, a driving force of the Qatari economy. Moreover, as more is revealed about Qatar's alleged role in depopulating towns in Syria in advance of Iranian interests, it is likely the country will continue to see worsening trends across other indicators.

Overall, the 2017 Qatari blockade and its regional implications may be a harbinger of much worse yet to come. In an April 2, 2018 article in *The New Yorker* profiling the ambitions of M.B.S., former American diplomats and regional scholars posit that the blockade of Qatar may only be one move in a larger effort by the Saudis and Emiratis to depose the Emir of Qatar and neuter Qatari influence in the region.² As reported in the article, this could well include a military invasion and seizure of Qatar's vast natural gas reserves and oilfields. Such an event would have far reaching implications not only for Middle East, but potentially draw in NATO allies such as Turkey, which has a strong relationship with Qatar and a military base in Doha. Already, in the short term, the conditions set out by the Saudis and their allies to end the blockade are seen as untenable, insisting that Qatar formally disavow Iran, sever all ties to its proxy forces, and shutter al Jazeera.

Internationally, with the seeming support of the Trump Administration for Saudi efforts to roll back Iranian influence in the region and punish Qatar, a peaceful end to the blockade seems unlikely. While Qatar's wealth may have spared the country from greater instability in 2017, the future for the tiny Gulf nation, and that of the region, appears very fragile indeed.

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CATALAN DIVORCE ATTEMPTS FUEL DIVISION AND INSTABILITY

AMANDA QUINN

October 1, 2017 marked the beginning of an intense social, political and constitutional crisis in Spain as Catalonia, a semi-autonomous region in the northeast of Spain, attempted to secede from the rest of the country through a controversial referendum. The situation spiraled into chaos as the Spanish government first declared the referendum illegal while the separatist regional administration in Barcelona moved forward with the process anyway. The vote resulted in an overwhelming victory for the separatists only to be dismissed by the government in Madrid and the separatist leadership charged with sedition and its leader fleeing to Belgium.

For some years, particularly in the wake of the economic crisis, Spain was one of a handful of Western European countries to struggle – indeed, between 2007 and 2012, each of the “PIIGS” (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), representing some of the weakest economies on the continent, all experienced significant declines. However, since 2013 the picture has been significantly rosier for Spain, with the country’s scores having improved across almost all twelve of the Fragile States Index (FSI) indicators. That improving trend has been reversed in 2017, with Spain ranking as one of the most worsened countries on the FSI for the past 12 months. This worsening was led in particular by a change in the country’s State Legitimacy score, which worsened by a highly significant four point change. This sharp increase can be attributed to Catalonia’s move toward independence and the subsequent drastic actions by the Spanish government.

Despite Spain’s Constitutional Court declaring the referendum unconstitutional and illegal, it was held on October 1, 2017, whereupon Catalan authorities reported a 90% vote in favor of independence with turnout of more than 2.2 million Catalan voters. It is important to place these events in

context – while the October vote marked a clear intensification of tensions between Catalan separatists and Spain’s government, the divisions between Catalonia and the rest of Spain date back hundreds of years. Catalonia’s latest push for independence was fueled by a combination of economic, cultural, and political factors.

In the more recent history of the Catalan independence movement, tensions between the region and the central government can be traced to the 2006 Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia. The statute was passed by the Catalan legislature, approved by Spain’s parliament, and then ratified in a referendum, giving the region more autonomy in many areas, including education, health, justice, and governance. Soon after the statute’s approval, one of Spain’s center-right political parties, the Popular Party, challenged it before Spain’s Constitutional Court. The Court debated the constitutionality of the statute for four years and in 2010 ruled to strike down parts of it, stating that reference to Catalonia as a nation has no legal bearing in Spain. While most of the statute’s 223 articles remained intact, the decision resulted in widespread protests in the region.

The Catalan independence movement has also been driven by economic and cultural factors. Catalonia is one of the wealthiest and most productive regions in Spain and is home to about 7.5 million people. The Catalan economy makes up about a fifth of Spanish GDP. Separatist sentiments were partially exacerbated by the 2008 financial crash, which resulted in the Spanish government instituting several austerity measures. These measures intensified already-existing beliefs that Catalonia financially supports the rest of Spain through high taxes and that this is financially detrimental to the region.

While these factors explain some of the drivers of Catalan



SPAIN

TREND LINE
2007 TO 2018



TOTAL SCORE
FSI SCORE 2018

41.4

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2018

149th

(OF 178 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+3.5

POINTS SINCE 2017

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

-3.0

POINTS SINCE 2013

LONG-TERM
TREND

-0.2

POINTS SINCE 2008


secessionist sentiments in the lead-up to the October referendum, it is more difficult to explain the chaos that followed.

The Spanish government's extreme reaction to the October referendum served only to escalate the situation. Spanish security forces utilized excessive force during the period of the referendum with raids on polling stations by riot police, who sometimes violently removed voters. According to some reports, thousands of votes could not be counted because ballots were confiscated by authorities and polling stations were forcibly closed.

In the days following the referendum, the Administration in Madrid continued its crackdown on Catalan separatists, with the imprisonment of eight former ministers of the Catalan government on charges of sedition and rebellion. The former Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, fled the country. The Spanish government also invoked Article 155, a measure that allowed it to dissolve the Catalan regional government and impose direct rule on the semi-autonomous region.

Following these actions, thousands gathered in Barcelona to protest the police violence that occurred during the referendum. If the goal of security force action during the vote was to put a stop to Catalan nationalist sentiments in the region, it appeared to have had the opposite result. The severe response of the central government to Catalonia's move toward independence only served to further solidify

SPAIN: KEY INDICATORS



INDICATORS

- C2: Factionalized Elites
- PI: State Legitimacy


negative sentiments toward the central government in Madrid.

While the movement for Catalonia's independence has been growing in recent years, Catalans are divided on the issue. The Catalan government's *Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió* (Centre for Opinion Studies) conducted a poll in June that revealed that only 41.1% of those polled supported Catalan secession. This number suggests that the movement for Catalan secession could have fizzled, even after the referendum. Instead December's Catalan parliamentary election saw the greatest success of pro-independence parties in their history.

If the Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, was hoping these elections would finally put an end to the Catalan independence movement, he was mistaken. Three pro-Catalan independence parties won a small majority, claiming 70 of 135 seats in the region's Parliament. A final count of the vote revealed that voter turnout was at 82% for the parliamentary elections, a record for Catalonia, and that there were 2,079,340 votes for pro-independence parties. These numbers indicate that pro-secession sentiments have been solidified in the region and will have to be addressed by the central Spanish government moving forward.

As populist and nationalist sentiments continue to grow across the European continent, it is likely that the Spanish government has not heard the last from Catalonia.

COMPARATIVE TRENDS: THE "PIIGS"



COUNTRY TRENDS

- Greece
- Ireland
- Italy
- Portugal
- Spain

SCRAPING THE BARREL: OIL-DEPENDENT VENEZUELA IN FREEFALL

HANNAH BLYTH

When the 14-year rule of the populist President Hugo Chávez came to an end upon his death in 2013, Venezuela was already well down the path to instability. Chávez's death made way for his handpicked successor Nicolás Maduro who, in stark contrast to Chávez's cult of personality, many Venezuelans have come to fear and loathe.

The Venezuelan economy – which remains heavily reliant on oil exports – was hit sharply by the drop in global crude oil prices in 2013. Without the same capital to line the public coffers for popular social programs, this exposed the vulnerabilities in the Chávez-era economic policies and set the country on a path towards increased unemployment, poverty and inflation. More focused on consolidating executive power than meaningful reform, President Maduro has pushed Venezuela into a dangerously precarious position – from rampant inflation fueled by food and medical shortages, to increased violence and criminal impunity on the streets.

Venezuela is the third most worsened country in the 2018 Fragile States Index (FSI) and has the highest FSI score for Latin America at 86.2. This year's score reflects not only the more dynamic pressures which affected Venezuela in 2017 – such as a mass exodus of asylum seekers fleeing the country – but also underlines a deeper trend of state decline in areas such as human rights, rule of law and state legitimacy. Long-term FSI trends across nearly all indicators suggest that without serious reforms to put functioning and representative governance structures back in place, the Maduro administration may not have much of a country or economy left to govern.

Venezuela's FSI Economy indicator has been steadily worsening for over a decade and 2017 marked the fourth year of a dire economic recession. With 95% of its export



earnings reliant on oil, the lack of a diversified economy leaves the country open to external commodity market shocks.¹ Hence, when global crude oil prices went from over US\$100 per barrel in 2013, to just US\$28 by early 2016,² this had a crippling impact on the Venezuelan economy and ultimately its people. There has been soaring inflation, with estimates suggesting the country's annual inflation rate reached 4,310% by the end of 2017,³ which has pushed up costs of basic goods and decimated the economy and many Venezuelans' jobs along with it.⁴ This has had devastating impacts on the population, with increased poverty, limited access to basic supplies, and rising child mortality rates.⁵

The financial mismanagement of the Maduro Administration – beset by long-standing cronyism and corruption within the political and military elite – has only served to worsen the crisis. Poorly implemented currency control policies have enabled a black market of U.S. Dollars to flourish, and strict government price controls on items like toilet paper have led to scarcity of such basic goods, as manufacturers withdraw because they cannot sustain production at the prescribed price levels.⁶ Emblematic of President Maduro's approach to handling the crisis, in November 2017 he appointed a loyal military general (who has no experience whatsoever in the oil industry) to head Venezuela's state-run oil company and the oil ministry.⁷ More concerned about maintaining his vice grip on power than actually governing, President Maduro continues to use the security apparatus to control everything from the economy to political dissent.

Under President Chávez and now President Maduro, Venezuela's civic space and participatory politics has become increasingly constrained. This is reflected in the FSI scores for State Legitimacy, and Human Rights and Rule of Law indicators which both reached scores of 9.0 (out of a worst possible score of 10) in the 2018 Index. Venezuela now

shares the same Human Rights and Rule of Law score as Myanmar and Saudi Arabia.

While the trajectory of representative governance has been slowly worsening over the past decade, 2017 was marked by several key events that undermined rule of law in Venezuela. In March 2017, the Venezuelan Supreme Court voted to strip the opposition-dominated National Assembly of its powers, and while the ruling was overturned after international condemnation, President Maduro then moved to hold a sham referendum which dissolved the National Assembly anyway.⁸ In its place he has installed a new Constituent Assembly with his loyalists, which is equipped with sweeping government powers including the ability to draft a new constitution. In July 2017, a high profile Venezuelan judge fled the country seeking asylum in Canada, alleging that, among other things, she had been intimidated into signing arrest warrants for President Maduro's political opponents. Her testimony is now being reviewed by the Organization of American States (OAS) as possible evidence of crimes against humanity to submit to the International Criminal Court.⁹

The FSI indicator score for Security Apparatus also follows the same worsening trajectory as President Maduro uses public security forces to crack down on growing dissent. In recent country reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, allegations of arbitrary arrests and detention of political opponents, excessive use of force on protesters, inhumane prison conditions and torture are levelled against the Venezuelan Government.¹⁰ Venezuela also continues to have one of the highest per capita homicide rates in the world,¹¹ and criminality and illicit trade are rampant with policing capacity (and credibility) remaining limited.

The impacts of the dire economic situation and poor governance by the Maduro Administration have been most keenly felt by the Venezuelan population. The FSI indicator score for Public Services continues to worsen, with the health sector in shambles. Reports suggest up to 85% of pharmaceutical drugs are now unavailable in Venezuela,¹² coinciding with spikes in maternal and child mortality, as well as new cases of malaria, malnutrition, and diphtheria.¹³ Media reports have also highlighted a lack of water, electricity and surgical instruments in Venezuelan hospitals – not to mention the criminal groups or public security officials that stalk the halls to extort patients and their families.¹⁴ Access to basic food and supplies also remains a daily battle for majority of Venezuelans, as people are forced to queue for hours at supermarkets to get basic price-controlled goods. To

make matters worse, these long lines are often targets for criminality, with prospective shoppers often victims of robberies or caught up in riots.¹⁵ Their only alternative for supplies remains the black market, where costly goods are made available largely thanks to corrupt military-controlled food imports.¹⁶

It is little wonder, with high unemployment, insecurity, poverty and lack of access to basic food, sanitation and health needs, that there has been a rise in people leaving Venezuela to seek shelter from their neighbors. The 2018 FSI score for Refugees and IDPs in Venezuela jumped by 0.5 this year, reflecting the rapid increase in Venezuelan asylum seekers in 2017. In 2014 the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that there were just over 4,000 asylum seekers leaving Venezuela; in 2017 there were over 94,000. This is creating humanitarian challenges for the neighboring hosts – with Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru and the Southern Caribbean all struggling to absorb the influx. The FSI indicator for Human Flight also worsened by 0.5 this year, reflecting the continued exodus of skilled and unskilled workers to neighboring Caribbean and South American countries, as well as the United States and Spain.¹⁷

The 2018 FSI scores for Venezuela paint a worrying picture of deterioration of basic governance and state responsibility to provide for its citizens. Despite having the largest oil reserves in the world, overreliance on the commodity has brought the Venezuelan economy into freefall. The Maduro Administration has doubled down on autocratic rule that has become characterized by stifling descent, empowering an increasingly corrupt military, and ignoring the immediate humanitarian needs of millions of Venezuelans. Without swift structural reforms to diversify the economy and lift it out of its recession, everyday life for Venezuelans will only become more difficult as they struggle to get food and basic supplies. The FSI indicator score for Group Grievance is slowly worsening for Venezuela (currently at 7.3) and if conditions worsen in 2018 and beyond, this may increase conflict risk in a country that already has one of the highest homicide rates in the world. Key regional and international partners must play a role in breaking this tailspin, applying pressure on the Maduro Administration to enable immediate humanitarian assistance, enact economic reforms, and bring the opposition back to the table for more inclusive governance and respect for human rights.

See page 22 for Endnotes.

A NATION DIVIDED AGAINST ITSELF: INTERNAL DIVISIONS FUEL U.S. WORSENING

J.J. MESSNER AND CHARLES FIERTZ

More than any previous year, the 2018 Fragile States Index (FSI) has demonstrated that rich and developed countries can be just as prone as any other to the effects of fragility and instability – and the United States is certainly no exception. A combination of political and social turmoil, coupled with severe natural disasters, gave cause for a deeply challenging year in the United States. All this despite a strong economy, underpinned by a robust stock market and record-low unemployment, demonstrating clearly that a country's economic performance cannot be taken as a sole indicator of success.

As a result of these recent challenges, the United States is the fourth most-worsened country on the 2018 FSI. But even more worryingly, this appears not to be a one-off aberration — not only was the United States among the 15 most-worsened countries in last year's FSI, but it is also among the 15 most-worsened countries overall of the past five years. The country has also demonstrated severe long-term worsening trends on specific key indicators. For example, the United States is the most-worsened country in the world for the past five years for the group of three Cohesion Indicators, which includes the Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and Group Grievance Indicators (and is the second-most worsened over the same period specifically for that latter Indicator). In terms of rate-of-change, this puts the United States in the same company as some countries in conflict, and among others (such as Poland and Turkey) that are experiencing increased illiberalism or authoritarianism. As the self-styled “land of the free”, for all Americans this should be the stuff of nightmares.

But how did America get here? With little doubt, 2017 saw an escalation of this trend toward political and social instability. Politically-charged investigations delved into Russian intervention in the country's democratic process,



UNITED STATES

TREND LINE
2007 TO 2018



TOTAL SCORE
FSI SCORE 2018

37.7

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2018

154th

(OF 178 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

+2.1

POINTS SINCE 2017

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

+4.2

POINTS SINCE 2013

LONG-TERM
TREND

+4.9

POINTS SINCE 2008

while Washington was rocked by a series of political scandals and investigations into alleged corruption, criminality, and wrongdoing at the highest levels of government. Meanwhile, Washington (and across the country in cities both large and small) was the scene of nearly-unprecedented mass marches and protests over issues ranging from immigration policy to women's rights, movements that took on greater energy than ever before.

This polarization, however, is neither unique nor unprecedented in the recent history of the country. Rather, it represents the continuation of a trend that has existed for decades. The causes for this polarization are both numerous and contentious, with little consensus as to which causes are most important, or even valid.


However, there are a number of potential contributing causes to this increasing polarization that can be identified. For example, greater rigidity in adherence to party doctrine have undermined cooperation and compromise in government, exacerbated by open primaries that encourage the selection of more radical, doctrinal, dogmatic, and “uncooperative” candidates on both sides of politics at the expense of constructive centrists. This has been further permitted by widespread gerrymandering – whereby legislators essentially choose their voters – sharply reducing the competitiveness of politics, thereby disincentivizing compromise, and reducing accountability to voters. Further, the increasing cost of elections, coupled with landmark decisions such as *Citizens United*, have contributed to the influence of special interests in politics. More broadly, the increasing politicization of institutions such as the judiciary and law enforcement, as well as attacks on (and dismantling of) nonpartisan governmental institutions have also eroded faith and trust in government. To a degree, the polarization has reflected growing social inequality gaps, such as in wealth

and access to healthcare and education. But perhaps one of the most notable developments in the recent polarization of the country is the rise of cable news, social media, and broader partisan media environments, which have fueled a near-tribalism in politics and have helped to solidify previously more fluid political allegiances, particularly by stirring up racial or ethnic divisions or using wedge issues such as immigration.

Undoubtedly, this list includes consequences of polarization as well as causes, and many are likely some combination of both. Some are superficially contradictory. Disentangling how and why this increased polarization has arisen will likely fascinate scholars for a long time to come, but for now, the United States is faced with a situation in which public opinion is more divided along partisan lines than along race, religion, age, gender, or educational background, according to a report from the Pew Research Center released in late 2017.¹ Attempting to determine when the relatively unpolarized political order dating back to the Great Depression and World War II began to decay is fraught with uncertainty and disagreement. The bottom line according to the FSI trend data is that the intense polarization currently felt by many Americans is both very real and increasing in intensity, with potentially serious future consequences for American society if that trend is not reversed.

Certainly, this trend should be viewed with deep concern – in particular the United States' worrying long-term declining trend even more so than simply the year-on-year worsening. But though concern is called for, hyperbole is not. In 2017, Professor Peter Temin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology made headlines by warning that the United States was “regressing to have the economic and political structure of a developing nation.”² There is certainly truth to the critical observations that America's infrastructure is crumbling and that the inequality gap in the United States is seriously worsening, risking potential social conflict in the future. However, to paraphrase Mark Twain, rumors of America's demise have been exaggerated. Based on the findings of the FSI, there is no suggestion whatsoever that the United States is at risk of becoming a fragile state anytime soon. The reality is that the United States is one of the most resilient nations on Earth and is blessed with relatively strong institutions – indeed, there exists no country with more capacity than the United States. Just as with our analysis of South Africa in 2017, countries with significant resilience and strong institutions demonstrate enormous absorptive capacity to handle challenges and shocks – but that should not let any of us be complacent, either.

UNITED STATES: COHESION INDICATORS



INDICATORS

- CI: Security Apparatus
- C2: Factionalized Elites
- C3: Group Grievance

As the United States heads into the 2018 Congressional mid-term elections, the risk is high that social and political divisions will continue to deepen, aided and abetted by divisive rhetoric by political leaders, political tribalism reinforced by social media echo chambers, and partisan media coverage. And, as our data has demonstrated, this worsening trend is not a recent development and has instead been years, if not decades, in the making meaning that it will take time and a serious commitment by all sides of politics to right this ship. While the end is definitely not nigh for the United States, these findings should nevertheless be heeded as a warning to political leaders and social influencers that fueling division and tribalism for short-term political gain is unsustainable and potentially catastrophic in the long-term.

ENDNOTES


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THE AUTHORITARIAN'S PLAYBOOK: CENTRAL EUROPE'S SLIDE TOWARD ILLIBERALISM

CHARLES FIERTZ

At the beginning of the 21st century, Hungary and Poland were frequently lauded as two of the most successful examples of democratic transitions, emerging from the shadow of communist dictatorships and joining the Euro-Atlantic community through membership in organizations such as NATO and the European Union.¹ Today the two countries are again often mentioned together, but now as vanguards of rising illiberal populism and democratic deterioration. The similar trajectories of the two countries is reflected in the trend of several of the Fragile States Index's (FSI) component indicators, most notably Group Grievance and Human Rights and Rule of Law.

The two countries' embrace of unconstrained majoritarianism has occurred over different timeframes. In Hungary, Viktor Orban, once upon a time a champion of liberalism in Hungary's struggle for freedom but now an admirer of the likes of Russia's Vladimir Putin and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, led his Fidesz party to a two-thirds parliamentary majority in 2010 giving him unchecked power to rewrite the constitution. He used that power to enact sweeping changes to the Hungarian system of government including overhauling the Constitutional Court to give Fidesz appointees a majority, eliminating the independent Fiscal Council, gerrymandering legislative districts, and gutting the independent press. In total, Orban and Fidesz passed more than 1,000 laws in their first five years, including a new constitution and a series of amendments, some of which had previously been deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.²




The end of those five years saw the election of Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, which won an absolute majority in the Sejm, the Polish Parliament, the first in Poland's post-communist history. Ahead of those elections, PiS had employed a vocabulary similar to that used by Fidesz, focusing on accusations that the ruling party had overseen a failed economy, embraced alien cosmopolitan liberal values, and failed to sufficiently purge communists and their collaborators. After their ascent to power, PiS's initial moves mirrored those enacted by Fidesz, as the government moved to pack the Constitutional Tribunal with its own appointees and assert control over public broadcasters, purging them of dissidents. The new government also passed notably illiberal laws including the criminalization of discourse on Polish complicity in the Holocaust as well as a law giving the security services sweeping powers over telecommunications and personal information. The latter is written in vague terms, giving a government that often labels its political opponents as traitors wide latitude in determining what constitutes an act of terrorism in a country that has not experienced any such acts whatsoever since the fall of the Soviet Union.³


The similar tactics employed by Fidesz and PiS are reflected in their scores and trends on the FSI Human Rights & Rule of Law indicator, wherein the two countries experienced a worsening of 1.1 and 1.2 points, respectively, in the four years after their assumption of power. This worsening has been mirrored by the deterioration of Hungary's and Poland's score on a wealth of

POLAND AND HUNGARY: COMPARATIVE TRENDS


CI: SECURITY APPARATUS



PI: STATE LEGITIMACY



P3: HUMAN RIGHTS



Poland

Hungary

metrics of institutional quality and rule of law from across the ideological spectrum, including Freedom House's Freedom in the World, the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom, and the Cato Institute's Human Freedom Index.

There has been a range of explanations proffered to explain the rise of illiberal majoritarian populism in Poland and Hungary, both by supporters and members of the two regimes as well as by outside observers. Some of the most frequently cited include the oppressive yoke of the European Union, the influx of refugees from Syria and other countries, and the inadequate response of the existing system to rising inequality and the financial crisis. There are likely grains of truth in each. Poland, however, has been the largest recipient of EU structural funds, with an allocation of around €80 billion for 2014-2020, and the structural funds allocated to Hungary represent the highest proportion of its GDP of any EU member state, at over 3%.⁴ The degree to which refugee inflows were a genuine catalyst is arguable – the spike in refugees arriving in Hungary did not begin until 2013, three years after Fidesz began implementing its illiberal agenda, while asylum application in Poland peaked in the same year and had declined by around 20% by 2015 when PiS was elected.⁵

In early 2015, Poland's economic performance was generating talk of a new golden age for the country. Since 1989, it had grown faster than all other large economies at a similar level of development and more than doubled its GDP per capita. and a poll found that more than 80% of Poles were satisfied with their lives.⁶ The FSI Uneven Development indicator also shows steady improvement by both

countries and World Bank estimates of the GINI Index suggests inequality in Poland had been declining through 2014 while inequality in Hungary hit a nadir in the year before Fidesz was elected and has increased since then.

One commonality between the two countries revealed by the FSI is the steady worsening in the Group Grievance indicator. While there has been some divergence in the last two years, both countries have seen fairly consistent annual increases in their score. While the score alone does not indicate the cleavages along which these grievances grew, both countries have seen an increase in nationalist rhetoric and actions even before the refugee crisis including, in Hungary's case, lamenting the loss of territory in the treaties that ended World War I.

With governing parties in countries such as Austria and the Czech Republic showing similarities to the authoritarian instincts of Fidesz and PiS, Poland and Hungary may be only the beginning of a troubling trend in Europe.

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RESILIENCE DRIVES A REMARKABLE BOUNCEBACK FOR MEXICO

MCKENZIE HORWITZ

In the previous edition of the Fragile States Index (FSI), Mexico was the most worsened country — a decline in Mexico's economy, the deteriorating status of refugees, and prevalent political corruption had pushed the country to the 88th position on the FSI in 2017, its worst ranking in over a decade. Indeed, Fund for Peace covered Mexico's rapid decline in an article entitled, *"So Far from God, So Close to the United States: Mexico Most-Worsened in 2017."*

However, in a surprising twist, in 2018 Mexico has recovered to become FSI's sixth-most improved country overall, showing moderate improvements across nearly every indicator. This dramatic shift is largely attributable to the country's resilience in the face of worsening U.S.-Mexican relations and the benefits reaped from overall improvements in its southern neighbors in Central America. In the face of very low expectations for its success in 2017, Mexico demonstrated continued economic strength and resilience.

During the campaign of U.S. President Donald J. Trump, in which Mexico and Mexicans were widely vilified, few thought Mexico would be able to weather his proposed "America First" policy agenda. The Mexican Peso saw a 11% crash in value immediately following the U.S. election. However, by the end of 2017, the Peso had more than recovered in value and the country's economic growth had been preserved by the continued strength of Mexico's automotive industry, the second largest in the Western Hemisphere. This sector alone saw 13% growth in 2017 compared to 0.9% growth the previous year.¹

Since the U.S. market accounts for 80% of Mexican exports and nearly half of Mexican imports, President Trump's anti-NAFTA rhetoric posed a serious threat to Mexico's economy. In 2017, Mexico responded by diversifying its trading partners and, therefore, reducing their future


dependence on U.S. agriculture. The country increased their imports of corn from Brazil ten-fold² and signed a trade deal with Argentina to import wheat.³ The country has also begun talks with the European Union to expand and modernize their existing free trade agreement.⁴ By forging new trade partnerships, Mexico's leaders have taken important steps that will only build on the economic strengths that have been demonstrated by its manufacturing sector.

In the 2017 FSI, Mexico's most-worsened indicator was Refugees and IDPs, largely due to the Central American refugee crisis which saw refugees from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras fleeing to, and through, Mexico. However, the 2018 FSI shows that each of these countries has seen significant improvements, reducing the pressure on Mexico, whose authorities had reported apprehending 27% fewer Central American migrants on its southern border in the first two months of 2017 than in the same period the previous year.⁵

Increased support from the international community also contributed greatly to Mexico's ability to manage the refugee crisis in 2017. Though asylum applications in Mexico continued to rise in 2017, this mainly reflected the growing number of civil society groups working to register refugees. UNHCR increased support for the refugees by opening new field offices along the Mexico-Guatemala border and in areas of forced displacement in Honduras.⁶ Additionally, the Inter-American Development Bank pledged US\$750 million toward key infrastructure projects in the Northern Triangle.⁷ The U.S. Congress also approved a US\$655 million package as part of the Alliance for Prosperity formed with heads of state in the Northern Triangle which aims to support anti-crime and anti-corruption initiatives in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.



MEXICO: YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGES



Mexican leaders also remained determined to not allow the U.S. administration's evolving immigration agenda to overburden Mexico's immigration apparatus. In President Enrique Peña Nieto's first call with President Trump, he made it clear that Mexico would not pay for the proposed wall along the Mexico-U.S. border. When the United States released an outline for mass deportations of undocumented immigrants into Mexican territory in early 2017, the country again responded with strong objections and plans to refuse any non-Mexican deported into the country from the United States.⁸

Despite the emerging rift between American and Mexican diplomats, Mexico has exceeded expectations in its ability to push back at its northern neighbor's evolving immigration platform and to manage the consequences of the Central American refugee crisis.

Despite Mexico's resilience in 2017, the nation still faces challenges in the year to come. Violent crime remains a challenge as levels rose again in 2017 which was reflected in Mexico's Security Apparatus score of the 2018 FSI. The country was also named the most dangerous for journalists in 2017 by the International Press Institute and recorded its highest homicide rate in decades.⁹ Corruption

continues to plague the political sphere as Mexico nears its presidential elections in July 2018. By the fall of 2017, 11 of the country's 32 governors were under investigation or facing charges for corruption.¹⁰ Nearly 90% of Mexicans see the state and federal governments as deeply corrupt, which has eroded the base of President Peña Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).¹¹ This shift is clear in the rise of presidential frontrunner Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador of the National Regeneration Movement (Morena), who is promising a return to state ownership, business subsidies, and agricultural self-sufficiency.

Though Mexico appears to have managed to weather the political and diplomatic storm resulting from the election of President Trump, its long-term resilience will still be tested by the entrenched problems of violence and corruption. Whether or not the country can eradicate corruption will greatly impact the nation's state legitimacy, and its ability to deal with the threat of violence will similarly impact its stability. U.S. administrations come and go, however, Mexico's ability to demonstrate resilience against its more domestic challenges will ultimately decide the trajectory of Mexico's performance over the longer term.

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THE GAMBIA DEMONSTRATES THE POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL ACTION

PATRICIA TAFT AND IGNATIUS ONYEKWERE

The tiny West African nation of The Gambia, a tropical country famed for its beautiful beaches, stunning vistas, and warm hospitality, has had a turbulent few years. Ruled for over two decades by President Yahya Jammeh, The Gambia experienced a progressive slide into authoritarianism from 1994 until late 2016, when a political and military intervention spearheaded by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) succeeded in forcing Jammeh's resignation.

During Jammeh's 22 years in power, The Gambia experienced a sharp curtailing of basic human rights and freedoms, as well as a crackdown on independent journalism. Under Jammeh's regime, human rights activists in the country were considered as "saboteurs," and their offenses were punishable by death. In addition, its strategic coastal location, weak judicial system, and endemic corruption continued to make The Gambia a desirable transit point for drug traffickers operating networks between Latin America and Europe. In mid-2010, The Gambia gained notoriety not only for its authoritarian leader and draconian laws, but also as being the locale of the largest drug bust in the history of West Africa, with an estimated US\$1 billion in cocaine seized from a warehouse in the northwest of the country.

Over the past five years on the Fragile States Index (FSI), The Gambia has consistently scored poorly across indicators measuring the health of the economy, the legitimacy of the state, and human rights. It also has one of the poorest scores in the category of Human Flight, indicating that Gambians have been steadily (and, by regional comparisons, wildly disproportionately) fleeing the country in search of better livelihoods abroad, or to escape repression. Associated with this indicator, the resultant "brain drain" has had significant long-term effects across a range of other indicators, undermining political and economic development, otherwise

the backbone of a stable country. Inside the country, the government stoked ethnic grievances and paranoia to cause widespread political polarization. All this combined to keep The Gambia a poor, factionalized and relatively isolated country.

In a series of increasingly flawed elections, President Jammeh was returned to power four times during his tenure. In 2016, however, the tide changed, and the President faced mounting pressure from both inside and outside of the country to step down. Despite a harsh crackdown on opposition parties and opponents, Jammeh lost the December 2016 election to politician and real estate developer Adama Barrow. Jammeh initially accepted defeat, but later retracted his resignation, alleging irregularities at polling stations. This triggered sharp international condemnation, including from the African Union and ECOWAS, with the former declaring his presidency "null and void." Behind the scenes, however, ECOWAS continued to exhaust all avenues of diplomatic pressure to get Jammeh to step down peacefully. When these efforts failed, the West African regional body acted to enforce the political transition, with an intervention known as the ECOWAS Military Intervention in The Gambia (ECOMIG), code-named "Operation Restore Democracy." Finally, in late December, Jammeh fled to Equatorial Guinea, allegedly with US\$50 million in stolen national funds, where he would be safe from transfer to the International Criminal Court.

ECOMIG represented the sixth military intervention by ECOWAS since 1990. Other interventions have taken place in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea Bissau and Mali. Since the regional organization's founding in 1975, it has consistently been willing to utilize the full spectrum of political and military might of its member states to restore order in the sub-region. While some of the earlier interven-



THE GAMBIA

TREND LINE
2007 TO 2018



TOTAL SCORE
FSI SCORE 2018

87.1

(MAXIMUM 120)

RANK
OVERALL 2018

42nd

(OF 178 COUNTRIES)

CHANGE
YEAR-ON-YEAR

-2.3

POINTS SINCE 2017

MEDIUM-TERM
TREND

+5.3


POINTS SINCE 2013

LONG-TERM
TREND

+10.2

POINTS SINCE 2008

COMPARATIVE TRENDS: ECOWAS



COUNTRY TRENDS

■ The Gambia ■ Liberia ■ Sierra Leone

tions, particularly in Liberia in the early 1990s, were marred by allegations of looting and human rights abuses, the organization has nevertheless managed to distinguish itself on the continent for its willingness to intervene in potential or active humanitarian emergencies. It has also fulfilled an essential role in the provision of “bridging forces,” or the temporary deployment of military assets later to be replaced or subsumed into wider United Nations or African Union peacekeeping operations.

For The Gambia, 2017 was a transitional year which saw significant successes despite numerous challenges. In the 2018 FSI, The Gambia showed signs of slow improvement across indicators related to human rights, state legitimacy and group grievance, although these scores remained high. The Gambian economy, after decades of mismanagement and high levels of youth unemployment, continued to perform poorly. Other indicators, such as Human Flight, may be more of a long-term project, likely to take years to demonstrate any reversal in negative trends. Attracting skilled and educated Gambians to return back to the country should be a priority going forward.

Despite The Gambia’s slow recovery on the 2018 FSI, improvement was visible and all signs indicate a continuation of this trend in the

foreseeable future. Within a few years of a crisis, a nation with steady leadership and economic stability can become one of the FSI’s most improved countries, as demonstrated by other countries in the sub-region, such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. In such cases, particularly in West Africa, it often helps to have a little help from friends. In the case of The Gambia, the role of regional organizations like ECOWAS in early interventions, whether political or military, is critical and should not be overlooked.

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SCRAPING THE BARREL: OIL-DEPENDENT VENEZUELA IN FREEFALL

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STABILITY IN THE SAHEL REGION WILL REQUIRE MORE THAN JUST COUNTER-TERRORISM

CHRISTINA MURPHY

The deaths of four U.S. soldiers in a remote region of Niger in October 2017 suddenly brought the Sahel region of West Africa to the attention of the American public and lawmakers, many of whom were previously unaware of there being any American military engagement in the region. The soldiers and their Nigerien counterparts were reportedly ambushed by fighters loyal to the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), one of the multiple extremist groups operating in the region's large and sparsely populated desert areas. While the October attack may have catapulted American counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel into the media spotlight, the region is no stranger to regional and international military operations aiming to combat the growth of violent extremism. The Sahel region is now home to a growing alphabet soup of regional and international peacekeeping and counterterrorism operations, from the French-led Operation Barkhane to the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the newly-formed Multinational Joint Task Force to combat Boko Haram.

In seeking to understand the many challenges facing states in the Sahel region and the capacity of states to effectively respond to these threats, all too often the approach has been narrowly focused on security and military engagement. While preventing the spread of violent extremism is undoubtedly critical, data from the Fragile States Index (FSI) highlights a number of other ongoing pressures facing states in the Sahel which are distinct from immediate security threats yet present real risks to the current and future stability of the region.


The most-worsened country in the Sahel over the last decade is undoubtedly Mali, whose FSI score has increased by 18 points over the last decade, moving from 89th-most fragile state in 2008 to the 27th-most fragile in 2018. While the current conflict, which started in 2012, has obviously had massive impacts on the Malian population and state, the conflict has also had broader regional implications due to refugee flows and spillover effects of insecurity. According to data from UNHCR, 2017 saw the highest numbers of Malian refugees since the start of conflict in 2012, reaching a high of nearly 145,000 people in May 2017. The ongoing Boko Haram insurgency centered in

northeast Nigeria has also contributed to massive displacement in the Lake Chad basin, with more than 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Nigeria and more than 200,000 refugees in Niger, Chad, and the Far North region of Cameroon. Cross-border attacks by Boko Haram in the southern Diffa region of Niger have also contributed to a growing number of Nigerien IDPs. Chad, Niger and Mauritania (and to a lesser extent Burkina Faso) have taken in nearly all of these refugees, placing additional pressure on these countries and their ability to meet the needs of their own populations.

In addition to the obvious humanitarian impacts of displacement, high levels of refugees and IDPs pose a particular challenge to states. If states do not have the capacity to absorb refugee populations or meet the needs of displaced persons, grievances may develop among both refugee populations and host communities, potentially resulting in tensions or conflict. Refugee populations may also place additional pressures on infrastructure and health and education systems, many of which are already deplorably weak in Sahelian states.

The FSI's Demographic Pressures indicator, which measures pressures around issues such as population growth, disease, natural disasters and food security, is also of particular salience to Sahelian countries. In fact, for three of the seven states discussed in this article (Chad, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania) Demographic Pressures is the highest-scoring indicator, and six of the seven countries have Demographic Pressures scores of 8.0 or higher. Demographic pressures in the region are often driven by high rates of population growth, as well as recurrent cycles of drought, natural disasters and food insecurity. High fertility rates and rapid population growth in many Sahelian countries have created large youth populations -- Niger, for example, has both the largest and the youngest youth bulge in the world, with a median age of just 14.8 years. While large youth populations have the potential to be a boon for economic growth, in countries characterized by low economic productivity and high rates of illiteracy and poverty the youth bulge also raises concerns around the potential for grievances and radicalization in the future.

COMPARATIVE TRENDS: THE SAHEL



Furthermore, the Sahel is highly vulnerable to the effects of global climate change, particularly changes in rainfall patterns, with negative implications for livelihoods and food security in the region. The effects of climate change also risk spurring migration and increasing conflicts between farmers and pastoralists as grazing and agricultural zones shift and competition for resources increases. While the FSI does not measure climate change as a unique indicator, the carry-on effects of

climate change are captured in indicators such as Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDPs and Economic Decline, which are already high-scoring indicators for many countries in the Sahel.

Despite these myriad challenges, there are positive trends in the region that offer hope. Improvements were seen in 2017 in the total FSI score for all of the Sahelian countries except Mali. Burkina Faso has also seen a steady improvement in its Economic Decline indicator since 2006 and now has the best Economic Decline score among Sahelian states and the third-best score among ECOWAS member states (after Cape Verde and Ghana). Similarly, Burkina Faso and Mauritania have both seen improvements in their Group Grievance indicators over the last decade. In fact, Burkina Faso now has one of the world's 50 lowest Group Grievance scores, scoring better than highly stable countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands.

The Sahel faces a veritable perfect storm of social, economic and security challenges, all of which both exacerbate, and are exacerbated by, the fragility of states in the region. However, ensuring future stability will require far more than a purely military approach. Investments in education, infrastructure, poverty alleviation, family planning, youth engagement, good governance initiatives, humanitarian relief and climate change adaptation strategies, among others, are critical to alleviating the pressures on states and addressing the broader causes of insecurity and violent extremism. By maintaining a more holistic understanding of the pressures facing states and populations today and in the future, governments in the region and their partners may yet contribute to a more peaceful and stable future for the Sahel.


IT'S (NOT) THE ECONOMY, STUPID

NATE HAKEN

It was a rough year for the United States in 2017. It was the country's worst year for hurricanes – Irma, Harvey, and Maria caused hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of damage in the Gulf Coast. It was the worst year for wildfires – over a million acres burned in California alone. It was the worst year for mass shootings – hundreds were killed at concerts and churches and schools. It was a pretty bad year for political polarization too, marked by politically charged investigations into Russian external intervention in the democratic process and a series of political scandals involving alleged corruption, criminality, and misconduct at the highest levels of government. Further, mass protests over issues like immigration policy and women's rights took on greater energy than ever before. But not everything was bad. The economy continued to improve through 2017, with unemployment continuing to drop since it peaked at 10% in 2009 to a low of 4.1%, the best rate since 2000. The stock market also did well throughout 2017, continuing its rise since the crash of 2008-2009.

These divergent trends belie the notion that economic development automatically correlates with good governance and social cohesion. While it is probably true that in the long run, societies with lower social, economic, political, and security pressures are healthier and more resilient (certainly our operating assumption at The Fund for Peace), in the short run, trends can move in all kinds of different directions. Notwithstanding issues of inequality and relative deprivation masked by any macro-economic improvements, this means that when designing a peacebuilding strategy, you cannot simply presume that in addressing the economic concerns of aggrieved parties, conflict risks and vulnerabilities will thereby be reduced. James Carville's famous line, "It's the economy, stupid" may be true about winning elections, but it's not the whole story if the goal is state resilience.

Early warning is about trying to guess the future. The temptation is to assume that current trends will continue unless some external force alters those trajectories. Certainly, in 2018, mass shootings and mass protest have continued into the new year, including a new factor: state-wide labor strikes by public school teachers across multiple



states. Approval ratings of political leaders and government institutions continue to be lower than any other time in the history of modern polling. And the economy continues to do well, with the unemployment rate as low as its been in almost 20 years. But if the first quarter of 2018 is any indication, the economic outlook is far from certain, what with the rumblings of a trade war and a decrease in the value of technology companies driving down the stock market, putting added pressure on the national debt and political pressure on Congress to cut services to vulnerable and politically marginalized populations. Given this context, with midterm elections around the corner, there's already the makings of a sharply divided electorate becoming even more so the closer we get to November.

Which brings us back to the question of agency. Policy and leadership matter. The economy is yet strong. Public services are still robust in comparison to historical levels. But unless we can agree as a society that public policy is intended to promote the public good, then we'll never develop a common vision for what a thriving and resilient country even looks like. Tools like the Fragile States Index provide a framework that can help guide these questions and conversations. If we can agree on the goal, then we can have a constructive debate on the best way to get there.

THE METHODOLOGY BEHIND THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX

In a highly interconnected world, pressures on one fragile state can have serious repercussions not only for that state and its people, but also for its neighbors and other states halfway across the globe. Since the end of the Cold War, a number of states have erupted into mass violence stemming from internal conflict. Some of these crises emerge from ethnic tensions; some are civil wars; others take on the form of revolutions; and many result in complex humanitarian emergencies.

Fault lines can emerge between identity groups, defined by language, religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, class, caste, clan or area of origin. Tensions can deteriorate into conflict through a variety of circumstances, such as competition over resources, predatory or fractured leadership, corruption, or unresolved group grievances. The reasons for state fragility are complex but not unpredictable. It is critically important that the international community understand and closely monitor the conditions that contribute to fragility — and be prepared to take the necessary actions to deal with the underlying issues or otherwise mitigate the negative effects.

To have meaningful early warning, and effective policy responses, assessments must go beyond specialized area knowledge, narrative case studies and anecdotal evidence to identify and grasp broad social trends. A mixed approach integrating qualitative and quantitative data sources is needed to establish patterns and trends. With the right data and analysis it is possible to identify problems that may be simmering below the surface. Decision makers need access to this kind of information to implement effective policies.

The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP) is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states' capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index — and the social science framework and data

analysis tools upon which it is built — makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.

The strength of the FSI is its ability to distill millions of pieces of information into a form that is relevant as well as easily digestible and informative. Daily, FFP collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing the existing social, economic and political pressures faced by each of the 178 countries that we analyze.

ORIGINS OF THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX: THE CAST FRAMEWORK

The genesis of most indices is to begin with a concept of what needs to be measured, followed by the development of a methodology that hopes to perform that measurement. The FSI followed a very different trajectory, whereby the idea for the Index occurred subsequently to the development of its own methodology.

The FSI traces its origins to the creation of FFP's Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which was developed in the 1990s as a framework for policymakers and field practitioners to be able to better understand and measure conflict drivers and dynamics in complex environments. The CAST framework has been widely peer reviewed, and the continued usage of the framework by many of those same professionals, as well as now by local civil society and community groups in conflict-affected areas, is testament to the framework's enduring relevance. In 2004, the CAST framework was used as the basis for the FSI, as researchers wished to determine whether state fragility could be assessed and ranked at a national level using the existing framework.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE FRAGILE STATES INDEX ANALYTICAL PROCESS


Though at the ground level the CAST framework is applied using various practices such as individual incident reporting and observation by field monitors, the sheer volume of data to be analyzed at an international level required a different approach. To that end, technology was employed to enable researchers to process large volumes of data to perform the national level assessments that feed into the FSI.

Based on CAST's comprehensive social science approach, data from three main streams — pre-existing quantitative data sets, content analysis, and qualitative expert analysis — is triangulated and subjected to critical review to obtain final scores for the Index.

1. **Content Analysis:** Each of the twelve indicators of the CAST framework are broken down into sub-indicators, and for each of these, hundreds of Boolean search phrases are applied to global media data to determine the level of saliency of issues for each of those sub-indicators in each country. The raw data, provided by a commercial content aggregator, includes media articles, research reports, and other qualitative data points collected from over 10,000 different English-language sources around the world. Every year, the number of articles and reports analyzed is between 45-50 million. Based on the assessed saliency for each of the sub-indicators, provisional scores are apportioned for each country.
2. **Quantitative Data:** Pre-existing quantitative data sets, generally from international and multilateral statistical agencies (such as the United Nations, World Bank, and World Health Organization) are identified for their ability to statistically represent key aspects of the indicators. The raw data sets are normalized and scaled for comparative analysis. The trends identified in the quantitative analysis for each country are then compared with the provisional scores from the Content Analysis phase. Depending on the degree to which the Content Analysis and the Quantitative Data agree, the provisional scores are confirmed, or where they disagree, are

reconciled based on a set of rules that dictate allowable movements in score in the event of disagreement between the two data streams.

3. **Qualitative Review:** Separately, a team of social science researchers independently reviews each of the 178 countries, providing assessments based on key events from that year, compared to the previous one. Recognizing that every data set and approach has different strengths and weaknesses, this step helps to ensure that dynamic year-on-year trends across different indicators are picked up — which may not be evident in lagging quantitative data sets that measure longer term structural factors. It also helps to mitigate any potential false positives or negative that may emerge from noisy content analysis data.



These three data streams are then triangulated, applying a set of rules to ensure the data sets are integrated in a way that leverages the strengths of the different approaches. This approach also helps to ensure that inherent weaknesses, gaps, or biases in one source are checked by the others. Though the basic data underpinning of the Index is already freely and widely available electronically, the strength of the analysis is in the methodological rigor and the systematic integration of a wide range of data sources. Final indicator scores for each country are then produced from this process. A panel review is then conducted by the research team of the final Index to ensure all scores are proportionate across the country spectrum.

The final FSI Index product is intended as an entry point into deeper interpretive analysis for the user. Though an index inherently ranks different countries — making some more fragile than others — ultimately the goal of the FSI is to measure trends in pressures within each individual state. By identifying the most salient pressures within a country, it creates the opportunity for deeper analysis and planning by policy makers and practitioners alike to strengthen each state's resiliency. To that end, the following section outlines what each indicator seeks to measure in the Index — as well as providing guiding questions for deeper levels of analysis and inquiry by the user.

COHESION INDICATORS

SECURITY APPARATUS



The Security Apparatus indicator considers the security threats to a state, such as bombings, attacks and battle-related deaths, rebel movements, mutinies, coups, or terrorism. The Security Apparatus indicator also takes into account serious criminal factors, such as organized crime and homicides, and perceived trust of citizens in domestic security. In some instances, the security apparatus may extend beyond traditional military or police forces to include state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. In other instances, the security apparatus of a state can include a “deep state”, that may consist of secret intelligence units, or other irregular security forces, that serve the interests of a political leader or clique. As a counter example, the indicator will also take into account armed resistance to a governing authority, particularly the manifestation of violent uprisings and insurgencies, proliferation of independent militias, vigilantes, or mercenary groups that challenge the state’s monopoly on the use of force.

Questions to consider may include:*

Monopoly on the Use of Force

- Is the military under civilian control?
- Do private militias exist against the state?
- Is there paramilitary activity?
- Do private armies exist to protect assets?
- Are there guerilla forces operating in the state? Do they control territory?

Relationship Between Security and Citizenry

- Are the police considered to be professional?
- Is violence often state-sponsored and politically motivated?
- Is the government dealing well with any insurgency or security situation?

Force

- Does the military and police maintain proper use of force?
- Are there accusations of police brutality?

Arms

- Is there a high availability of weapons?
- If in reconstruction, is there an adequate plan for demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants?

FACTIONALIZED ELITES



The Factionalized Elites indicator considers the fragmentation of state institutions along ethnic, class, clan, racial or religious lines, as well as brinksmanship and gridlock between ruling elites. It also factors in the use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of nationalism, xenophobia, communal irredentism (e.g., a “greater Serbia”) or of communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”). In extreme cases, it can be representative of the absence of legitimate leadership widely accepted as representing the entire citizenry. The Factionalized Elites indicator measures power struggles, political competition, political transitions and, where elections occur, will factor in the credibility of electoral processes (or in their absence, the perceived legitimacy of the ruling class).

** Indicator descriptions are not exhaustive, and are intended only as an entry point for further interpretive analysis by the user.*

GROUP GRIEVANCE

Questions to consider may include*:

Representative Leadership

- Is leadership fairly elected? Is leadership representative of the population?
- Are there factionalized elites, tribal elites and/or fringe groups? How powerful are they?
- Is there a political reconciliation process?
- Is the military representative of the population?

Identity

- Is there a sense of national identity? Are there strong feelings of nationalism? Or are there calls for separatism?
- Does hate speech via radio and media exist?
- Is religious, ethnic, or other stereotyping prevalent and is there scape-goating?
- Does cross-cultural respect exist?

Resource Distribution

- Is wealth concentrated in the hands of a few?
- Is there a burgeoning middle class?
- Does any one group control the majority of resources?
- Are resources fairly distributed? Does the government adequately distribute wealth through taxes?

Equality and Equity

- Are the laws democratic or reasonable?
- Is the system representative of the population?



The Group Grievance indicator focuses on divisions and schisms between different groups in society – particularly divisions based on social or political characteristics – and their role in access to services or resources, and inclusion in the political process. Group Grievance may also have a historical component, where aggrieved communal groups cite injustices of the past, sometimes going back centuries, that influence and shape that group's role in society and relationships with other groups. This history may in turn be shaped by patterns of real or perceived atrocities or “crimes” committed with apparent impunity against communal groups. Groups may also feel aggrieved because they are denied autonomy, self-determination or political independence to which they believe they are entitled. The indicator also considers where specific groups are singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression, or where there is public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power “illegitimately”, which may manifest itself in the emergence of fiery rhetoric, such as through “hate” radio, pamphleteering, and stereotypical or nationalistic political speech.

Questions to consider may include*:

Post-Conflict Response

- Does a Truth & Reconciliation process exist or is one needed?
- Have groups been reintegrated?
- Is there a plan for reconstruction and development?
- Are victims of past atrocities compensated or is there a plan to compensate them?
- Are war criminals apprehended and prosecuted? Does the public feel they are properly punished?
- Has amnesty been granted?

Equality

- Is there an equitable and efficient distribution of resources?

Divisions

- Are there feelings of or reports of ethnic and/or religious intolerance and/or violence?
- Are groups oppressed or do they feel oppressed?
- Is there history of violence against a group or group grievance?
- How are intertribal and/or interethnic relations?
- Is there freedom of religion according to laws and practiced by society? Are there reports of religiously motivated violence?

Communal Violence

- Is vigilante justice reported?
- Are there reports of mass violence and/or killings?

ECONOMIC INDICATORS

ECONOMIC DECLINE



Economic Decline indicator considers factors related to economic decline within a country. For example, the indicator looks at patterns of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, Gross National Product, unemployment rates, inflation, productivity, debt, poverty levels, or business failures. It also takes into account sudden drops in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment, and any collapse or devaluation of the national currency. The Economic Decline indicator further considers the responses to economic conditions and their consequences, such as extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programs, or perceived increasing group inequalities. The Economic Decline indicator is focused on the formal economy as well as illicit trade, including the drug and human trafficking, and capital flight, or levels of corruption and illicit transactions such as money laundering or embezzlement.

Questions to consider may include:*

Public Finances

- What level is the government debt?

Economic Conditions

- How are the interest rates – actual and projected?
- How is the inflation rate – actual and projected?
- What is the level of productivity?
- What is the GDP – actual and projected?
- How is the unemployment – current and rate of unemployment?

Economic Climate

- Consumer Confidence: How do people view the economy?
- How do experts view the economy?
- Is the business climate attractive to Foreign Direct Investment?
- Do the laws and access to capital allow for internal entrepreneurship?

Economic Diversification

- Economic Focus: Does one product make up the majority of the economy?

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT



The Uneven Economic Development indicator considers inequality within the economy, irrespective of the actual performance of an economy. For example, the Indicator looks at structural inequality that is based on group (such as racial, ethnic, religious, or other identity group) or based on education, economic status, or region (such as urban-rural divide). The Indicator considers not only actual inequality, but also perceptions of inequality, recognizing that perceptions of economic inequality can fuel grievance as much as real inequality, and can reinforce communal tensions or nationalistic rhetoric. Further to measuring economic inequality, the Indicator also takes into account the opportunities for groups to improve their economic status, such as through access to employment, education, or job training such that, even if there is economic inequality present, to what degree it is structural and reinforcing?

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HUMAN FLIGHT AND BRAIN DRAIN

Questions to consider may include*:

Economic Equality

- Economic Equality: Is there a large economic gap?
- Is the economic system discriminatory?
- Does economic justice exist?
- Are hiring practices generally fair – legally and perceived?
- Do equal rights exist in the society?
- Are there laws protecting equal rights?

Economic Opportunity

- Does free education exist and if so, to which grade?
- Is the education provided relatively equal?
- Fair Housing: Is there a housing system for the poor?
- Do programs for job training exist?
- Do people know about the job training and is it available based on qualification and need?

Socio-Economic Dynamics

- Do ghettos and slums exist?



The Human Flight and Brain Drain Indicator considers the economic impact of human displacement (for economic or political reasons) and the consequences this may have on a country's development. On the one hand, this may involve the voluntary emigration of the middle class – particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, or skilled workers such as physicians – due to economic deterioration in their home country and the hope of better opportunities farther afield. On the other hand, it may involve the forced displacement of professionals or intellectuals who are fleeing their country due to actual or feared persecution or repression. The indicator specifically measures the economic impact that displacement may wreak on an economy through the loss of productive, skilled professional labor.

Questions to consider may include*:

Retention of Technical and Intellectual Capital

- Are professionals leaving the country?
- Are politicians or political elites leaving the country?
- Is there a relatively high proportion of higher educated people leaving the country?
- Is the middle class beginning to return to the country?

Economics

- Are there a large amount of remittances coming to families from relatives overseas?

Diaspora

- Is there growth of a country's exiled communities or diasporas abroad?
- Does the diaspora have an impact on the home state economy, or on politics in the home state?

POLITICAL INDICATORS

STATE LEGITIMACY



The State Legitimacy Indicator considers the representativeness and openness of government and its relationship with its citizenry. The Indicator looks at the population's level of confidence in state institutions and processes, and assesses the effects where that confidence is absent, manifested through mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, or the rise of armed insurgencies. Though the State Legitimacy indicator does not necessarily make a judgment on democratic governance, it does consider the integrity of elections where they take place (such as flawed or boycotted elections), the nature of political transitions and, where there is an absence of democratic elections, the degree to which the government is representative of the population which it governs. The Indicator takes into account openness of government, specifically the openness of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation, or conversely the levels of corruption, profiteering, and marginalizing, persecuting, or otherwise excluding opposition groups. The Indicator also considers the ability of a state to exercise basic functions that infer a population's confidence in its government and institutions, such as through the ability to collect taxes.

Questions to consider may include:*

Confidence in the Political Process

- Does the government have the confidence of the people?

Political Opposition

- Have demonstrations occurred?
- Have riots or uprisings occurred?

Transparency

- Is there evidence of corruption on the part of government officials?
- Are national and/or local officials considered to be corrupt?

Openness and Fairness of the Political Process

- Do all parties enjoy political rights?
- Is the government representative of the population?
- Have there been recent peaceful transitions of power?
- What is the longer term history of power transitions?
- Are elections perceived to be free and fair?
- Have elections been monitored and reported as free and fair?

Political Violence

- Are there reports of politically motivated attacks, assassinations?
- Are there reports of armed insurgents and attacks?
- Have there been terrorist attacks and how likely are they?

PUBLIC SERVICES



The Public Services Indicator refers to the presence of basic state functions that serve the people. On the one hand, this may include the provision of essential services, such as health, education, water and sanitation, transport infrastructure, electricity and power, and internet and connectivity. On the other hand, it may include the state's ability to protect its citizens, such as from terrorism and violence, through perceived effective policing. Further, even where basic state functions and services are provided, the Indicator further considers to whom – whether the state narrowly serves the ruling elites, such as security agencies, presidential staff, the central bank, or the diplomatic service, while failing to provide comparable levels of service to the general populace – such as rural versus urban populations. The Indicator also considers the level and maintenance of general infrastructure to the extent that its absence would negatively affect the country's actual or potential development.

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HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

Questions to consider may include*:

General Provision of Public Services

- Is there equal access to public services?
- What are the general conditions of public services?

Health

- Is there adequate access to medicines?
- Are there an adequate number of medical facilities for all people?
- Are there an adequate number of medical professionals for the population?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?
- Is sanitation system adequate?

Education

- What is the level of school enrollment? Is it different by gender?
- What are the literacy rates? Is it different by gender?

Shelter

- Do the poor have access to housing?
- Are housing costs in line with the general economy?

Infrastructure

- Are roads adequate and safe?
- Are there adequate airports for sustainable development?
- Are there adequate railroads for sustainable development?
- Is there an adequate supply of fuel?



The Human Rights and Rule of Law Indicator considers the relationship between the state and its population insofar as fundamental human rights are protected and freedoms are observed and respected. The Indicator looks at whether there is widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political

ends, repression of political opponents). The Indicator also considers outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence perpetrated against civilians. It also looks at factors such as denial of due process consistent with international norms and practices for political prisoners or dissidents, and whether there is current or emerging authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated.

Questions to consider may include*:

Civil and Political Rights and Freedoms

- Do communal, labor, political, and/or minority rights exist and are they protected?
- Are there civil rights laws and are civil rights protected?
- Is the right to life protected for all?
- Is freedom of speech protected?
- Is there freedom of movement?
- Does religious freedom exist?

Violation of Rights

- Is there a history of systemic violation of rights by the government or others?
- Are there reports of state- or group-sponsored torture?
- Are there labor laws or reports of forced labor or child labor?
- Are groups forced to relocate? Is there proper compensation?

Openness

- Does independent media exist?
- Do reporters feel free to publish accusations against those in power?
- Is there equal access to information?

Justice

- If rights are not protected, is there a legal system in which they can be addressed?
- Do accused receive a fair and timely trial? Is this equal for all?
- Are there accusations or reports of arbitrary arrests? Are these state-sponsored?
- Are there accusations or reports of illegal detention?
- How are the prison conditions?

Equality

- Is there a process and system that encourages political power sharing?

SOCIAL INDICATORS

DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES



The Demographic Pressures Indicator considers pressures upon the state deriving from the population itself or the environment around it. For example, the Indicator measures population pressures related to food supply, access to safe water, and other life-sustaining resources, or health, such as prevalence of disease and epidemics. The Indicator considers demographic characteristics, such as pressures from high

population growth rates or skewed population distributions, such as a “youth or age bulge,” or sharply divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups, recognizing that such effects can have profound social, economic, and political effects. Beyond the population, the Indicator also takes into account pressures stemming from natural disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes, floods or drought), and pressures upon the population from environmental hazards.

Questions to consider may include:*

Population

- Is the population growth rate sustainable? Is the current and projected distribution reasonable?
- Is population density putting pressure on areas of the state?
- What is the infant mortality rate – actual and projected?
- Is there a high orphan population?

Public Health

- Is there a system for controlling spreading of diseases, pandemics?
- Is there a high likelihood or existence of diseases or epidemics?

Food and Nutrition

- Is the food supply adequate to deal with potential interruption?
- Is there are likelihood of droughts?

- Is there a short-term food shortage or longer-term starvation?
- Are there long-term food shortages affecting health?

Environment

- Do sound environmental policies exist and are current practices sustainable?
- Is natural disaster likely, recurring?
- If a natural disaster occurs, is there an adequate response plan?
- Has deforestation taken place or are there laws to protect forests?

Resources

- Does resource competition exist?
- Does land competition it and are there laws to arbitrate disputes?
- Is there access to an adequate potable water supply?

REFUGEES AND IDPS



The Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons Indicator measures the pressure upon states caused by the forced displacement of large communities as a result of social, political, environmental or other causes, measuring displacement within countries, as well as refugee flows into others. The indicator measures refugees by country of asylum, recognizing that population inflows can put additional pressure on public services, and can sometimes create broader humanitarian and security challenges for the receiving state if that state does not have the absorption capacity and adequate resources. The Indicator also measures the internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees by country of origin, which signifies internal state pressures as a result of violence, environmental or other factors such as health epidemics. These measures are considered within the context of the state’s population (per capita) and human development trajectory, and over time (year on year spikes), recognizing that some IDPs or refugees, may have been displaced for long periods of time.

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CROSS-CUTTING INDICATOR

EXTERNAL INTERVENTION

Questions to consider may include*:

Refugees

- Are refugees likely to come from neighboring countries?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual refugees?
- Are there sufficient refugee camps or are refugees integrated into communities?
- Are there reports of violence against refugees?
- Are conditions safe in refugee camps?

Internally Displaced Persons

- How many IDPs are there in relation to population?
- Are IDPs likely to increase in the near future?
- Are there resources to provide for projected and actual IDPs?

Response to Displacement

- Is there access to additional resources from international community for refugees and/or IDPs?
- Are there plans for relocation and settlement of current IDPs and/or refugees?



The External Intervention Indicator considers the influence and impact of external actors in the functioning – particularly security and economic – of a state. On the one hand, External Intervention focuses on security aspects of engagement from external actors, both covert and overt, in the internal affairs of a state by governments, armies, intelligence services, identity groups, or other entities that may affect the balance of power (or resolution of a conflict) within a state. On the other hand, External Intervention also focuses on economic engagement by outside actors, including multilateral organizations, through large-scale loans, development projects, or foreign aid, such as ongoing budget support, control of finances, or management of the state's economic policy, creating economic dependency. External Intervention also takes into account humanitarian intervention, such as the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission.

Questions to consider may include*:

Political Intervention

- Is there external support for factions opposed to the government?


























































Force Intervention

- Are foreign troops present?
- Are military attacks from other countries occurring?
- Is there external military assistance?
- Are there military training exercises with other nations or support of military training from other states?
- Is there a peacekeeping operation on the ground?
- Is there external support for police training?
- Are covert operations taking place?


























































Economic Intervention


























































- Is the country receiving economic intervention or aid?
- Is the country dependent on economic aid?

INDICATOR SCORES
























































															
			C1	C2	C3	E1	E2	E3	P1	P2	P3	S1	S2	X1	Total
			SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX	
9th		Afghanistan	10.0	8.6	8.1	8.3	7.8	8.1	9.1	10.0	8.2	9.2	9.9	9.4	106.6
122nd		Albania	4.8	6.5	4.2	5.7	3.3	7.5	6.0	3.8	4.5	3.4	3.3	7.0	60.1
73rd		Algeria	6.9	7.1	7.3	6.3	6.3	6.0	7.2	5.7	6.3	4.9	7.1	4.6	75.8
33rd		Angola	6.8	7.2	7.2	6.3	9.6	6.9	8.5	8.8	7.0	9.2	6.8	5.1	89.4
127th		Antigua and Barbuda	5.7	3.7	3.6	4.8	4.2	6.7	5.1	3.8	4.4	4.6	3.2	5.8	55.6
141st		Argentina	4.6	2.8	4.7	4.2	5.1	2.8	4.5	3.5	3.8	3.5	2.2	4.3	46.1
102nd		Armenia	5.2	7.4	5.8	6.6	4.2	6.1	8.1	3.4	6.9	2.8	6.7	6.4	69.5
170th		Australia	2.4	1.7	3.6	1.9	1.9	1.3	0.7	1.2	2.0	1.4	2.0	0.7	20.8
165th		Austria	1.3	3.2	4.8	1.9	2.6	1.2	1.4	1.0	1.0	1.6	5.3	0.9	26.2
78th		Azerbaijan	6.1	7.9	6.2	4.1	5.6	4.0	8.8	5.1	8.6	4.3	7.4	6.5	74.6
135th		Bahamas	4.6	4.5	3.8	4.5	4.2	4.6	3.3	4.3	3.7	6.6	2.5	3.4	50.0
113th		Bahrain	6.6	7.6	8.7	3.8	4.3	3.7	8.4	1.8	8.9	3.8	2.3	4.5	64.4
32nd		Bangladesh	7.9	9.3	8.4	5.8	6.4	7.9	7.5	7.8	7.6	7.8	7.8	6.1	90.3
139th		Barbados	4.4	4.2	3.8	5.6	4.3	5.3	2.2	2.4	3.2	4.9	2.2	5.7	48.2
97th		Belarus	5.8	8.3	6.8	5.5	4.6	3.1	8.7	3.9	8.0	5.2	3.3	7.3	70.5
163rd		Belgium	2.3	4.4	4.6	4.5	2.4	1.7	1.7	2.0	1.2	1.7	2.5	0.7	29.7
115th		Belize	6.7	4.3	3.8	6.6	5.1	6.6	4.9	5.6	5.0	4.6	3.3	7.2	63.7
74th		Benin	6.2	6.7	3.1	6.5	7.9	7.4	5.1	8.4	4.9	8.0	5.2	6.3	75.7
81st		Bhutan	4.2	7.5	8.2	5.0	5.6	7.2	4.0	5.8	6.3	5.8	6.7	8.0	74.3
76th		Bolivia	6.2	8.0	5.7	5.4	8.3	7.1	6.6	6.5	6.0	6.3	3.7	5.5	75.2
95th		Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.4	8.7	6.9	6.0	5.0	5.4	6.2	3.3	5.3	3.7	7.5	7.9	71.3
120th		Botswana	4.1	3.3	4.6	5.7	7.5	5.8	3.0	6.8	5.0	8.2	4.2	3.8	62.0
106th		Brazil	6.8	5.2	6.5	4.5	7.7	4.8	6.7	6.1	6.7	7.6	2.7	3.4	68.7
124th		Brunei Darussalam	4.8	7.4	5.6	3.8	7.8	4.7	8.0	1.7	7.4	3.4	1.9	3.3	59.8
133rd		Bulgaria	4.6	5.3	5.1	5.5	4.1	3.9	4.2	4.1	3.2	3.4	4.2	4.0	51.7
45th		Burkina Faso	8.5	7.8	4.2	6.6	7.9	7.5	6.8	8.4	5.9	8.8	6.3	7.8	86.5
17th		Burundi	8.5	7.9	7.6	8.1	7.0	6.0	8.9	7.7	8.9	9.4	8.7	8.7	97.4
53rd		Cambodia	6.5	8.6	6.6	5.5	6.5	7.5	8.5	7.5	7.8	6.5	5.4	7.1	84.0
23rd		Cameroon	8.0	9.1	8.4	6.7	7.5	7.5	8.5	8.4	7.6	8.1	8.0	7.5	95.3
168th		Canada	2.5	2.5	3.1	1.8	2.2	2.0	0.7	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.9	0.7	21.5
110th		Cape Verde	5.1	5.5	3.8	5.5	6.8	7.7	5.0	5.7	3.7	6.9	3.9	8.4	68.0
5th		Central African Republic	9.1	9.7	8.8	8.8	9.8	7.4	9.4	10.0	9.4	9.3	10.0	9.5	111.1
8th		Chad	9.5	9.5	7.7	9.0	9.3	8.6	8.8	9.7	8.8	10.0	9.3	8.0	108.3
150th		Chile	3.5	2.2	3.3	3.5	5.4	4.1	3.0	3.7	3.1	5.0	2.1	1.8	40.7
89th		China	5.9	7.2	7.6	4.1	7.0	4.9	8.6	5.4	8.5	6.2	4.6	2.4	72.4
71st		Colombia	6.6	7.6	7.0	4.5	7.3	5.9	6.0	5.6	6.7	6.3	7.4	5.7	76.6
57th		Comoros	6.4	8.0	5.1	7.9	7.2	7.1	7.0	7.9	6.0	7.3	5.0	7.7	82.6
6th		Congo Democratic Republic	9.1	9.8	10.0	8.1	8.5	7.0	9.6	9.5	9.8	9.6	10.0	9.7	110.7
29th		Congo Republic	7.0	6.7	7.5	7.3	7.8	7.7	9.0	9.2	8.5	8.2	7.5	6.8	93.1
144th		Costa Rica	3.5	3.8	3.9	4.3	5.0	4.4	2.1	3.7	1.6	3.0	3.6	4.2	43.2
25th		Cote d'Ivoire	7.7	9.1	7.8	6.8	7.7	7.3	7.6	8.5	7.6	8.2	7.5	8.7	94.6
138th		Croatia	3.2	4.4	5.5	5.6	3.0	4.4	2.6	2.5	3.3	3.2	6.7	4.3	48.7
119th		Cuba	4.9	7.0	3.7	4.0	5.1	4.9	7.6	4.4	7.2	5.6	3.7	4.8	62.9
121st		Cyprus	4.4	7.9	6.0	5.7	5.6	3.7	4.5	2.4	3.0	3.5	5.0	8.7	60.3
153rd		Czech Republic	2.9	5.3	5.1	4.3	2.4	2.5	5.0	2.3	2.2	1.1	3.5	2.4	39.0

THE FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2018


															
			C1	C2	C3	E1	E2	E3	P1	P2	P3	S1	S2	X1	Total
			SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX	
175th		Denmark	1.4	1.4	4.4	1.7	1.3	2.0	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.7	2.1	0.7	19.8
42nd		Djibouti	6.2	7.3	6.2	6.7	7.9	5.5	8.1	7.8	7.7	8.1	7.0	8.7	87.1
104th		Dominican Republic	6.1	6.2	5.5	5.2	5.6	6.8	6.5	6.6	5.6	7.0	3.0	5.1	69.2
82nd		Ecuador	6.5	8.2	7.0	6.0	6.7	5.5	6.2	6.2	4.5	6.0	5.4	6.0	74.2
36th		Egypt	8.2	8.8	8.9	7.9	5.7	5.2	8.3	4.6	9.9	6.6	7.0	7.6	88.7
96th		El Salvador	7.2	4.3	6.4	5.3	6.1	7.9	4.5	6.1	6.0	6.9	4.8	5.6	71.2
55th		Equatorial Guinea	6.2	8.2	6.0	6.2	8.4	5.2	9.8	8.0	8.9	7.6	4.2	4.7	83.4
19th		Eritrea	6.9	8.1	7.4	7.8	8.1	8.6	9.4	8.1	8.7	8.7	8.0	7.4	97.2
145th		Estonia	3.0	5.9	7.5	3.4	2.9	4.0	2.4	2.6	1.9	2.5	2.8	4.0	43.0
15th		Ethiopia	8.7	8.4	8.8	6.7	6.8	7.6	8.5	8.5	8.7	9.5	9.0	8.4	99.6
79th		Fiji	7.1	7.9	6.6	6.2	6.0	8.5	6.6	4.7	6.6	4.4	3.0	6.9	74.5
178th		Finland	2.2	1.4	1.5	3.2	0.7	2.3	0.9	0.7	0.7	1.1	2.2	1.0	17.9
160th		France	3.2	1.9	7.0	4.0	2.9	2.5	1.0	1.1	1.9	2.5	2.5	1.8	32.2
88th		Gabon	4.7	7.9	3.5	5.8	6.2	6.1	7.9	6.6	7.5	6.6	4.2	5.4	72.5
42nd		Gambia	6.6	7.7	3.5	8.7	6.6	8.2	8.3	7.5	8.9	8.1	6.3	6.7	87.1
83rd		Georgia	6.5	9.1	7.6	5.8	5.2	4.6	8.0	4.0	5.3	3.4	7.2	7.3	74.0
167th		Germany	2.0	2.6	4.9	1.9	2.7	2.0	0.7	0.9	0.8	1.7	4.9	0.7	25.8
108th		Ghana	4.3	4.9	4.1	6.0	6.3	8.1	3.9	7.5	5.0	6.7	4.7	6.6	68.1
128th		Greece	4.4	4.1	5.1	6.2	3.4	3.0	6.4	3.5	3.2	4.2	6.0	5.8	55.3
123rd		Grenada	5.5	5.6	3.6	5.8	4.6	8.2	5.2	3.6	3.0	4.5	2.9	7.4	59.9
59th		Guatemala	7.3	7.1	8.8	5.4	7.8	7.2	6.6	7.2	7.1	7.1	5.3	4.9	81.8
13th		Guinea	8.9	9.6	8.9	8.9	7.6	7.4	9.7	9.4	7.4	8.8	7.9	7.1	101.6
16th		Guinea Bissau	8.6	9.6	5.2	8.0	8.9	7.8	9.2	9.2	7.5	8.8	7.0	8.3	98.1
98th		Guyana	6.6	5.1	7.0	6.1	5.4	9.1	5.1	5.9	3.4	5.9	3.8	7.0	70.4
12th		Haiti	7.4	9.6	6.2	8.4	9.5	8.7	8.7	9.4	7.4	9.0	7.7	9.9	102.0
68th		Honduras	7.1	6.8	5.6	6.4	7.4	6.1	6.9	6.6	6.8	5.8	4.6	7.2	77.3
134th		Hungary	3.0	5.3	4.5	5.1	3.5	3.0	6.1	2.9	5.2	1.5	6.2	3.9	50.2
174th		Iceland	0.8	1.8	1.1	3.2	0.9	2.6	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.4	1.8	3.9	20.3
72nd		India	7.1	7.3	8.3	5.0	6.7	6.4	4.4	7.1	5.8	8.0	5.0	5.2	76.3
91st		Indonesia	6.2	7.0	7.2	4.8	5.5	7.2	4.8	5.6	7.3	6.7	5.1	4.9	72.3
52nd		Iran	7.2	9.6	9.3	6.4	5.6	6.2	9.2	4.2	9.2	5.0	6.2	6.2	84.3
11th		Iraq	9.0	9.6	9.3	6.3	7.0	7.4	9.2	8.3	8.4	8.7	9.6	9.4	102.2
173rd		Ireland	2.4	1.5	1.1	3.1	1.9	2.6	0.7	1.4	1.7	1.5	1.7	1.1	20.7
66th		Israel and West Bank	6.6	8.1	10.0	4.1	6.5	4.1	6.5	4.5	7.2	5.7	7.5	7.8	78.5
143rd		Italy	4.8	4.9	4.8	5.1	2.6	1.7	3.7	3.0	1.7	3.8	5.2	2.5	43.8
118th		Jamaica	6.8	3.7	3.1	6.7	4.8	8.4	4.5	6.1	5.8	4.7	3.0	5.5	63.1
158th		Japan	1.9	2.6	3.4	3.8	1.3	3.5	0.9	1.9	3.1	4.5	4.1	3.5	34.5
70th		Jordan	5.6	6.9	8.3	6.7	5.1	4.0	6.1	3.9	7.7	6.2	9.1	7.1	76.8
117th		Kazakhstan	4.9	7.6	7.9	5.9	3.9	3.3	8.4	3.7	7.0	4.2	2.7	3.9	63.4
17th		Kenya	8.4	9.6	8.9	7.0	7.6	7.5	8.1	8.3	7.3	8.9	8.0	7.8	97.4
126th		Kuwait	3.9	7.5	4.4	2.7	3.9	3.9	7.3	2.3	7.6	4.7	3.2	4.5	55.9
65th		Kyrgyz Republic	6.8	8.0	8.1	6.7	5.6	6.7	7.4	4.8	7.2	5.6	5.0	6.7	78.6
60th		Laos	5.2	8.3	6.4	5.5	6.2	7.7	8.9	6.7	7.6	7.0	5.4	5.8	80.7
142nd		Latvia	2.7	4.3	8.3	3.8	3.8	4.8	3.1	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.5	3.6	44.9
44th		Lebanon	8.4	9.6	8.2	6.1	5.5	5.3	7.3	5.4	7.3	5.3	9.0	9.4	86.8


															
			C1	C2	C3	E1	E2	E3	P1	P2	P3	S1	S2	X1	Total
			SA	FE	GG	EC	UD	HF	SL	PS	HR	DP	RD	EX	
61st		Lesotho	6.2	7.3	3.6	8.4	7.8	8.3	5.6	7.8	4.9	8.0	4.7	7.5	80.1
30th		Liberia	6.7	8.6	5.5	8.0	8.1	7.5	7.1	9.0	6.2	8.5	8.4	9.0	92.6
25th		Libya	9.3	9.4	7.8	8.0	5.3	6.3	9.8	6.7	9.4	4.6	8.0	10.0	94.6
152nd		Lithuania	2.9	3.0	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.3	2.4	3.2	2.2	2.5	2.2	4.3	39.4
170th		Luxembourg	1.4	3.4	2.8	1.3	1.3	1.8	0.7	1.8	1.0	1.3	3.2	0.8	20.8
112th		Macedonia	5.3	7.3	6.6	6.1	4.9	4.9	5.5	3.8	3.5	2.8	7.8	6.3	64.8
54th		Madagascar	7.2	7.8	3.8	7.6	9.1	7.0	6.8	8.9	5.8	9.0	4.2	6.5	83.6
47th		Malawi	4.5	8.1	5.6	8.1	8.0	7.7	6.4	8.3	6.2	9.4	5.5	7.7	85.5
116th		Malaysia	6.0	6.8	6.2	3.4	4.7	5.3	7.4	3.9	7.7	5.0	3.7	3.5	63.6
89th		Maldives	6.1	8.3	4.5	5.6	3.3	6.5	8.3	5.5	8.0	5.7	4.4	6.2	72.4
27th		Mali	9.3	5.4	7.9	7.6	7.3	8.6	6.1	8.5	7.3	8.0	8.2	9.5	93.6
155th		Malta	3.3	2.0	3.6	4.0	2.3	3.4	3.6	1.7	3.0	2.2	4.1	3.0	36.2
31st		Mauritania	6.6	8.8	6.7	7.4	6.5	7.2	8.2	8.8	7.8	8.8	7.7	7.7	92.2
151st		Mauritius	2.0	3.2	3.5	4.3	3.2	4.6	2.7	3.0	3.7	3.3	2.6	4.4	40.5
94th		Mexico	8.5	5.4	6.9	4.7	5.8	5.5	6.2	6.5	6.2	5.8	4.8	5.2	71.5
80th		Micronesia	4.3	5.6	3.7	8.5	8.0	9.9	5.2	5.7	3.6	6.6	3.6	9.8	74.4
102nd		Moldova	5.8	8.3	7.3	6.1	4.5	6.4	6.6	4.7	4.6	4.5	3.6	7.1	69.5
130th		Mongolia	3.3	5.5	3.5	4.9	6.1	3.5	4.0	5.1	4.4	4.8	2.7	7.0	54.9
128th		Montenegro	4.3	6.5	8.2	5.5	2.1	3.8	4.3	3.2	3.9	2.5	4.3	6.8	55.3
83rd		Morocco	5.5	6.6	8.2	5.1	5.9	8.0	6.9	4.9	6.5	4.9	5.8	5.7	74.0
36th		Mozambique	6.7	6.6	5.1	8.3	9.1	8.0	6.5	9.4	5.3	9.8	6.1	7.7	88.7
22nd		Myanmar	9.0	8.3	9.8	5.6	7.4	6.9	8.6	8.6	9.0	6.3	9.2	7.4	96.1
105th		Namibia	5.2	3.5	5.5	7.1	7.9	7.1	3.0	7.1	3.5	8.1	4.7	6.1	68.8
39th		Nepal	6.2	8.8	9.6	6.1	6.4	6.4	7.1	6.9	7.4	8.7	7.5	6.8	87.9
165th		Netherlands	1.8	3.4	4.5	2.4	1.9	2.5	1.0	0.8	1.0	2.2	3.5	1.2	26.2
169th		New Zealand	1.5	1.4	3.3	3.3	2.0	2.4	0.6	1.1	0.8	1.8	1.8	0.9	20.9
75th		Nicaragua	5.3	7.1	6.2	5.6	7.7	7.8	7.6	6.5	4.9	5.4	3.8	7.4	75.3
21st		Niger	8.4	8.9	7.7	7.3	8.2	7.6	7.0	9.4	6.8	9.1	8.0	7.8	96.2
14th		Nigeria	8.9	9.6	9.3	8.0	8.3	7.2	8.3	8.9	8.6	9.1	7.5	6.2	99.9
28th		North Korea	8.3	8.8	5.8	8.9	7.5	4.4	10.0	8.6	9.4	7.2	4.4	9.9	93.2
177th		Norway	1.8	1.1	3.4	2.0	1.0	1.4	0.6	0.8	0.9	1.3	2.9	1.1	18.3
132nd		Oman	3.9	6.6	2.6	4.6	4.5	2.8	7.1	3.2	7.8	4.5	2.4	2.6	52.6
20th		Pakistan	8.8	8.9	9.7	6.6	6.2	7.1	7.8	7.9	7.7	8.1	8.4	9.1	96.3
136th		Panama	5.5	2.2	5.6	2.9	7.1	4.9	3.0	4.6	4.0	4.4	2.8	2.4	49.5
51st		Papua New Guinea	6.9	7.1	6.0	6.1	9.1	7.4	6.5	9.1	7.3	7.8	4.9	6.5	84.8
101st		Paraguay	6.3	7.8	5.5	5.0	7.6	5.9	7.1	5.9	5.6	5.4	3.2	4.5	69.8
100th		Peru	6.8	6.9	7.7	3.5	7.1	7.1	6.9	6.4	4.0	6.5	4.0	3.2	70.1
47th		Philippines	9.8	8.0	8.2	5.2	5.4	6.3	7.5	6.4	7.1	7.5	7.2	6.9	85.5
148th		Poland	2.1	4.2	5.9	3.9	2.7	4.5	3.6	2.0	3.7	2.7	3.3	2.9	41.5
164th		Portugal	1.0	2.5	2.2	4.8	2.2	1.9	1.3	2.5	1.5	2.6	2.1	2.6	27.3
140th		Qatar	2.3	5.0	4.3	1.8	4.6	2.4	6.3	1.3	6.2	3.5	1.7	8.6	48.1
137th		Romania	2.7	5.7	6.5	4.6	3.9	4.2	5.5	3.7	3.8	2.9	2.6	3.3	49.4
69th		Russia	8.6	8.1	8.5	4.9	5.9	3.7	8.5	3.9	9.2	4.7	5.5	5.7	77.2
34th		Rwanda	6.0	8.0	9.7	6.3	8.0	7.4	7.0	7.1	6.9	7.7	8.0	7.2	89.3
111th		Samoa	4.4	5.1	4.2	6.6	4.6	9.4	5.2	4.6	4.0	5.4	2.6	9.5	65.5

THE FUND FOR PEACE FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2018

															Total
			C1 SA	C2 FE	C3 GG	E1 EC	E2 UD	E3 HF	P1 SL	P2 PS	P3 HR	S1 DP	S2 RD	X1 EX	
92nd		Sao Tome and Principe	5.0	6.3	4.2	8.5	6.3	8.8	5.3	5.6	3.0	6.3	4.7	8.2	72.1
99th		Saudi Arabia	6.0	8.5	8.1	4.4	4.7	3.9	8.3	3.5	9.0	5.0	4.4	4.4	70.2
62nd		Senegal	5.9	6.9	6.1	7.2	7.1	8.0	4.4	7.3	5.7	7.7	7.0	6.4	79.6
108th		Serbia	5.2	8.3	7.3	6.4	4.5	5.0	5.2	3.9	4.1	4.0	7.9	6.3	68.1
125th		Seychelles	6.1	6.0	4.2	3.8	5.2	6.0	5.2	2.4	3.5	4.8	2.9	6.7	56.8
35th		Sierra Leone	4.3	7.8	6.5	8.4	8.6	8.3	6.6	9.1	5.1	9.1	7.7	7.6	89.1
161st		Singapore	1.3	4.0	2.3	1.7	3.5	3.0	3.9	1.0	4.9	2.2	1.4	1.2	30.4
147th		Slovak Republic	2.1	5.0	6.6	4.3	3.2	3.9	4.3	2.1	2.5	2.0	3.5	3.0	42.5
162nd		Slovenia	1.3	2.0	4.5	3.5	3.1	3.3	2.4	1.3	1.2	2.0	3.7	2.0	30.3
56th		Solomon Islands	5.9	8.2	6.2	7.4	8.7	7.2	6.5	7.5	4.9	8.0	4.1	8.5	83.1
2nd		Somalia	9.7	10.0	9.0	8.9	9.3	9.5	9.1	9.3	9.6	10.0	9.7	9.1	113.2
85th		South Africa	6.4	6.6	6.4	7.1	7.2	5.8	6.8	7.0	4.3	6.9	5.1	3.3	72.9
156th		South Korea	2.4	3.9	2.6	2.0	2.7	3.7	3.9	1.6	3.2	2.6	1.9	5.3	35.7
1st		South Sudan	10.0	9.7	9.7	10.0	8.9	6.3	10.0	9.9	9.2	10.0	10.0	9.6	113.4
149th		Spain	3.1	7.2	5.8	4.9	3.2	1.6	6.8	1.9	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.7	41.4
50th		Sri Lanka	7.1	8.8	8.7	5.5	6.8	7.4	6.6	4.8	8.4	6.7	8.1	6.0	84.9
7th		Sudan	8.7	9.7	10.0	8.0	7.7	8.6	9.7	8.9	9.3	9.3	9.5	9.2	108.7
114th		Suriname	4.6	5.8	5.5	7.2	6.1	6.5	4.7	5.3	4.6	5.4	2.7	5.6	64.0
40th		Swaziland	6.0	6.8	3.1	9.8	8.1	7.3	8.6	7.8	8.8	9.1	4.6	7.6	87.5
170th		Sweden	2.4	1.8	1.8	1.6	1.6	1.2	0.8	0.9	0.9	1.7	5.2	0.9	20.8
176th		Switzerland	1.4	1.0	3.6	2.0	1.9	1.8	0.7	0.9	1.5	1.2	2.5	0.7	19.2
4th		Syria	9.9	9.9	9.9	8.5	7.8	8.1	9.9	9.3	9.9	8.2	10.0	10.0	111.4
63rd		Tajikistan	6.4	8.4	7.1	7.0	4.5	6.1	9.1	5.3	8.3	7.6	4.1	5.6	79.5
64th		Tanzania	5.4	5.7	4.9	6.3	7.4	7.6	5.8	8.7	6.0	8.3	6.4	6.9	79.4
77th		Thailand	8.7	9.4	8.2	3.4	5.0	5.0	7.6	4.1	8.0	6.5	5.6	3.5	75.0
38th		Timor-Leste	6.9	8.3	6.2	7.6	7.1	7.9	6.4	8.2	5.0	9.5	6.0	9.2	88.3
49th		Togo	6.8	7.6	4.9	6.7	8.2	7.5	8.1	8.5	6.8	7.5	6.9	5.7	85.2
131st		Trinidad and Tobago	6.5	5.6	3.9	4.5	4.6	7.9	4.2	4.0	3.8	4.2	2.6	2.8	54.6
92nd		Tunisia	8.0	7.8	7.4	6.6	5.0	6.0	6.6	4.1	6.2	3.9	4.4	6.1	72.1
58th		Turkey	8.0	9.1	10.0	4.5	5.4	4.9	7.7	4.9	7.8	5.2	9.3	5.4	82.2
86th		Turkmenistan	6.0	7.8	6.3	4.8	6.7	5.0	9.7	5.3	8.7	5.4	3.2	3.8	72.6
24th		Uganda	7.1	8.6	8.6	6.0	7.3	7.6	8.3	8.0	7.9	8.9	9.0	7.8	95.1
86th		Ukraine	7.4	8.0	6.4	6.6	3.9	4.9	7.9	3.9	6.5	3.9	4.9	8.3	72.6
146th		United Arab Emirates	3.4	3.6	3.1	2.5	3.1	2.8	6.6	1.9	7.9	3.7	2.1	2.1	42.8
159th		United Kingdom	3.2	5.0	6.4	3.6	3.7	2.4	1.8	1.3	1.8	2.1	1.9	1.0	34.3
154th		United States	3.5	5.8	6.1	2.3	4.0	2.2	2.4	1.3	3.3	3.3	2.1	1.5	37.7
157th		Uruguay	4.1	2.7	2.3	3.5	3.8	4.1	0.7	2.8	3.1	3.5	2.4	2.5	35.4
67th		Uzbekistan	7.1	8.8	6.9	6.1	6.7	5.8	9.5	4.7	8.7	5.4	5.3	4.1	79.1
46th		Venezuela	7.4	8.5	7.3	8.3	6.6	6.0	9.0	7.8	9.0	5.7	5.1	5.5	86.2
107th		Vietnam	4.3	6.9	5.7	4.8	4.7	6.2	8.3	4.4	7.7	5.8	4.4	5.2	68.4
3rd		Yemen	9.9	10.0	9.5	9.6	8.2	7.2	9.7	9.7	9.8	9.6	9.5	10.0	112.7
41st		Zambia	4.9	5.9	5.6	7.8	9.3	7.6	8.0	7.6	7.7	9.5	6.4	6.9	87.2
10th		Zimbabwe	9.1	10.0	7.0	8.6	8.2	7.6	9.7	8.9	8.5	8.9	8.2	7.6	102.3

FRAGILE STATES INDEX 2008 2018
DECADE TRENDS





DECADE TRENDS: 2008-2018






SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT

	-16.2	Moldova
	-15.7	Cuba
	-14.3	Uzbekistan
	-13.9	Belarus
	-13.6	Turkmenistan
	-13.0	Bosnia & Herzegovina
	-12.7	Cape Verde
	-12.7	Seychelles
	-12.4	Colombia
	-12.4	Trinidad & Tobago
	-12.1	Malta
	-12.0	Serbia
	-11.5	Germany
	-11.1	Bhutan
	-11.0	Indonesia
	-10.7	Croatia
	-10.7	Sri Lanka
	-10.5	Bahamas
	-10.5	Romania
	-10.3	Barbados
	-10.2	Kyrgyz Republic
	-10.2	Zimbabwe

STRONG IMPROVEMENT

	-10.0	Bangladesh
	-10.0	Cote d'Ivoire
	-9.8	Georgia
	-9.8	Macedonia
	-9.6	Albania
	-9.6	Latvia
	-9.4	Cyprus
	-9.4	Tajikistan
	-9.3	Lithuania
	-9.3	Solomon Islands
	-9.2	Dominican Republic
	-9.1	Grenada
	-9.1	Panama
	-9.0	Bolivia
	-9.0	Kazakhstan
	-8.9	Lebanon
	-8.7	Brunei Darussalam
	-8.5	Antigua & Barbuda
	-8.4	Iraq
	-8.4	Suriname
	-8.4	United Arab Emirates
	-8.0	Estonia
	-8.0	Laos
	-8.0	Maldives
	-7.9	China
	-7.7	Costa Rica
	-7.5	Pakistan
	-7.4	Malawi
	-7.4	Peru
	-7.1	Luxembourg
	-6.9	Samoa
	-6.8	Bulgaria
	-6.8	Slovenia
	-6.7	Saudi Arabia
	-6.5	Belize
	-6.4	Azerbaijan
	-6.4	Nicaragua
	-6.3	Nepal
	-6.3	Slovak Republic
	-6.2	Sao Tome & Principe
	-6.2	Vietnam
	-6.1	Ecuador
	-6.1	Kuwait
	-6.1	Poland

SOME IMPROVEMENT

	-6.0	Uruguay
	-5.5	Timor-Leste
	-5.1	Israel / West Bank
	-4.9	South Korea
	-4.8	Canada
	-4.6	Equatorial Guinea
	-4.6	Qatar
	-4.5	North Korea
	-4.5	Portugal
	-4.3	El Salvador
	-4.3	Sudan
	-4.2	Myanmar
	-4.1	Namibia
	-3.9	Botswana
	-3.8	Australia
	-3.6	Malaysia
	-3.4	Burkina Faso
	-3.2	Sierra Leone
	-3.1	Czech Republic
	-2.9	Mongolia
	-2.9	Singapore
	-2.6	Chad
	-2.6	France
	-2.6	Jamaica
	-2.5	Gabon
	-2.5	Paraguay
	-2.5	Russia
	-2.1	Fiji

MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT*		MARGINAL WORSENING*		SOME WORSENING		WORSENING	
	-2.0 Algeria		+0.2 Papua New Guinea		+2.1 Philippines		+6.1 Mauritania
	-1.9 Mauritius		+0.3 Austria		+2.4 Honduras		+6.5 Tunisia
	-1.8 Cambodia		+0.3 Tanzania		+2.7 Haiti		+6.8 Guinea-Bissau
	-1.8 Guyana		+0.4 Micronesia		+2.9 Benin		+6.8 Turkey
	-1.8 Morocco		+0.7 Belgium		+3.0 Comoros		+6.9 Madagascar
	-1.7 Denmark		+0.8 Ireland		+3.3 Burundi		+7.1 Djibouti
	-1.6 Lesotho		+1.0 Sweden		+3.4 India		+7.4 Central African Republic
	-1.6 Togo		+1.1 Brazil		+3.5 Ethiopia		+7.5 Swaziland
	-1.4 Iran		+1.2 Afghanistan		+3.5 Ghana		+7.6 Bahrain
	-1.2 Armenia		+1.2 Guatemala		+3.9 Italy		+8.3 Venezuela
	-1.1 Netherlands		+1.3 Rwanda		+4.0 Congo (Dem. Rep.)		+8.7 Senegal
	-1.1 Switzerland		+1.4 United Kingdom		+4.0 Kenya		+9.8 Eritrea
	-1.0 Somalia		+1.5 Norway		+4.1 Cameroon		+9.9 Greece
	-1.0 Uganda		+1.6 Liberia		+4.2 Nigeria	SIGNIFICANT WORSENING	
	-0.7 Hungary		+1.7 Niger		+4.4 Chile		+10.2 The Gambia
	-0.7 Mexico		+1.8 Ukraine		+4.7 Argentina		+10.2 South Africa
	-0.6 Iceland				+4.8 Japan		+11.9 Mozambique
	-0.6 Thailand				+4.9 United States	CRITICAL WORSENING	
	-0.5 Finland				+5.2 Oman		+17.3 Yemen
	-0.5 Jordan				+5.6 Angola		+18.0 Mali
	-0.5 Montenegro				+5.6 Zambia		+21.3 Syria
	-0.5 New Zealand						+24.6 Libya
	-0.3 Congo (Republic)						
	-0.2 Guinea						
	-0.2 Spain						
	0.0 Egypt						

* Also includes countries that recorded insignificant change, denoted by *italics*.

THE FUND FOR PEACE

The Fund for Peace (FFP) works to prevent conflict and promote sustainable security globally by building relationships and trust across diverse sectors. Founded in 1957, FFP is an independent, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. and Abuja, Nigeria.



Our objective is to create practical tools and approaches for conflict mitigation that are contextually relevant, timely, and useful to those who can help create greater stability. Our approach brings together local knowledge and expertise with innovative tools and technologies to help anticipate and alleviate the conditions that lead to conflict.

To date, FFP has worked in over 60 countries with a wide range of partners in all sectors. These include governments, regional and international organizations, the military, non-governmental organizations, academics, journalists, civil society networks, and the private sector. Our projects include supporting grassroots organizations, developing national dialogues, building the capacities of regional organizations, working to prevent gender-based violence, and taking leadership roles in international initiatives.

Combining social science techniques with information technology, we have produced the patented Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), a content analysis software product that provides a conceptual framework and a data gathering technique for measuring conflict risk. Annually, we produce The Fragile States Index, a ranking of 178 countries across 12 indicators of the risks and vulnerabilities faced by individual nations.

FFP specializes in building early warning networks and systems in complex environments. Working directly with local and international

partners, we collect and analyze local, national and regional data and trends. This information is then made publicly available in order to foster more informed decisions and policy making, as well as better coordinated approaches to peacebuilding. In addition to our early warning work with civil society, governments, and regional bodies from around the world, we also advise companies operating in complex environments on how to ensure they operate responsibly, respecting human rights and promoting greater stability.

Most importantly, in all our work, we focus on building capacity among local actors so they can develop and implement informed and locally relevant solutions. We believe that is key to truly sustainable human security.

CONFLICT RISK ASSESSMENT ADVISORY SERVICES

FFP provides conflict risk assessment Advisory Services for a variety of clients including governments, multilateral institutions and companies. FFP is able to provide tailored assessments that focus on the regional-, national-, or provincial-level. FFP also provides training programs for policymakers and field practitioners who wish to apply the CAST conflict assessment framework to assess conflict drivers and analyze risk. Further, FFP has assisted some clients in developing specialized, made-for-purpose conflict and risk assessment tools, frameworks, and platforms, such as for organizations that are focused on specific regions, or for investors who seek to better analyze the social, economic and political risks of potential investments.

For more information, contact us at inquiries@fundforpeace.org.

THE FUND FOR PEACE IN THE FIELD

Right: Conflict Assessment workshop in Kenya.

Below: Violence Against Women & Girls Workshop in Nigeria.

Far Below Left: Community focus group in Mali.

Far Below Right: Interviews with traditional leaders in Cote d'Ivoire.



Left: CAST training.

Below: Security and human rights assessment in Cameroon.



Above: Community Engagement in Papua New Guinea.

Right: Multi-stakeholder human rights dialogues in Ghana.





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